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I. 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. 
§ 78-2-2(3) (j) (2001) . 
II. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The issues presented for decision by this Court are: 
1. Whether Appellant ("Ms. Womack") properly denied 
Appellee's ("Ms. Snow's") $5,000 exempt property 
because of the statute of limitations, insufficiency of 
estate assets and Ms. Snow's receipt of various items 
of personal property from the estate. (R. 180-82). 
2. Whether the trial court erred in granting Ms. Snow's 
Motion for Partial Summary Judgment concerning the 
interpretation of five key provisions in the trust: 
A. whether Ms. Womack was only entitled to a life 
estate or whether she obtained a remainder 
interest; (R. 583). 
B. whether Ms. Womack's use of the trust assets was 
limited to only the interest generated by the 
trust principal; (R. 583). 
C. whether Ms. Womack was within her rights to use 
trust principal to move the mobile home; (R. 583). 
D. whether Ms. Womack, as trustee, was entitled to 
have attorney's fees paid from the estate pursuant 
to the express terms of the trust; (R. 583) . 
E. whether Ms. Womack was entitled to have the lien 
on the van paid off from estate assets pursuant to 
the terms of the trust. (R. 583). 
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3. Whether the trial court erred in failing to allow 
extrinsic evidence of the testator's intent and 
surrounding circumstances to assist in interpreting 
ambiguities in the trust. (R. 583). 
Because disposition of a case on summary judgment 
denies the benefit of a trial on the merits, the appellate 
court must review the evidence in the light most favorable 
to the losing party. The appellate court must affirm only 
where it appears there is no genuine dispute as to any 
material issues of fact, or where, even according to the 
facts as contended by the losing party, the moving party is 
entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Hunt v. ESI Enq'q, 
Inc., 808 P.2d 1137 (Utah Ct. App.), cert, denied, 826 P.2d 
651 (Utah 1991). 
Since a summary judgment is granted as a matter of law 
rather than fact, the appellate court is free to reappraise 
the trial court's legal conclusions. Barber v. Farmers Ins. 
Exch., 751 P.2d 248 (Utah Ct. App. 1988); Winegar v. Froerer 
Corp., 813 P.2d 104 (Utah 1991). 
If a contract is ambiguous and the trial court makes 
findings of fact from extrinsic evidence, the appellate 
court's review is strictly limited. However, if the 
contract is ambiguous but the case is decided on summary 
judgment, the appellate court can affirm only if the 
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undisputed material facts concerning the parties' intent 
demonstrate that the successful litigant's position is 
correct as a matter of law. Fashion Place Inv., Ltd. v. Salt 
Lake County/Salt Lake County Mental Health, 776 P.2d 941 
(Utah Ct. App.), cert, denied, 783 P.2d 53 (Utah 1989). 
III. 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES 
Among the determinative statutes are Utah Code Ann. §§ 
75-1-201, 75-2-402 (1988), 75-2-405(1), 75-3-803 and 75-7-
402. The full text of the statutes is provided in the 
addendum, while the more pertinent provisions of the 
statutes are set forth below as follows: 
1. Utah Code Ann. § 75-1-201. General definitions. 
See addendum. 
2. Utah Code Ann. § 75-2-402 (1988). Exempt Property 
- Amount. 
In addition to the homestead allowance, 
the surviving spouse of a decedent who 
was domiciled in this state is entitled 
from the estate to value not exceeding 
$5,000 in excess of any security 
interests therein in household furniture, 
automobiles, furnishings, appliances, and 
personal effects. If there is no 
surviving spouse, children of the 
decedent are entitled jointly to the same 
value....These rights are in addition to 
any benefit or share passing to the 
surviving spouse or children by intestate 
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succession, but is chargeable against any 
share passing by the will of the decedent 
unless the will provides otherwise. 
3. Utah Code Ann. § 75-2-405(1). Source, 
determination and documentation. 
...the surviving spouse, guardians of minor 
children, or children who are adults may select 
property of the estate as ...estate property.'" 
4. Utah Code Ann. § 75-3-803. 
See addendum. 
5. Utah Code Ann. § 75-7-402 
See addendum. 
IV. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This appeal is to review the Memorandum Decision, 
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, Final Decision and 
Order of the Third District Court concerning Ms. Snow's 
Motion for Summary Judgment on Exempt Property Claim and 
Motion for Partial Summary Judgment granted by the District 
Court. (R. 153-57, 180-84, 223-24, 489-95, 516-17). 
V. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. Richard D. Snow ("Decedent") executed The Richard D. 
Snow Family Trust ("trust") on November 18, 1993, for the 
purposes of administering his estate during his life and after 
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his death. At the same time, Mr. Snow executed his Last Will and 
Testament. (R. 67-100) . 
2. Mr. Snow executed an Amendment to the Richard D. Snow 
Family Trust ("amendment") on September 15, 1995. The Trust and 
Amendment designated Ruby Womack, who had lived with Mr. Snow and 
who had been his companion for years, to act as Trustee upon 
Decedent's incapacity or death. Mr. Snow's Will designated Ms. 
Womack as personal representative. (R. 291-373). 
3. Mr. Snow died on January 28, 1998. (R. 67-100). 
4. Based on the language of the amended trust and Mr. 
Snow's expressed intent prior to his death, Ms. Womack believed 
that she had complete discretion to use the trust assets. 
Accordingly, Ms. Womack used trust funds to: (1) pay the balance 
of the loan on the van than was granted to her pursuant to the 
trust; (2) pay moving expenses to relocate the mobile home she 
and Richard Snow had occupied prior to his death which was 
granted to her by the trust; and (3) pay attorney's fees incurred 
in administering the trust and to defend this action. (R. 291-
373, 583) . 
5. Pursuant to a "Letter of Disposition of Personal 
Effects," attached as part of Schedule A to the amended trust, 
Marcia Snow, Mr. Snow's only living child, received personal 
property which included jewelry, crystal, oil paintings, and 
other belongings. (R. 291-373). 
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6. On June 2, 1998, Ms. Womack filed an Inventory of 
the property owned by decedent Mr. Snow on the date of his death. 
The Inventory listed "Miscellaneous Personal Effects," referenced 
the schedules which granted the specific bequests and listed 
their value as unknown. (R. 291-373). 
7. On January 20, 1999, Ms. Snow initiated an action in 
the Third District Court and filed a Petition for Formal 
Appointment of Special Administrator, Removal of Trustee, and 
Request for Accounting of Estate and Trust Assets; for an Order 
from the Court Appointing Marcia L. Snow as the Special 
Administrator of the Estate, to Act without Bond; that the Court 
Order an Accounting of the Assets of the Estate and Trust, 
Including but not Limited to All Distributions made from the 
Estate or Trust, be Provided by Ruby Womack from the time of 
Decedent's Death up to the Present Date; for an Order Removing 
Ruby Womack as Trustee; and for an Order Appointing Marcia L. 
Snow as Tirustee of the Trust. (R. 1-7) . 
8. On July 14, 1999, Ms. Snow filed a Claim of Exempted 
Property in the amount of $10,000 pursuant to U.C.A. § 75-2-403. 
(R. 180-82) . 
9* On July 30, 1999, Ms. Womack denied Ms. Snow's claim 
as being untimely and without merit. (R. 180-182) . 
10. Chris Welch and Jim Goss have personal knowledge as 
to statements the decedent, Mr. Snow, made regarding his intent 
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and wishes concerning the disposition of his trust estate. Mr. 
Snow intended for Ms. Womack to be the sole beneficiary and the 
person in charge of all of his affairs. He did not want to 
include his children in the disposition of his estate. He did 
not want Ms. Snow to interfere with the administration of his 
estate. (R. 291-373) . 
11. Mr. Snow had an estranged and limited relationship 
with Ms. Snow because she refused to help and visit or come 
around when her mother was dying of cancer. (R. 291-373). 
12. The trial court did not consider the testator's 
intent or any extrinsic evidence of the surrounding 
circumstances or statements made by witnesses concerning the 
testator's intent in reaching its decision. (R. 583). 
13. There has been no probate of the decedent's estate 
and no personal representative has been appointed. 
VI. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The trial court made several mistakes of law that 
should be overturned by this court. First, the trial court 
granted Ms. Snow's $5,000 exempt property claim despite the 
fact that no probate estate existed and that Ms. Snow had 
already received personal property from the estate in an 
unknown value. Instead of hearing evidence on the value of 
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this property to determine whether it satisfied the $5,000 
claim, the court found that the property had little or no 
value because the value was unknown. (R. 180-82). 
Second, the court erred in interpreting several key 
provisions in the trust. The court found that Ms. Snow was 
entitled to a remainder interest where the trust was silent 
on this issue and despite clear language granting a 
remainder interest to Ms. Womack. The court also found that 
the word "income" referred only to interest generated from 
principal as opposed to money used for living expenses. The 
court also limited the trustee's discretion in using 
principal from the trust and paying certain debts. Finally, 
the court limited the trustee's reimbursement for attorney's 
fees despite the express language in the trust and relevant 
statutes. 
In making the errors described above, the court failed 
to consider the testator's intent when interpreting 
ambiguous provisions in the trust. The court looked to 
rules of statutory construction but did not consider 
evidence of the surrounding circumstances or statements from 
witnesses with personal knowledge concerning the decedent's 
intent. Based on the above factors, this court should 
8 
reverse the trial court and remand this case for further 
fact determinations consistent with applicable law. 
VII. 
ARGUMENT 
A. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT GRANTED MS. SNOW'S 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN THE AMOUNT OF 
$5,000 ON HER EXEMPT PROPERTY CLAIMS UNDER 75-2-
402 BECAUSE OF THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS, 
INSUFFICIENCY OF ESTATE ASSETS AND BECAUSE SHE 
RECEIVED PERSONAL PROPERTY FROM THE TRUST. 
Section 75-2-402 provides: 
In addition to the homestead allowance, the 
surviving spouse of a decedent who was domiciled 
in this state is entitled from the estate to value 
not exceeding $5,000 in excess of any security 
interests therein in household furniture, 
automobiles, furnishings, appliances, and personal 
effects. If there is no surviving souse, children 
of the decedent are entitled jointly to the same 
value. . . These rights are in addition to any 
benefit or share passing to the surviving spouse 
or children by intestate succession, but is 
chargeable against any share passing by the will 
of the decedent unless the will provides 
otherwise.l 
lrThis version of 75-2-402 was in effect at the time of 
Mr. Snow's death. A new version of the statute was enacted 
by by Laws 1998, chp. 39, section 41, but did not become 
effective until July 1, 1998. The text of the new statute is 
contained in 75-2-403 and states: "In addition to the 
homestead allowance, the decedent's surviving spouse is 
entitled from the estate to a value, not exceeding $10,000 
in excess of any security interests therein, in household 
furniture, automobiles, furnishings, appliances, ad personal 
effects. If there is no surviving souse, the decedent's 
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1) MS. SNOW IS BARRED BY THE TIME LIMITATIONS SET 
FORTH IN UTAH CODE ANN. § 75-3-803 FROM FILING 
HER EXEMPT PROPERTY CLAIM. 
Because Ms. Snow did not file her exempt property claim 
within the time period prescribed by law, she is barred from 
making this claim against the trust. Utah Code Ann. § 75-3-
803 provides in pertinent part: 
(3) All claims against a decedent's estate which 
arise at or after the death of the decedent, 
including claims of the state and any of its 
subdivisions, whether due or to become due, 
absolute or contingent, liquidated or 
unliquidated, founded on contract, tort, or other 
legal basis are barred against the estate, the 
personal representative, and the heirs and 
devisees of the decedent, unless presented as 
follows: 
(a) a claim based on a contract with the personal 
representative within three months after 
performance by the personal representative is due; 
or 
(b) any other claim within the later of three 
months after it arises, or the time specified in 
Subsection (1)(a). 
children are entitled jointly to the same value. . . . 
Unless otherwise provided by the will or governing 
instrument, the exempt property allowance is chargeable 
against any benefit or share passing to the surviving 
spouse, if any, or if there is no surviving spouse, to the 
decedent's children, by the will of the decedent, by 
intestate succession, by way of elective share, and by way 
of nonprobate transfers as defined in Sections 75-2-205 and 
75-2-206." 
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As used in this section, "claims" include, "liabilities 
of the decedent ...whether arising in contract, in tort, or 
otherwise, and liabilities of the estate which arise at or 
after the death of the decedent." Utah Code Ann. § 75-1-
201. Here, Ms. Snow's claim is for an exempt property 
allowance under the Utah Uniform Probate Code arising at the 
time of decedent's death. As such, to be valid Ms. Snow's 
claim must have been submitted to the decedent's Personal 
Representative within three months of the decedent's death 
pursuant to the above statute. 
Ms. Snow failed to bring her claim of exempt property 
until July 14, 1999. (R. 180-82). This is a period of 
nearly 18 months in which Petitioner waited to bring an 
exempt property claim against the estate. As noted in the 
case of Jones v. State Tax Comm'n, such claims must be 
filed, after proper notice, within the time limit or be 
forever barred. 104 P.2d 210 (1940). Because Ms. Snow 
failed to present her claim against the estate within the 
three month time limit imposed by Section 75-3-803, Ms. 
Snow's claim is forever barred. 
2) MS. SNOW'S EXEMPT PROPERTY CLAIM SHOULD NOT 
HAVE BEEN GRANTED BECAUSE DECEDENT'S ESTATE 
HAD NO ASSETS FROM WHICH TO SATISFY HER CLAIM. 
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At the decedent's death, he did not have a probate 
estate from which Ms, Snow's claim might be satisfied 
because he did not own any assets of value. Under Utah Code 
Ann. § 75-2-405(1), "the surviving spouse, guardians of 
minor children, or children who are adults may select 
property of the estate as ...exempt property." The UUPC 
defines "estate" to include only, "the property of the 
decedent...whose affairs are subject to this Title." Utah 
Code Ann. § 75-1-201 (2001). (Emphasis added). 
Nearly four and one-half years prior to his death, the 
decedent created, funded, and properly executed The Richard 
D. Snow Family Trust. (R. 67-100). Because the purposes of 
this trust were to create a mechanism by which the decedent 
would be taken care of in the event he became incapacitated 
and to distribute the decedent's possessions in a 
predetermined manner after he no longer needed use of the 
items, substantially all of the decedent's assets and 
possessions were transferred to the trustee of the trust. 
(Exhibit "A"). The duty of the trustee was to manage and 
distribute according to the terms of the trust. Id. 
Under very well established trust law, assets 
transferred to a trustee to be managed and distributed 
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according to the terms of a valid trust document are no 
longer the possessions of the grantor and therefore are not 
part of the grantor's estate at death. Horn v. First 
Security Bank of Utah, 548 P.2d 1265 (Utah 1976) . Despite 
this, Ms. Snow is attempting to include the trust in her 
claim against the estate. 
Under Sections 75-2-405(1) and 75-1-201 of the Utah 
Uniform Probate Code, assets other than those belonging to 
the estate are not available for satisfaction of exempt 
property claims. Because the probate estate contained no 
assets of value, Ms. Snow's exempt property claim against 
the estate should be denied. 
3) MS. SNOW RECEIVED ITEMS OF DECEDENT'S PERSONAL 
PROPERTY UNDER THE TRUST THAT MAY BE WORTH 
MORE THAN THE $5,000 EXEMPT PROPERTY 
ALLOWANCE. 
Ms. Snow received property from the trust worth a 
substantial sum. (R. 291-373). The items Ms. Snow was 
entitled to receive under the trust include crystal pieces, 
electronic equipment, furniture, jewelry, an oil painting, 
and personal memorabilia. Id. The aggregate value of these 
items is not known, however, it is very likely that the 
value exceeds the $5,000 exempt property allowance. (R. 291-
373) . 
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The court below determined that, based on the Inventory 
filed by Ms. Womack, the property received by Ms. Snow did 
not have a value of $5,000. The court stated that the 
Inventory specified that the property had little or no 
value. (R. 180-82). Here, the court was in error because 
the inventory lists the value of this property as unknown. 
Nowhere does it state that the property had little or no 
value. (R. 291-373) . 
The only way to determine the actual value of these 
items is through an evidentiary hearing on this issue. This 
court should remand this case and specifically this issue to 
the trial court for a determination of the value of the 
property received by Ms. Snow in order to establish whether 
Ms. Snow's exempt property claim should have been granted. 
B) THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING MS. SNOW'S 
MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT CONCERNING THE 
INTERPRETATION OF FIVE KEY PROVISIONS IN THE 
TRUST. 
1) PURSUANT TO THE TRUST AMENDMENT, MS. WOMACK 
WAS ENTITLED TO A LIFE ESTATE AND REMAINDER 
INTEREST IN THE DECEDENT'S MOBILE HOME. 
The first page of the amendment, numbered paragraph 1 
of the Special Provisions states that "Ruby Womack may live 
in the mobile home, Guredon, as long as she desires or until 
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she remarries or dies." (Exhibit "A"). This bequest 
provides a life estate in favor of Ms. Womack, which can be 
terminated on the occurrence of any one of the following 
three events: (1) Ms. Womack's death; (2) Ms. Womack's 
remarriage; or (3) Ms. Womack's ceasing to live in the 
mobile home. 
Paragraph three of the amendment provides, "The 
remainder of the trust estate shall be held in trust to 
provide Ruby Womack with income. Ruby shall have complete 
discretion in the use of the trust estate." The above 
language creates a remainder interest for Ms. Womack and 
makes no mention of a remainder interest for Ms. Snow. The 
"remainder" here is a future interest vested in Ms. Womack, 
a transferee that will become possessory upon the expiration 
of all prior interests. See Wills, Trusts & Estates, 
Dukeminier, p. 751 (Little Brown 1995). 
Upon the expiration of the life estate in the mobile 
home, the remainder interest will vest in Ms. Womack. Thus, 
under the express provisions of the trust amendment, Ms. 
Womack was given a life estate with a remainder interest to 
be used in her sole discretion. There is no language in the 
amendment granting a remainder interest to Ms. Snow. 
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Therefore, Ms. Snow has no right to standing as a 
beneficiary where the language of the trust excludes Ms. 
Snow from any such claim. 
2) MS. WOMACK'S USE OF THE TRUST ASSETS WAS NOT 
LIMITED TO ONLY THE INTEREST GENERATED BY THE 
TRUST PRINCIPAL BECAUSE THE TRUST PROVIDED MS. 
WOMACK WITH INCOME IN HER SOLE DISCRETION. 
In addition to creating a remainder interest for Ms. 
Womack, the above language in paragraph three of the 
amendment also provides Ms. Womack with income and complete 
discretion in the use of the trust estate. The above 
language creates a discretionary trust for Ms. Womack in the 
use of the trust estate. The decedent expressly gave this 
discretionary power to the beneficiary, Ms. Womack, rather 
than the trustee. This power is equivalent to a general 
power of appointment. Ms. Womack has the legal right to 
appoint as much of the income and principal of the trust up 
to the whole as she desires. 
The plain language of the amendment indicates that the 
trust estate is to be used to provide Ms. Womack with 
income. If the decedent had intended to provide Ms. Womack 
with the trust's income, as Ms. Snow claims, he could have 
easily used that language, but he did not. 
Ms. Snow's claim that the term "income" has a different 
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meaning than the meaning relied upon by Ms. Womack indicates 
that a "latent ambiguity" may exist in the decedent's 
express language. Whether an ambiguity exists is a question 
of law. Wineaar v. Froerer Corp., 813 P.2d 104, 108 (Utah 
1991). The general rules of construction of written 
instruments apply to construction of trust instruments. 
Makoff v. Makoff, 528 P.2d 797, 798 (Utah 1974). A 
provision is ambiguous if it is capable of more than one 
reasonable interpretation because of uncertain meanings of 
terms. Wineqar at 108. Here, the decedent's language has 
two (2) apparent and reasonable meanings: 
1. The first meaning, as argued by Ms. Snow, is that the 
decedent merely meant for Ms. Womack to be entitled to the 
trust's income, which amounts to a little over $300 per year. (R. 
583) . 
2. The second meaning, relied upon by Ms. Womack, is that 
she was entitled to income from the trust, whether from interest 
or principal, to supplement her living expenses. R. 291-373). 
Ms. Snow relies on Utah Code Ann. § 22-3-4 in her claim 
that the word income means interest generated from 
principal. (R. 583). Ms. Snow claims that this statutory 
definition should prevail in this case. However, the common 
meaning of the word income is money used for expenses. If 
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someone says, "I'm going to provide you with income," they 
don't mean the interest generated from some principal 
account, they mean money that they can use for whatever they 
wish. 
Because both interpretations of income are reasonable, 
the trial court should have looked to extrinsic evidence to 
determine the decedent's intent in using the word income, 
but instead relied on rules of statutory construction 
without allowing evidence of the testator's intent. See 
Section C. supra and R. 583). Because the trial court used 
rules of statutory construction, a determination of the 
decedent's intent should have also be made. As stated by 
this court in Makoff v. Makoff: 
The general rules of construction of written 
instruments apply to the construction of trust 
instruments, and those rules require a 
determination of the intention of the settlor 
where the creation of the trust is a unilateral 
matter. 
528 P.2d 797 (Utah 1374). 
Here, the trial court admitted to resorting to rules of 
construction to aid in interpreting the trust, however the 
court made no inquiry and received no evidence concerning 
the testator's intent to assist the court in construing the 
trust. This resulted in a decision that was based on 
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speculation rather than the actual intent of the testator. 
Because the extrinsic evidence of surrounding circumstances 
and testimony from witnesses shows that the decedent 
intended to support Ms. Womack while limiting Ms. Snow's 
access to the trust, the court's decision was in error. 
3) PURSUANT TO THE EXPRESS PROVISIONS OF THE 
TRUST, MS. WOMACK WAS WITHIN HER RIGHTS TO USE 
TRUST PRINCIPAL TO MOVE THE MOBILE HOME. 
There are two sections of the trust that grant broad 
powers to Ms. -Womack, as trustee and beneficiary, to expend 
money from the trust. The first section, discussed 
previously, is in paragraph three of the amendment where it 
states, "Ruby shall have complete discretion in the use of 
the trust estate." The second section is found in Article 
VIII of the trust where it states: 
The Trustee shall have full power to do everything 
in administering these trusts that they deem to be 
for the best interests of the beneficiaries 
(whether or not it be authorized or appropriate 
for fiduciaries but for this broad grant of 
authority), including power to determine whether 
and to what extent expenditures should be charged 
against principal or income. 
(Emphasis added). 
Here, Ms. Womack determined that it was in the best 
interests of the beneficiaries to move the mobile home. 
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Because of Ms. Womack's age, she is unable to perform all of 
the maintenance and repairs on the mobile home. Ms. Womack 
moved the mobile home closer to her children so that they 
could help her with the upkeep and maintenance. Assistance 
with the upkeep and maintenance of the mobile home benefits 
all beneficiaries and was within the rights and prudent 
judgment of Ms. Womack as trustee. Under either of the 
above provisions in the trust, Ms. Womack should be allowed 
to make this expenditure. 
A trustee's discretion is generally broadly construed. 
Ward v. Nationsbank of Virginia, N.A., 507 S.E.2d 616 (Va. 
1998). The limitation on this is that, "his actions must be 
an exercise of good faith and reasonable judgment to promote 
the trust's purpose." .Id., (citation omitted). Here, Ms. 
Womack's broad discretion was not a breach of good faith or 
reasonable judgment to promote the trust's purpose. The 
primary purpose of the trust was to provide for Ms. Womack 
while giving her the broadest possible discretion. In 
moving the mobile home, Ms. Womack was within the trust's 
purpose of providing for her as primary beneficiary. 
Therefore, this court should find that Ms. Womack's actions 
in moving the mobile home were within her rights as trustee. 
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4) MS. WOMACK IS ENTITLED TO HAVE HER ATTORNEY'S 
FEES PAID OUT OF THE ESTATE BASED ON UTAH CODE 
ANN. § 75-7-402, THE EXPRESS PROVISIONS OF THE 
TRUST AND UTAH CASE LAW. 
Ms. Womack is entitled to all attorney's fees incurred 
in this case because Ms. Womack's actions were performed as 
trustee. Utah Code Ann. § 75-7-402(3) provides, in 
pertinent part: 
A trustee has the power to "pay or contest any 
claim; ...employ persons, including attorneys, 
auditors, investment advisers, or agents, even if 
they are associated with the trustee, to advise or 
assist the trustee in the performance of his 
administrative duties; ...prosecute or defend 
actions, claims, or proceedings for the protection 
of trust assets and of the trustee in the 
performance of his duties." 
(Emphasis added). Here, Ms. Womack contested Ms. Snow's 
exempt property claims and Ms. Womack retained counsel for 
assistance in performing her administrative duties. (R. 37-
43). In addition, Ms. Womack incurred legal fees in 
defending claims against the trust assets as well as claims 
that Ms. Womack breached her fiduciary duties. (R. 1-7). 
Further legal fees were also incurred in the ordinary 
administration of the trust, such as accountings, 
preparation of income taxes, inventories, etc. Therefore, 
based on the above controlling statute, Ms. Womack's 
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attorney's fees should be paid for by the estate because all 
of these fees fall under the provisions in the statute. 
Under the express terms of the trust, Ms. Womack's 
attorney's fees as trustee should be paid for by the estate. 
Article VIII of the trust, entitled, "Powers of the 
Trustees" states that the Trustees shall have the power to 
"delegate powers to agents including accountants, investment 
counsel, appraisers, legal counsel, and other experts, 
remunerate them and pay their expenses; ...out of income or 
principal" (Emphasis added) (Exhibit "A"). Thus, under the 
express provisions of the trust itself, Ms. Womack's 
attorney's fees should be paid for by the estate. 
In addition to the controlling statute and express 
provisions of the trust, Utah case law also supports paying 
Ms. Womack's attorney's fees out of the estate. This court 
in Walker v. Walker stated, "a trustee is entitled to 
reimbursement for all expenses properly incurred in 
discharging the responsibilities of his trust." 17 Utah 2d 
53, 60, 404 P.2d 253 (1965). Here, it was Ms. Womack's 
responsibility to defend the trust assets against Ms. Snow's 
claims. Ms. Womack was acting in her duty as trustee in 
defending this attack on the corpus of the trust. 
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that case, the litigation began and continued as a dispute 
over who would inherit from the estate. 
Here, the litigation began with charges that the 
trustee violated her fiduciary duties. (R. 1-7). In 
addition, much of the litigation has been over trust 
interpretation and questions concerning whether Ms. Womack 
breached her fiduciary duties in making distributions from 
the estate. Although this case does involve the question of 
who should inherit and how much, the issues of trust 
administration are paramount. Therefore, this court should 
allow Ms. Womack to pay her attorney's fees from the estate. 
In the alternative, this court should remand this case 
back to the trial court to determine what portion of the 
litigation involved disputes over trust administration and 
what portions involved disputes over competing claims to 
trust assets. An award of partial attorney's fees would 
come closer to complying with the statute and terms of the 
trust than a complete disallowance of Ms. Womack's claims 
for attorney's fees. Because a substantial portion of Ms. 
Womack's legal expenses came in defending her actions as 
trustee, she should be entitled to attorney's fees for these 
matters. 
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In Sundquist v. Sundquist, a trustee was defending the 
trust from depletion and was entitled to attorney's fees for 
this defense. 639 P.2d 181 (Utah 1981). This court allowed 
the trustee to be reimbursed for these attorney's fees, 
despite the trustee's personal interest in the outcome of 
the case. Here, although Ms. Womack has a personal interest 
in the outcome of the case as a beneficiary of the trust, 
she should not be excluded from reimbursement of attorney's 
fees for actions taken as trustee in defending the trust 
from invasion and for attorney's fees incurred in the 
ordinary administration of the trust. 
The trial court and Ms. Snow relied on Ashton v. Ashton 
in determining that Ms. Womack was not entitled to 
reimbursement for attorney's fees. 898 P.2d 824 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1995) (R. 583). There, the court held that where a 
personal representative was acting solely in her role as 
claimant rather than administrator, she was not entitled to 
attorney's fees. This case is distinguished from Ashton 
because of the nature of the litigation and role of the 
claimants. In Ashton, the personal representative's step-
children appealed a trial court decision that named the 
personal representative the sole heir of the estate. In 
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5) UNDER THE EXPRESS TERMS OF THE TRUST, MS. 
WOMACK WAS REQUIRED TO USE TRUST PRINCIPAL TO 
SETTLE THE DECEDENT'S DEBTS. 
The trust expressly requires the trustee to pay debts 
of the decedent. Article VIII, paragraph C states, "From 
the income of the trusts hereby created, or, if that be 
insufficient, from the principal thereof, the Trustees shall 
pay and discharge all expenses incurred in the 
administration of the Trusts." (Emphasis added). In 
accordance with this provision, Ms. Womack, as trustee, paid 
the decedent's debt to U.S. Bank on or about February 23, 
1998, in the amount of $7,034.67 to pay off the balance 
owing on the decedent's van. (R.291-373). The decedent gave 
Ms. Womack the van in a specific bequest in the trust. 
(Exhibit "A", Paragraph 2). 
Ms. Snow claims that the Utah "non-exoneration" 
statute, Section 75-2-609, applies to this gift. (R. 238-
281). However, chapter two of the Utah Uniform Probate 
Code, relied on by Ms. Snow, applies to intestate succession 
and wills, not to trusts. Chapter seven deals specifically 
with trusts and this is the chapter that applies in this 
case. Yet, even applying the provisions in chapter two, Ms. 
Womack should still be allowed to pay off this debt. 
25 
The editorial board comment to this section states, 
"Section 75-2-609 establishes a rule of construction against 
exoneration." (Emphasis added). However, this court has 
mandated that if the language in the trust itself concerning 
this matter is clear and unambiguous, this court need not 
and may not apply rules of construction to give the document 
another meaning or to supplant terms that are not present. 
Wineaar v. Froerer Corp., 813 P.2d 104, 108 (Utah 1991). 
Further, the Utah legislature has spoken to this issue 
in the Utah Uniform Probate Code, wherein it provides that 
"a trustee is authorized to pay and settle claims against 
the trust". See Utah Code Ann. § 75-7-402(3) (5) (i) (2001). 
Based on the express terms of the trust and statutory trust 
authority, Ms. Womack was well within her rights as trustee 
to pay off the decedent's loan on the van and the non-
exoneration statute should not apply because of the specific 
language contained in the trust. 
C. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
AND FAILING TO ALLOW EXTRINSIC EVIDENCE OF THE 
TESTATOR'S INTENT AND SURROUNDING CIRCUMSTANCES TO 
ASSIST IN INTERPRETING AMBIGUITIES IN THE TRUST. 
Where an ambiguity exists, the court may consider 
extrinsic evidence to determine intent. See Wineaar at 108. 
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Moreover, "A testator's intent may be ^ascertained not alone 
from the provision itself, but from a scrutiny of the entire 
instrument of which it is a part, and in the light of the 
conditions and circumstances in which the instrument came 
into existence.' Thus, extrinsic evidence may be used to 
ascertain what the testator intended." In the Matter of the 
Estate of Hamilton, 869 P.2d 971, 975 (Utah App. 1994) 
(citations omitted). 
Here, there is ambiguity in the decedent's use of the 
word "income," as well as ambiguities concerning the 
remainder interests of both parties and the trustee's 
discretion. Both parties have provided reasonable 
definitions for income, and the court should have looked to 
extrinsic evidence to determine the decedent's intent. Ms. 
Womack has evidence of both the surrounding circumstances 
and statements from witnesses showing that the decedent 
intended to continue supporting Ms. Womack as he did while 
he was alive that were submitted below. (R. 291-373) . 
In addition, Ms. Womack has evidence of the decedent's 
poor relationship with his daughter and his intent to leave 
her out cf his trust. However, these issues raise factual 
concerns that require an evidentiary hearing. This dispute 
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over the decedent's intent and evidence surrounding the 
creation of the trust preclude summary judgment in this 
matter. Therefore, the trial court below should not have 
granted summary judgment for Ms. Snow in this case as key 
issues of fact were undecided. 
In In the Matter of the Estate of Ashton, 804 P.2d 540 
(Utah App. 1990), the Court of Appeals found that the 
following provision in a will was ambiguous on its face: 
I give, devise and bequeath all of my property, 
real, personal, or mixed, of whatever nature or 
whatever situated, which I may own or have the 
right to dispose of at the time of my death to my 
beloved wife, Ruth Elizabeth Ashton. She shall 
have the full enjoyment of the estate for as long 
as she desires or shall live. 
Id. at 542-543. The court held that "[t]he first sentence 
of the disputed passage appears to devise the entire estate 
to Mrs. Ashton in fee simple, while the last sentence 
suggests a life estate, making the clause ambiguous on its 
face." Id. 
After making the determination that the provision was 
ambiguous, the court held as follows: 
While the court did make findings in the present 
case, those findings pertain only to the dates of 
marriage, execution of the will, signing of an 
addendum, and of the death. The findings make no 
mention of the testator's intent or the conditions 
and circumstances surrounding the making of the 
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will. Nor do the findings include subsidiary 
facts showing the steps leading to the court's 
conclusion that the decedent intended that Mrs. 
Ashton be the only heir, taking the estate free 
and absolute of any claim of any other heir. 
Because the findings are insufficient to allow for 
adequate review, we remand for the trial court to 
make explicit, detailed findings as to the 
conditions and circumstances surrounding the 
making of the will, the nature of the estate, and 
finally the decedent's intent, and how that intent 
supports the court's conclusion. 
(Emphasis added). The facts of this case are very similar 
to those of Ashton regarding the trial court's treatment of 
the case., Here, the provisions of the trust are even more 
ambiguous than the provision in Ashton. Determining what 
the decedent intended in using the word income and whom the 
decedent intended to receive a remainder interest, or 
whether a remainder interest exists at all is unclear. Yet, 
similar to the facts in Ashton, the trial court refused to 
consider the extrinsic evidence concerning the decedent's 
intent and surrounding circumstances. 
When the trial court interpreted the word "income," 
ruling that Ms. Womack was only entitled to the interest 
from principal, the court stated: 
Now, in my mind, income is income and while I 
understand the position taken by Ms. Walton that I 
do not need to look at statutory or constructive 
rules, that's exactly what I would have to do in 
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order to aid me in the construction of these legal 
terms. 
(R. 583). Here, the court made a mistake of law by looking 
to rules of statutory construction to aid in interpreting 
the trust without looking to the decedent's intent as 
evidenced by the surrounding circumstances and affidavits of 
those with personal knowledge. Because of this, the case 
should be remanded for a determination of the decedent's 
intent to aid in interpreting ambiguous provisions in the 
trust. 
In fact, the trial court issued its decision based in 
part on what the trust did not say as opposed to what it 
said. In discussing Ms. Womack's paying off the van, the 
court said, "In that way the Court finds most importantly 
what was not said ..." (R. 583). Here again, the court is 
interpreting ambiguous provisions of the trust based on 
statutory construction without allowing extrinsic evidence 
of the testator's intent. 
Moreover, the trial court did not show what facts led 
to their conclusion that Ms. Womack be restricted in her use 
of the trust assets to only interest from principal without 
discretion as trustee. In addition, the trial court used no 
evidence of surrounding circumstances or the testator's 
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intent, despite the ambiguity. Similar to Ashton, this 
court should remand the case to the trial court to determine 
these fact issues and preclude summary judgment. 
Because the trial court did not allow extrinsic 
evidence concerning this ambiguity, the court ruled that 
summary judgment was proper because no factual disputes 
existed relating to admissible evidence. Yet, where a court 
must interpret ambiguous language in a document, extrinsic 
evidence should be admitted to show intent. Therefore, this 
court should remand the case back to the trial court to 
consider this evidence in determining the meaning of the 
word "income" and the testator's intent relating to 
remainder interests as used in the trust. 
VIII. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court made several mistakes of law that 
should be overturned by this court and the case remanded for 
further determinations of fact. First, the court erred in 
granting Ms. Snow's exempt property claim. Second, the 
court erred in interpreting several provisions of the trust, 
including the remainder interests of the parties, definition 
of income, trustee's discretion and ability to pay debts, as 
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well as attorney's fees. Third, the trial court should have 
considered the intent of the decedent in interpreting 
ambiguous provisions in the trust. Based on the above 
factors, this court should reverse and remand this case for 
further proceedings and fact-finding consistent with 
governing law. 
RoEy'n RoWfe Walton, #82 61 
ROWE & WALTON, P.C. 
915 South Main Street 
Bountiful, Utah 84010 
Counsel for Appellant 
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Exhib i t "A" 
THE RICIIA11D D. SNOW Third Judicial District 
FAMILY TRUST FED 1. 0 1999 
SAL! LAKE COUNTY 
hy- UenulyCli PURPOSE
 0 v 
yA f p y 
The Undersigned, RICHARD D. SNOW, of West-VaHey, Salt Lake 
County, and State of Utah, hereby establishes THE RICHARD D. SNOW 
FAMILY TRUST for the purposes of owning, operating and 
administering my estate both during my life and after my death and 
avoiding the probate thereof. 
ARTICLE I 
Transfer in Trust 
For good and valuable considerationf the Undersigned, RICHARD 
D. SNOW, hereby transfers, conveys, assigns and delivers to the 
Trustees and any successor Trustees the property listed on Schedule 
"A" or any supplemental schedules annexed hereto and incorporated 
herein by reference, to have and to hold the same, and any cash, 
securities, or other property, real and personal and wherever 
situate, which the Trustees may, pursuant to any of the provisions 
hereof, at any time hereafter hold or acquire, all of such property 
being hereinafter referred to collectively as the "Trust Estate" 
for the uses and purposes and upon the terms and conditions herein 
set forth. 
ARTICLE II 
Disposition Before the Death of the Undersigned 
Before the death of the Undersigned, the Trustees shall hold, 
manage, invest, and re-invest the Trust Estate, and shall collect 
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the income thereof and shall dispose of the net income and 
principal as follows: 
Subject to the provisions contained in Article XIII 
hereinafter, the Trustees shall pay to the Undersigned all to the 
net income of this Trust, in monthly or other convenient 
installments, but at least annually. The Trustees, shall al#0 pay 
to the Undersigned as much of the principal of the Trust as the 
Undersigned may request. Trustees may, in their discretion, pay or 
apply for the benefit of the Undersigned, in addition to the income 
payments herein provided for, such amounts as the Trustees may from 
time to time deem necessary or advisable for the use and benefit of 
the Undersigned. 
ARTICLE III 
Disposition on Death of the Undersigned 
Upon the death of the Undersigned, the property of THE RICHARD 
D. SNOW FAMILY TRUST, and including also any other portions added 
thereto from the estate of the Undersigned or other sources, 
together with the undistributed income, shall be held in trust and 
shall be administered and disposed of as follows: 
A. An amount determined solely by the Trustees shall be set 
aside from the balance of the funds held in trust, and shall be 
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used for the support, and education of the Undersiqnedr s 
beneficiaries who have not reached aye twenty-one (2.1) prior to the 
death of the Undersigned. In determining the amount to be set 
aside under the provisions of this paragraph, and the amounts to be 
paid therefromf the Trustee? shall take into account the needs, 
age.^
 r assets, and other available sources o[ income and support:, 
including any manner of state or federal financial assistance, to 
the Undersigned's children. The Trustees, in their sole and 
unqualified discretion, shall determine the amount to be 
distributed, the child or children to whom distributions are to be 
made, and the time and manner; of distributions made under this 
paragraph, and shall distribute according to the various needs of 
the children, even if such distributions are unequal. A child 
shall receive no further distributions pursuant to this paragraph 
after she has attained the age designated above. Immediately upon 
the death of the Undersigned, the balance, if any, of the amounts 
set aside under this paragraph shall be distributed according to 
Article III., paragraph D«, below. 
B. After setting aside sufficient amounts to carry out the 
purposes of Article III., paragraph A., above, the Trustees shall 
next divide the Trust Estate into as many equal parts as may be 
necessary to provide one part, or share, for each of the 
Undersigned's children then living, and one part, or share, for the 
then-living descendants, taken collectively, of each of the 
Undersigned's children who may then be deceased, which such 
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B Q ^ ^ Q Q ^ p h a r e shall be further divided into separate parts or 
^SM^B^for^such descendants, they taking per stirpes; and as thusly 
WMS^ffi each said share or part shall be held as a separate trust 
^B^FlTe benefit of the person or persons Cor whom it was set aside 
and shall be held, administered as follows: 
1. The Trustees may use and expend or apply so much or 
all of first, the income, and second, the principal of the trusts 
hereby created for the benefit of a beneficiary hereof, and said 
amounts shall be used as the Trustees determine necessary or 
advisable and in such reasonable manner as the Trustees see fit, to 
provide for the health, reasonable comfort, education, support, and 
maintenance of the beneficiary for whom such trust shall have been 
created. Provided, however, that in determining 
said amounts the Trustees shall first take into account any 
distributions provided for such beneficiary under Article III., 
paragraph A., above, and the needs, assets, and other available 
sources of income and support of a beneficiary thereof. Provided, 
however, the said powers of encroachments upon a beneficiary's 
share shall be limited to the respective share held for the 
respective beneficiary. 
2. Upon the death of the undersigned, the Trustees shall 
distribute to that respective beneficiary, the share of the Trust 
Estate for said beneficiary, free and clear of trust if and when 
that beneficiary has reached twenty-one (21) years of age. 
3. In the event a beneficiary is for any reason unable 
or unwilling to take any portion of his or her share of the Trust 
Estate, or in the event of the death of any of the beneficiaries, 
namely the Undersigned's children, pursuant to the above 
paragraphs of this Article III., then such portion shall be 
distributed in whole to his or her living descendants, equally, 
they taking per stirpes; and if there be no such descendants, then 
such funds shall be divided equally between such beneficiary's 
then-living brothers and sisters, and if there be no brother or 
sister then living, then such funds shall be divided equally 
between the descendants of such beneficiary's brothers and sisters, 
said descendants taking per stirpes; and if there be no descendants 
of such beneficiary's brothers or sisters then living, then the 
Trustees shall distribute according to the principle of 
representation, the portion of the property of that beneficiary to 
the other portions of the other living beneficiaries, and if there 
are no other living beneficiaries, then: said heirs at law of the 
Undersigned, shall take the Trust property in the same priority and 
in the same distributive order as listed in the law of intestate 
succession in force in the state of the Undersigned's residence on 
the date of the signing of this Trust Agreement. Notwithstanding 
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anything contained to the contrary in this paragraph, if, under the 
provisions of this subparagraph 3., of paragraph D., Article III., 
any person under age twenty-one (21) shall become entitled to a 
share of the Trust Estate, such share shall not be distributed to 
such beneficiary's benefit, and shall be held, administered, and 
disposed of according to subparagraphs 1., 2., and 3., of paragraph 
B., Article III. 
4. If under the terms of this Article III., and upon the 
death of any beneficiary, any other person for whom a share or 
portion is being held in trust shall become entitled to an 
additional share or portion, such additional share or portion shall 
not necessarily be delivered free of trust, but shall be added to 
the principal of the share or portion held in trust for 
such person and shall go as and with the same. 
C. At the death of the Undersigned, the Trustees shall 
distribute all of the Undersigned's personal effects, including any 
contents of the Undersigned's residence, according to that certain 
Letter of Disposition of Personal Effects referring to Article III, 
Subparagraph B, of this Trust Agreement, dated and signed by the 
Undersigned and located among the Undersigned's important papers at 
the time of his death. 
D. Whenever, used herein, the terms "issue", "child", 
"children", and "descendants" include adopted issue, adopted child, 
adopted children and adopted descendants, as well as natural issue, 
natural child, natural children, and natural descendants, and 
include descendants of adopted issued, adopted child, adopted 
children, and adopted descendants. Provided, however, adopted 
issue who are also natural issue shall take their share oj the 
Trust Estate only in one capacity, such capacity being trite one 
which grants to such issue the larger share. Where applicable, the 
masculine includes the feminine, and vice versa, and the neuter 
includes the masculine or feminine, and vice versa. Where 
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a p p l i c a b l e , the s i n g u l a r inc lude* Llio plur.ni «nd </Jo« v&rtffl* 
ARTICLE IV 
Spendthrift Provision 
After any of the trusts created herein become irrevocable, 
the interests of each beneficiary in income and principal shall be 
free from the control or interference of any creditor of such 
beneficiary, or the spouse of a married beneficiary, or the parent 
of a child beneficiary, and shall not be subject to attachment or 
be subject to assignment unless herein specified otherwise. 
ARTICLE V 
Invalid Provisions 
If any of the provisions of this Trust are held to be invalid, 
none of the other Trust Agreement provisions shall thereby be 
rendered invalid or inoperative as long as they do not frustrate 
the intents of the Undersigned, but tend to accomplish his over-all 
objectives . 
ARTICLE VI 
Perpetuities Savings Clause 
In any event, and anything to the contrary herein contained 
notwithstanding, the trusts created in this agreement shall 
terminate upon the day next preceding the expiration of twenty-one 
(21) years after the death of the Undersigned and his issue now 
living, in the event these trusts shall not have previously 
terminated in accordance with the terms hereof. In the event of 
termination of these trusts provided for in this paragraph, the 
Trustees shall distribute the Trust Estate as it shall then be 
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constituted, together with any net income, to the beneficiaries 
then entitled to the income from the Trust Estate, in the same 
proportions in which they are entitled to such income. 
ARTICLE VI1 
Trustees 
A. The following people will act as trustees in the 
following order of succession: 
FIRST: RICHARD D. SNOW is to act solely as the Trustee 
of THE RICHARD D. SNOW FAMILY TRUST, unless he becomes disabled or 
legally incompetent or placed in n rehabilitation facility, 
hospital, nursing homer or long-term health care facility, then the 
next successor trustee shall act as Trustee. 
SECOND: Upon the death or inability to function of 
RICHARD D. SNOW then RUDY WOMACK shall act solely as Trustee of 
THE RICHAJ1D D. SNOW FAMILY TRUST. 
THIRD: Upon the death or incapacitation of RUDY WOMACK, 
a Trustee shall be chosen by a majority of the beneficiaries, with 
a parent or legal guardian voting for minor beneficiaries; 
provided, however, that the issue of any deceased child shall have 




UPON THE DEATH OF THE UNDERSIGNED, THIS TRUST ESTATE SHALL BE 
DISTRIBUTED AS FOLLOWS: 
1. RUBY WOMACK MAY LIVE IN THE MOBILE.HOte, GUREDON, AS LONG ^6' 
AS SHE DESIRES OR UNTIL SHE REMARRIES OR SHE DIES, AT T.HA-T_*JHHE_J.'HE--^  * 
MOBILE HOME SHALL BE DISTRIBUTED TO MARCIA ELLINGSON, PER STIRPES. 
THE SAID MOBILE HOME SHALL NOT BE SOLD, LEASED, OR RENTED BY RUBY 
WOMACK. _ / . _
 t/A . 
2. THE-MOTOR-HOMBr-QKANACAN, SHALL BE DISTRIBUTED TO RUBY 
WOMACK. 
3.r THE BALANCE OF THE TRUST ESTATE SHALL BE DISTRIBUTED- TO*'' 
MAJ&CIA\ELI/INGSON,) PER STIRPES . 5,^OU/ 
4. PATRICIA SPROUSE SHALL NOT RECEIVE ANYTHING FROM THIS 
TRUST ESTATE AS SHE ALREADY RECEIVED HER SHARE PRJOR TO THE 
UNDERSIGNED'S DEATH, INCLUDING: 
A) 1901 PONTIAC, /??<f f'~0l?,l '//a'jU^Jj *%$!'**& 
B) 19 07 FORD RANGER PICKUP TRUCK, 
C) PAYMENT OF HER AND HER HUSBAND'S DEBTS IN THE 
AMOUNT OF APPROXIMATELY TWENTY THOUSAND DOLLARS 
($20,000), AND 
D) SHIRLEY SNOW'S RINGS AND PERSONAL BELONGINGS 
WORTH APPROXIMATELY TWENTY THOUSAND DOLLARS 
($20,000). 
THESE ABOVE SPECIAL PROVISIONS SUPERSEDE ALL OTHERS IN THIS 
TRUST. 
CATASTROPHIC ILLNESS PROVISION 
If at any time the undersigned should become disabled and 
placed in a rehabilitation facility, hospital nursing home, or 
long-term health care facility, then this trust shall become 
irrevocable and the disabled trustor shall be forbidden to act as 
8 
Trustee and shall forfeit any benefit or share of this trust estate 
except an income benefit and only to the extent that it will not 
jeopardize his Medicaid eligibility or any trust assets. 
D. Whenever more than two Trustees are designated to act 
concurrently, a majority of the Trustees, whether individual or 
corporate, shall have the power to make any provision, undertake 
any action, or execute any documents affecting the Trusts created 
herein, but a dissenting or nonassenting Trustee shall not be 
responsible for any action taken by the majority pursuant to such 
decision. Before or after the death of the Undersigned, if only 
two individual Trustees are in office, they must act unanimously; 
provided, however, the Trustees may form joint savings, checking or 
investment accounts that require onJy one Trustee's signature to 
effect transactions for such an account. If an individual and a 
corporate Trustee are in office, the determination of the 
individual Trustee shall be binding. 
C. Any Trustee may from time to time delegate to one or more 
of the remaining Trustees any powers, duties, or discretions. 
Every such delegation shall be made by a writing delivered to the 
delegate or delegates, and shall remain effective for the time 
therein specified or until earlier revocation by a writing 
similarly delivered. Every one dealing with the Trustees shall be 
absolutely protected in relying upon the certificate of any Trustee 
as to who are the Trustees for the time being acting, and as to the 
extent of their authority by reason of any delegation or otherwise, 
U. No Trustee named above need give bond in any jurisdiction. 
9 
If a fiduciary's bond may not be dispensed with, the Undersigned 
request that the bond be accepted without surety and in the lowest 
possible amount. In the absence of breach of trust, no Trustee 
shall ever be required to qualify before, be appointed by, or 
account to any court, or obtain the order or approval of any court 
in the exercise of any power or discretion herein given. 
ARTICLE VI11 
rowers of the Trustees 
A. The Trustees shall have full power to do everything in 
administering these trusts that they deem to be for the best 
interests of the beneficiaries (whether or not it be authorized or 
appropriate for fiduciaries but for this broad grant of authority), 
including power: 
1. To acquire by purchase or otherwise, and to retain 
so long as they deem advisable, any kind of realty or personal 
property, or undivided interests therein, including common and 
preferred stocks, bonds, or other unsecured obligations, options, 
warrants, interests in investment trusts and discretionary common 
trust 'funds, all without diversifications as to kind or 
amount,without being limited to investments authorized by law for 
the investment of trust funds, and power to hold or take title to 
property in the name of a nominee. 
2. To sell for cash or on credit, at private or public 
sale, exchange, hypothecate, sell short, or otherwise dispose of 
any real or personal property. 
3. To make distributions, including distributions to 
themselves as trustees, in kind or in money or partly in each, even 
if shares be composed differently; for such purposes, the valuation 
of the Trustees shall be given effect if reasonably made. 
4. If, in the Trustee's sole discretion, any beneficiary 
(whether a minor or of legal age) is incapable of making proper 
disposition of any sum of income or principal that is payable or 
appointed to said beneficiary under the previous terms of this 
Trust Agreement, the Trustees may apply said sum to or on behalf of 
the beneficiary by any one or more of the following methods: by 
payments on behalf of the beneficiary to any one with whom the 
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beneficiary resides, or by payments in discharge of the 
beneficiary's bills or debts, including bills for premiums on any 
insurance policies, or by paying an allowance to a beneficiary 
directly. The foregoing payments shall be made without regard to 
other resources of the beneficiary, or the duty of any person to 
support the beneficiary and without the intervention of any 
guardian or like fiduciary; provided, however, that the Trustees 
shall insure and see to the application of the funds for the 
benefit of the beneficiary, so that the funds will not be used by 
any other person for a purpose 
other than the direct benefit of the beneficiary, and particularly 
so that said funds will not be diverted from the purpose of support 
and education of said beneficiary. 
5. To determine whether and to what extent receipts 
should be deemed income or principal, whether or to what extent 
expenditures should be charged against principal or income, and 
what other adjustments should be made between principal and income, 
provided such adjustments do not conflict with well-settled rules 
for the determination of principal and income questions. 
G. To delegate powers to agents including accountants, 
investment counsel, appraisers, legal counsel, and other experts, 
remunerate them and pay their expenses; to employ custodians of the 
Trust assets, bookkeepers, clerks, and other assistants and pay 
them out of income or principal. 
7. To renew, assign, alter, extend, compromise, release, 
with or without consideration, or submit to arbitration or 
litigation, obligations or claims held by or asserted against the 
Undersigned, the Trustees, or the Trust assets. 
8. To borrow money, from others or from the Trustees for 
the payment of taxes, debts, or expenses, or for any other purpose, 
which in the opinion of the Trustees, will facilitate the 
administration of these trusts, and pledge or mortgage property as 
security for any such loans; and, if money is borrowed from any 
Trustee, individually, to pay interest thereon at the then-
prevailing rate of interest. 
9. To lease, or grant options to lease, for periods to 
begin presently or in the future, without regard to statutory 
restrictions or the probable duration of any trust; to erect or 
alter buildings or otherwise improve and manage property; demolish 
buildings; make ordinary and extra-ordinary repairs; grant 
easements and charges; make party wall contracts; dedicate roads, 
subdivide; adjust boundary lines; partition and convey property or 
give money for equity of partition; to be either a generdT or 
limited partner. 
10. To enter into transactions with any other trust in 
which the Undersigned or the beneficiaries of this Trust Agreement, 
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or any of them, have beneficial interests, even though any Trustee 
of such other trust is also a Trustee under this Trust Agreement. 
11. To exercise all the foregoing powers alone or in 
conjunction witli others, even though any of the Trustees are 
personally interested in the property that is involved, 
notwithstanding any rules of law relating to divided loyalty or 
self-dealing. 
12. The Trustees may engage in the practice of writing 
options on all recognized exchanges to buy, sell, and trade in 
securities of any nature, (including "short" sales) on margin, and 
for such purposes may maintain and operate margin accounts with 
brokersf and may pledge any securities held or purchased by them 
with such brokers as security for loans and advances made to the 
Trustees. 
B. Any Trustee may decline to act or may resign as Trustee 
at any time by delivering a wj'itten resignation to the 
beneficiaries of a trust then subsisting. 
C. From the income of the trusts hereby created, or, if that 
be insufficient, from the principaJ thereof, the Trustees shall pay 
and discharge all expenses incurred in the administration of the 
Trusts. 
D. No successor Trustee shall be liable for any misfeasance 
of any prior Trustee. 
ARTICLE) IX 
Additions to Trust 
A. The Undersigned or any other person may grant, a^ rd the 
Trustees may receive, as part of this Trust, additional real and 
personal property, by assignment, transfer, deed, or other 
conveyance, or by any other means, testamentary or inter vivos, for 
inclusion in the Trust herein created. Any such property so 
received by the Trustees shail become a part of the Trust into 
12 
which it is transferred and shall become subject to the terms of 
t±JLs Acreerae n t. 
MITICLE X 
Delegation of Authority 
During physical or mental incapacitation, the Undersigned 
herein appoints, the next successor Trustee succeed to his place, 
during said period of incapacitation, either as Trustee, Executor, 
or in any other legal capacity, whether appointed, orally or in 
writing, and to supervise all matters in which the Undersigned had 
the right to act if he had not become incapacitated. 
Incapacitation shall be established either by a court of competent 
jurisdiction or by a written statement filed with the Trustees and 
signed in good faith by two (2) physicians unrelated to the 
Undersigned. 
ARTICLE XI 
Parties Dealing with Trustees 
No purchaser, and no issuer of any stock, bond, or other 
instrument evidencing a deposit of money or property, or other 
person dealing with the Trustees hereunder with respect to any 
propert}' hereunder as purchaser, lessee, party to a contract or 
lease, or in any other capacity whatsoever, shall be under any 
obligation whatsoever to see to the disbursing of money paid to the 
Trustees or to the due execution of this Trust in any particular, 
but such persons shall be absolutely free in dealing 
with the Trustees on the same basis as though the Trustees were the 
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absolute owners of the said property, without any conditions, 
restrictions, or qualifications whatsoever. 
ARTICLE XII 
^Pjyz^e_££jyJ^^ Property; 
All property conveyed or transferred to the Trustees or now 
held by the Trustees pursuant to this Trust Agreement that was the 
separate property of the Undersigned at the time of such conveyance 
or transfer, shall remain, respectively, the separate property of 
the Undersigned who transferred such property to the Trustees. 
Accordingly, while the Undersigned is alive, the Trustees shall pay 
to the Undersigned only the .income or principal from his separate 
property that he contributed to this Trust. 
ARTICLE XIII 
Revocation and Amendment 
A. As long as the Undersigned is alive, he reserves the 
right, without the consent or approval of any other, to amend, 
modify, revoke, or remove from this Trust the property that he has 
contributed, in whole or in part, including the principal and the 
present or past undisbursed income from such principal. On the 
death of the Undersigned, the remainder oC the Trust Estate, and 
the trusts created hereinafter, may not be amended, revoked, or 
terminated, other than by disposition of the trust property to the 
beneficiaries according to the terms stated herein. 
B. While the Undersigned is alive, he shall have full 
authority, in his discretion, to sell, convey, or mortgage property 
in his own name, without disclosing his capacity as Trustee of this 
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Trust Agreement; any such sale or conveyance of property in 
accordance with this provision, shall be considered as, and shall 
cause, a partial revocation of the Trust with respect to the 
property so conveyed or sold, and shall be sufficient to remove 
said property from the Trust. 
YesJ^ ecLilik?JL?J5JL^ ^ 
The interest of the beneficiaries is a present vested interest 
which shall continue until this Trust is revoked or terminated 
other than by death. 
_JP.Y. -LVIli I?_SJ _ b a w 
This Agreement shall be construed and regulated by the laws of 
the state of residence of the Undersigned. 
ARTICLE XVI 
Last Instructions 
During any serious illness, or at the death, of the 
Undersigned, the Undersigned requests that the Trustees call his 
attorney, DEL B. ROWE, of 535 West 500 South, Gateway Plaza #300, 
Bountiful, Utah 84010, (801) 298-0(540, or another attorney 
specializing in Estate Planning, to obtain instructions regarding 
the settlement of his estate. 
ARTICLE XVII 
Settlement of the Undersigned's Estate 
This Trust Agreement has been prepared in duplicate, one copy 
of which has been executed as an original and the other is a 
r» 
photocopy of the unexecuted original, retained in the above 
attorneys office. Either copy may be used as an original without 
the other; if only one copy of this Trust Agreement can be found, 
then it shall be considered as the original, and the missing copy 
will be presumed inadvertently lost. Any clarifications or 
instructions concerning this Trust Agreement may be obtained by 
calling the above named attorney, DDL D. ROWE of Bountiful, Utah, 
who is requested to do everything necessary to implement the 
provisions of this Trust Agreement, who also retains an unexecuted 
copy of the foregoing. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the Undersigned has executed this Trust 
7 Agreement on the day oL ,\J CJ J - , 19 9 3. 
STATE OF UTAH 
COUNTY OF DAVIS 




day of w, 
. .
 n r - - — • ° ^  • ' 1993, personally appeared 
before me RICHARD D. SNOW, who acknowledged to me that he executed 
the foregoing Trust Agreement. ,. , •' 4 
MY COMMISSION EXPIRES: 04-27-96 
NOTARY PUBLICS-
RESIDING AT DAVIS COUNTY 
<s^%yt) Nnfjity f t J '••; * KAMAM V ' OMNIA f I /^>^<^\ .vo\n/\ri v 'OMNIA f 
Stnta of Ufnli J 
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AMENDMENT TO THE 




The Undersigned, RICHARD D. SNOW, Grantor, hereby amends THE 
RICHARD D. SNOW FAMILY TRUST, established the 8th day of November, 
1993, as follows: 
ARTICLE VII 
Trustees 
A. The following people will act as trustees in the 
following order of succession: 
FIRST: RICHARD D. SNOW is to act solely as the Trustee 
of THE RICHARD D. SNOW FAMILY TRUST. 
SECOND: Upon the death or inability to function of 
RICHARD D. SNOW, then RUBY WOMACK shall act solely as Trustee of 
THE RICHARD D. SNOW FAMILY TRUST. 
THIRD: Upon the death or incapacitation of RUBY WOMACK, 
then MARCIA SNOW shall act solely as Trustee of THE RICHARD D. SNOW 
FAMILY TRUST. 
FOURTH: A Trustee chosen by a majority of the 
beneficiaries, with a parent or legal guardian voting for minor 
beneficiaries; provided, however, that the issue of any deceased 
child shall have collectively only one vote. 
****SPECIAL PROVISIONS**** 
UPON THE DEATH OF THE UNDERSIGNED, THIS TRUST ESTATE SHALL BE 
DISTRIBUTED AS FOLLOWS: 
1. RUBY WOMACK MAY LIVE IN THE MOBILE HOME, GUREDON, AS LONG 
AS SHE DESIRES OR UNTIL SHE REMARRIES OR SHE DIES. 
2. THE 1995 CHEVROLET CUSTOM VAN (OR WHATEVER VEHICLE THE 
GRANTOR OWNS AT HIS DEATH) SHALL BE DISTRIBUTED TO RUBY 
WOMACK. 
3. THE REMAINDER OF THE TRUST ESTATE SHALL BE HELD IN TRUST 
TO PROVIDE RUBY WOMACK WITH INCOME. RUBY SHALL HAVE COMPLETE 
DISCRETION IN THE USE OF THE TRUST ESTATE. 
4. PATRICIA SPROUSE SHALL NOT RECEIVE ANYTHING FROM THIS 
TRUST ESTATE AS SHE ALREADY RECEIVED HER SHARE PRIOR TO THE 
UNDERSIGNED'S DEATH, INCLUDING: 
A) 1965 FORD 
B) 197 6 FORD TIIUNDERBIRD 
C) 19 81 PONTIAC, 
D) 1987 FORD RANGER PICKUP TRUCK, 
E) PAYMENT OF HER AND HER HUSBAND'S DEBTS IN THE 
AMOUNT OF APPROXIMATELY TWENTY THOUSAND DOLLARS 
($20,000), AND 
F) SHIRLEY SNOW'S RINGS AND PERSONAL BELONGINGS 
WORTH APPROXIMATELY TWENTY THOUSAND DOLLARS 
($20,000). 
THESE ABOVE SPECIAL PROVISIONS SUPERSEDE ALL OTHERS IN THIS 
TRUST. 
CATASTROPHIC ILLNESS PROVISION 
THIS PROVISION IS HEREBY REVOKED IN WHOLE AND SHALL NO LONGER 
CONTROL THE DETERMINATION OF THIS TRUST ESTATE. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the Undersigned has executed this Trust 
Amendment on the f5 day of (^?(cftva?f , 19 95. 
^-S? o J>-^7C^</ 
RICHARD D. SNOW 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
: ss 
COUNTY OF DAVIS ) 
On this IS day of 6^ >trmfcpf r 1995, personally 
appeared before me RICHARD D. SNOW, who duly acknowledged to me 
that he executed the foregoing Trusl 
MY COMMISSION EXPIRES: 04< 
ustiAmendment. ~ 
-H-97 llirkJfiySaLtovi1^ l a d e 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
Residing at Salt Lake County 
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gTNftTRUCTIONS TO THE LIVING TRUST 
5*BRE INSTRUCTIONS FOR TRANSFERRING INDIVIDUAL ASSETS 
ORS INTO THE TRUST. 
gBTflftggE MOST IMPORTANT PART OF YOUR LIVING TRUST. YOUR TRUST 
ffl»BE FUNDED WITH YOUR ASSETS IN ORDER TO OPERATE PROPERLY, 
TF, THESE ITEMS ARE NOT PROPERLY TRANSFERRED INTO THE TRUST THEY MAY 
STILL BE SUBJECT TO PROBATET 
**** Please follow each set of instructions carefully. We have 
first indicated how to transfer each item to the trust and then 
given you an area to list each of the items in the separate areas. 
**** We advise you to complete these lists as thoroughly as 
possible as they will be very helpful for successor trustees in 
locating the items and accounts as well as a check list to make 
sure that you have completed the transfers. 
**** Do not hesitate to call the attorney or a legal assistant if 
you have any questions about these procedures, 
**** Since you are the grantor and the beneficiary of this trust 
agreement during your lifetime, and the trust income is the same as 
your personal income (which you report on your personal income tax 
returns), then no special IRS election or return is required for 
the trust during your lifetime. Therefore, your social security 
numbers may still be used as identification on these accounts. 
Whenever this trust becomes irrevocable, you (or your successor 
trustees) should contact an accountant or tax attorney for 
information on any necessary changes. 
*••* From this date forward your assets should be acquired with 
THE RICHARD D. SNOW FAMILY TRUST as legal owner of the assets 
(except for automobiles and personal property). This is usually 
donevTDy putting the following statement on the assets: 
[RICHARD D. SNOW AS TRUSTEE OR SUCCESSOR TRUSTEES OF THE 
ti^KARD D. SNOW FAMILY TRUST. 
**** It is a good idea to keep your documents in a safe deposit 
box or safe. To help in keeping your trust currently funded, a 
copy of this schedule should be kept handy at home. After 
initially completing your asset transfers and asset listings, you 
should update and review your trust, and more particularly your 
SCHEDULE "A" annually, perhaps each year when filing taxes• This 
will insure that nothing has been left out of the trust for tb^t 
year. 
**** When completing asset transfers, you may use the letters 
provided. If there are not enough letters you may make as many 
copies of the letters as you need, but be sure to copy them before 
signing them. A transfer letter will require an original signature 
to be valid. 
**** We also suggest keeping a copy of your completed and signed 
transfer letters in the event a letter is lost or destroyed before 




REAL PROPERTY AMD 
REAL PROPERTY CONTRACTS 
AL PROPERTY 
hL PROPERTY MUST UK TRANSFERRED TO THE TRUST HY LEuAL DEED. 
DEED EACH PIECE OF REAL PROPERTY FROM THE GRANTOR (BE SURE TO 
L -)i'?. FHLT. LEGA1' H W F r'15 '''^v *>•<• i en IHI i.wr.M.- ...r. 
"RICHARD D. SNOW, TRUSTEE OR '""" 
TRUSTEES OF THE RICHARD I). SNOW FAM r» 
LESi^  UttEDS MUST BE RECORDED WiTU THE COUNTY RECORDER I 
1QPERTY ADDRESS OR LOCATION DATE RECORDED 
-fl-
L PROPERTY CONTRACTS 
.. . -. v-uitnuii. .' •« I.VLI. I JU AKL ta-'.^ -NG 
. S F'.R, YOU MUST MAKF AN ASS, . . E PAYML.'.-- TO THE 
. AS WELL AS QUIT (LAIM DEEDING THE PROPERTY T> THE TRUST A 
Jn OF All ASSIGNMENT CAN RF OBTAINEr "POM '!'• \ ?,T )PNEY - :\\\ . 
:CTION T^ APPLICABLE TO YOUR m nrtr *t 
)NTwi>.i J L ^ K i F ' i i o n ' .A^Jh DATE OF ASSIGNMENT 
~MxXA/ £Z 
V 
BANK, CREDIT UNION OR SAVINGS & LOAN ACCOUNTS 
AND SAFE DEPOSIT BOXES 
EaftUKWFCRBDIT'UNION OR SAVINGS & LOAN ACCOUNTS 
'C^ERSHIP OF YOUR BANK, CREDIT UNION OR SAVINGS & LOAN CHECKING 
NGS/ACCOUNTS SHOULD BE OWNED BY THE TRUST, SO THAT IN THE 
:tif$DEATH THE TRUST IS A LEGAL OWNER AND THE TRUSTEES MAY HAVE 
TO!'THESE ACCOUNTS. 
ffiffijtDO^NOT! NEED TO HAVE NEW CHECKS PRINTED OR CHANGE THE NAME OF 
EOT£ACC0UNT,, SIMPLY INSTRUCT THE BANK TO ADD THE TRUST THE OWNER 
B§§|)BXIjSTING' ACCOUNTS. PLEASE SEE EXAMPLE LETTER 1 PROVIDED, WHICH 
[^JJPlE^.PRESENTED TO YOUR BANK, CREDIT UNION OR SAVINGS & LOAN 
^ASSOCIATION AND INSTRUCTS THEM IN THE PROPER TERMINOLOGY TO USE IN 
i§!H%TRANSFER. THIS TRANSFER SHOULD SIMPLY BE THE COMPLETION OF A 
JNEWt'SiGNATURE CARD. 
NAME OF INSTITUTION NAME/TYPE & ACCOUNT NUMBER DATE OF TRANSFER 
SAFE DEPOSIT BOX 
THE OWNERSHIP OF YOUR SAFE DEPOSIT BOX NEEDS TO BE SHARED WITH THE 
TRUST, SO THAT IN THE EVENT OF DEATH, THE RICHARD D. SNOW FAMILY 
TRUST IS A LEGAL OWNER AND THE TRUSTEES MAY HAVE ACCESS TO THIS 
SAFE BOX. ADD RICHARD D. SNOW, TRUSTEE OR SUCCESSOR TRUSTEES AS A 
JOINT TENANT ON YOUR SAFE DEPOSIT BOX BUT BE SURE THAT YOUR 
SUCCESSOR TRUSTEES CAN GET IN THE BOX, ESPECIALLY IF YOU HAVE 
PLACED YOUR TRUST IN THE BOX 1 
NAME OF BANKS OR INSTITUTIONS SAFE BOX # DATE OF TRANSFER 
ASQAJ'tf 
iii 
^^^QCT^OJI^^IIOI CHECKING ACCT. NO. / J ^ V ^ o , -
C , D , f S ) NMl
 • -^= OTHER ACCOUNTS: ^ 
Tn
' ti£S.AlU*_.Lk^JjJm^UAME OF BANK, CREDIT UNION OR S & L) 
I have established a Revocable Livina Trn^ t- on *->,« ^- J 
account («o nnst be change! ' 
•'• :J. SNJW, AS TRUSTEE OF THE RICHART « -NOW FAMILY 
19
-2J2L_- —J^-- •. >^_r^  frg^__, 
As this trust will now provide a successor to this account it 
- monger necessary to have anyone elKP nn Z\ • docuuuL, xL 
-se remove all n t w T , ™ ^ * JL n t h i s acc°unt with me. 
stated al^ve? accordina
 t o ! L T Jhe8e a c c o u n ^ other than as 
n„ ^ H 0 0 ^ e x i s t i ng tax laws, my social sec-
; r ^ ^
x
 identification number for the «VuV ' ^ ^ 
lerxfxcat.on that this transaction has beV ^pleted^* ^ " ^ 
Thank you for your help in this matter. 
DATED this _ _ £ _
 d a y o f ^ ^ ^ 1993_ 
Sincerely, 
J.K^ E^P 1 
BANK, CREDIT UNION OR SAVTN " *,0AN INSTRUCTION LETTER 
SECURITY, FINANCIAL AND/OR BROKERAGE ACCOUNTS, 
DIVIDEND REINVESTMENT ACCOUNTS AND STOCK CERTIFICATES 
THESE ACCOUNTS SHOULD BE OWNED BY YOUR FAMILY TRUST. PLEASE 
INSTRUCT THE BROKER TO MAKE THE TRUST THE NEW OWNER OF YOUR PRESENT 
ACCOUNT. YOU MAY PRESENT EXAMPLE LETTER 2 TO YOUR BROKER WHICH 
INSTRUCTS THEM IN THE PROPER' TERMINOLOGY TO USE IN THE TRANSFER. 
THIS SHOULD ALSO BE DONE FOR DIVIDEND REINVESTMENT ACCOUNTS. IF 
YOUR PARTICULAR BROKER REQUIRES A COPY OF YOUR TRUST, THEN COPY 
ONLY UP TO THE SIGNATURE PAGE. SCHEDULE "A" IS A PERSONAL 
ACCOUNTING AND SHOULD NOT BE INCLUDED. 
NAME/TYPE & ACCOUNT NUMBER BROKERAGE FIRM DATE OF TRANSFER 
=rf= 
STOCKS 
IF YOU HAVE ACTUAL STOCK CERTIFICATES, CONTACT YOUR BROKER, 
TRANSFER A.GENT, OR THE COMPANY THAT ISSUED THE STOCK AND REQUEST 
THAT IT BE REISSUED IN THE NAME OF YOUR TRUST: RICHARD D. SNOW 
TRUSTEE OR SUCCESSOR TRUSTEES OF THE RICHARD D. SNOW FAMILY TRUST. 
IF YOU DO NOT HAVE CERTIFICATES PLEASE FOLLOW THE INSTRUCTIONS FOR 
SECURITIES & BROKERAGE ACCOUNTS ABOVE. 
NAME/TYPE & NUMBER OF SHARES DATE OF TRANSFER 
f%5 fNAMI* f i r T\P\1} \> r i n> K i j ' M ) 
„JB>:« SNOW, TRUSTEE 
jt^abjishew .. Revocal i e ;.; , i..; .. -
"sting- s e c u r i t i e s . ij .neincia .:.. 
your f inm i n t o my T r u s : . . P l e a s e maks 
ESSS:Pfffiny acrourr- -v y - ; r ' . -
, .« tJ t j b ... J. ^ L O 
b r o k e r a g e 
DAY;OF 
* -ii.-.w . . SNOW FAMILY TRUST I.l/A 
1
 Q ', 7 
[.provide v e r i f i c a t i o n * 
day of 
- e n 
RlCHARD|D;tSNOW 
LKq iTyP 
SECURITIES,. FlNAMi LAI AI Hi n BROKERAGE ACCOUNTS 
« > 
LIFE INSURANCE POLICIES 
LIFE INSURANCE POLICIES 
CONTACT YOUR LIFE INSURANCE CARRIER BY SENDING EXAMPLE LETTER AND 
REQUEST A "CHANGE OF BENEFICIARY". YOU MUST CHANGE THE FIRST 
BENEFICIARY TO: TRUSTEE OR SUCCESSOR TRUSTEES OF THE RICHARD D. 
SNOW FAMILY TRUST. 
YOU MAY PRESENT EXAMPLE LETTER 3 TO THE LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY 
WHICH WILL INSTRUCT THEM AS TO THE CORRECT TERMINOLOGY IN MAKING 
THIS CHANGE. 
IF YOU HAVE A LIFE INSURANCE WITH FEDERAL EMPLOYEES GROUP LIFE 
INSURANCE PLEASE REQUEST A SPECIAL FORM FROM YOUR PERSONNEL OFFICE. 
NAME/POLICY NUMBER & TYPE VALUE DATE OF TRANSFER 
3o pJ?/M£AJT A,re ^ona nn ^ - AJauQM b PAL 1993 
& /?<}/ 9#06 
s £ U V / ? o DlJcj FT ?T^///AS<I 
ACCOUNT OR POLICY NO. 
TO AJfi7k)fJ & I See VtCe As f7^ i M F E T^SURAirF COMPANY) 
I h a v e e s t a b l i s h e d a R e v o c a b l e .A\ K_ i i . t h e <g? d a y 
o f AJasiZ+th CK 19 5 5 r and l e s i r e t< -Jhango t . \ e f i r s t b e n e f i c i a r y 
o f my l i f e i n s u r a n c e po.,1 I c j r ' i F* % ••• : as follows: 
TRUSTEE OR SUCCESi l . r ? ^ f! il- u I CHARD 
D . SNOW F AM II .1 TK* 
Because I have established,, successoi --•.-*• - , 
no alternate beneficiary will be require 
If necessary, please send m" *:.- a; ;>: priat - 4 :.. - *o 
effectuate this char lge Please ie vei : 4 .*ati-r: t.ha- < '.. 
transact ion has been completed. " ~' 




LIFE INSURANCE POLICIES 
ACCOUNT OR POLICY NO. 3 o^8 ?'</ 
TO /cc/frg/ £**4dAyt>* /^hoopi (LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY) 
I have established a Revocable Living Trust on the 
°f AJb\J fMheiL. i 19 c5t3.r anci desire to change the first beneficiary 
of my life insurance policy(ies) with you to read as follows: 
TRUSTEE OR SUCCESSOR TRUSTEES OF THE RICHARD 
D. SNOW FAMILY TRUST. 
Because I have established successor trustees of this Trust, 
no alternate beneficiary will be required. 
If necessary, please send me the appropriate forms to 
effectuate this change. Please provide verification that this 
transaction has been completed. 
Thank you in advance for your assistance in this matter. 
Sincerely, 
RICHARD D. SNOW 
<Ti/ 
LETTER 3 
LIFE INSURANCE POLICIES 
PENSIONS. ANNUITIES AND I-R&rBCCggBTS 
PENSIONS. ANNUITIES AND IRA ACCOUNTS 
PLEASE CHANGE THE BENEFICIARY OF THESE ACCOUNTS TO: THE RICHARD D. 
SNOW FAMILY TRUST. 
YOU MAY PRESENT EXAMPLE LETTER 4 TO THE FIRMS THAT MAINTAIN THESE 
ACCOUNTS, WHICH WILL INSTRUCT THEM AS TO THE PROPER TERMINOLOGY IN 
MAKING THIS CHANGE. 
NAME/TYPE & ACCOUNT NUMBER VALUE DATE OF TRANSFER 
POLICY NO. 
TO __: (LIFE COMPANY) 
I have established a Revocable Living Trust on the day 
of , 19 , and desire to change the first beneficiary 
of my life policy(ies) with you to read as follows: 
TRUSTEE OR SUCCESSOR TRUSTEES OF THE 
FAMILY TRUST. 
Because I have established successor trustees of this Trust, 
no alternate beneficiary will be required. 
If necessary, please send me the appropriate forms to 
effectuate this change. Please provide verification that this 
transaction has been completecTT ' ' 
Thank you in advance for your assistance in this matter. 
Sincerely, 
LETTER 3 
BUSINESS ". KTERFSTS . TAPTN™'"! 1" 
, .^ -CEIVABLES 
AND BONDS 
BUSINESS INTERESTS, PARTNERSHIP INTERESTS & OTHER CONTRACTS. NOTES 
& RECEIVABLES 
COMPLETE A TRANSFER AGREEMENT AND ASSIGNMENT TRANSFERRING ALL SUCH 
INTERESTS TO THE TRUST. SEE ATTORNEY FOR SPECIAL FORMS IN 
COMPLETING THESE TRANSFERS. 
NAME & TYPE OF INTEREST OR NOTE VALUE DATE OF TRANSFER 
j^± 
BONDS 
BONDS CAN BE CASHED IN AT MATURITY ..'; . .... ,-, . ,u TRUSTEE .^  --^ 
RICHARD D. SNOW FAMILY TRUST, HOWEVER, THE TRUSTEE MUST PROVIDE THE 
TREASURY DEPARTMENT WITH A COPY OF THE FRONT PAKE, TRUSTEE PAGE & 
SIGNATURE PAGE OF THE RICHARD D. SNOW FAMILY Tirjrr. EXISTING BONDS 
DO NOT NEED TO BE CHANGED, HOWEVER WHEN F'lRCF.A.'-'ING NEW BONDS YOU 
SHOULD DO SO IN THE NAME OF THE TRUST. 
BOND/TYPE NUMBER & VALUE 
T7t^ 
v I i 
"LETTER OF DISPOSITION OF PERSONAL EFFECTS" 
OF RICHARD D. SNOW 
AN APPENDAGE TO THE RICHARD D. SNOW FAMILY TRUST 
'WHICH BY REFERENCE IS MADE A PART THEREOF 
In accordance with Article III, Subparagraph B of the 
foregoing Trust Agreement The Undersigned hereby bequeaths to the 
following named persons the following personal effects listed 
below: To #vby.My£c 
VC 
/Wo^AcVVg-vft-- /AllrlA>&l?OQAA S*rf To 1A,, A„dUr _ 
ll^A V N,I1*«J. *i#v iXi " Wf . \fooR Bezs-t +&/J3J 7^A/^-3 
, -^rt fy UTAH- F-Vtf 1» 7V M AG.\>A\/n^ WfeahAtiT' 
m 5 O W SAX ^ Vy O f t SLy»*A>A,A 
A1L hTi+cHfAJ Ctj>/4t*$ I c? /3c-'P->/o/<;-t Ggyj/ft/ J^a^/is 
Pai-J J PHAJ\ s,/*</t usee* 0<£Sk- 4 Qh$t0 
<< 
H/AsHf* * eftY'-Z Ac*>& T-^l*. Coarof. pro 
ALL fc3Tl<* frtn*.M,TvA<r 
fit" A9k +€«U t/A*£<? 
BAAKK- su,**- ,VASJT 
< • MAK&A -el CUM 
kstttt CJtys-?Xh iA'afcy
 u _ _ 
TH>O A^i^tfRvoM AB.ufrS
 m 
T h e s e i t e m s s h a l l b e d i s t r i b u t e d a s i n s t r u c t e d h e r e i n and t h i t f 
l e t t e r of d i s p o s i t i o n of p e r s o n a l e f f e c t s and t h e d i s t r i b u t i o n s 
t h e r e i n s h a l l n o t i n v a l i d a t e any o t h e r p r o v i s i o n s of t h e f o r e g o i n g 
T r u s t Agreement* 
DATED t h i s ff day of A/n\lBM^df 1 9 J 3 -
RICHARD D. SNOW 
v i i i 
rT.TETTER OF DISPOSITION OF PERSONAL EFFECTS" 
- -: K1JI1AK1'. . _ . -t r» . • 
*
W
 APPENDAGE TO THE RICHARD 1.). SNOW FAMILY TRUST 
WHICH BY REFERENCE IS MADE A PART THEREOF 
in iinronliiii' K ' ppnrnrjrapli I' < * ' iie 
foregoxny Trust L^eeiiifeUi- x n^ undersigned. lu.-reJjy DequeaLi.^ ' ' hp 
following named persons the follow.iny unisonal effects ..r* :>••. 
\ i'j 1 o w : 
i ^ [ £ J fr-o xx .._ _. i „ i ,/:»^ T ^a r y 
These i t e m s s h a l l be d i s t r i b u t e d \<* MC* — * ..-j h o r r . i n anr; t v i i s 
' " t t R J I - . , 
, „ _* ^^^,— ns 
t h e r e i n s h a l l .\-• . w a u a a t e an\ c t a e , p r o v i s i o n s ^: t ; ^ f o r e g o i n g 
T r u s t Agreemen t . 
^ ^
 ,tj
* ' Lrui. _A„__ -ddj uj ^ oof&L* *hf>nt i n t } 3 . 
"LETTER OF DISPOSITION OF PERSONAL EFFECTS" 
OF RICHARD D. SNOW 
AN APPENDAGE TO THE RICHARD D. SNOW FAMILY TRUST 
WHICH BY REFERENCE IS MADE A PART THEREOF 
In accordance with Article III, Subparagraph B of the 
foregoing Trust Agreement The Undersigned hereby bequeaths to the 
following named persons the following personal effects listed 
b e l o w s
 To ^<9fc/A s^ocu 
3 CAyi-Txf ASH TTAVT 
.> QwGf 4c.Antfis - M 3 c f f 
SJ/Ae. fiojurte .it -rAidm 
^UsAJLk 6-eftMAAj -nif>/*7*Y. 
OU f>auniv*J C&±a»*A.^ 
--77K R*A 
s )d UOMML t\S. 
^ M\ ILI%**I -M iro ftA s. 
These item, shall be distributed as instructed herein and this 
letter oi disposition of personal effects and the distributions 
,tK«ein -nail not invalidate any other provisions of the foregorng 
gny,<oft AjmutfMD*** 19£2 
RICHARD,D. SNOW 
Addendum 
75-1-201. General definitions. 
Subject to additional definitions contained in the subsequent chapters that are applicable to 
specific chapters, parts, or sections, and unless the context otherwise requires, in this code: 
(1) "Agent" includes an attorney-in-fact under a durable or nondurable power of attorney, an 
individual authorized to make decisions concerning another's health care, and an individual 
authorized to make decisions for another under a natural death act. 
(2) "Application" means a written request to the registrar for an order of informal probate or 
appointment under Title 75, Chapter 3, Part 3, Informal Probate and Appointment Proceedings. 
(3) "Beneficiary," as it relates to trust beneficiaries, includes a person who has any present or 
future interest, vested or contingent, and also includes the owner of an interest by assignment or other 
transfer; as it relates to a charitable trust, includes any person entitled to enforce the trust; as it relates 
to a "beneficiary of a beneficiary designation," refers to a beneficiary of an insurance or annuity 
policy, of an account with POD designation, of a security registered in beneficiary form (TOD), or of 
a pension, profit-sharing, retirement, or similar benefit plan, or other nonprobate transfer at death; 
and, as it relates to a "beneficiary designated in a governing instrument," includes a grantee of a deed, 
a devisee, a trust beneficiary, a beneficiary of a beneficiary designation, a donee, appointee, or taker 
in default of a power of appointment, and a person in whose favor a power of attorney or a power 
held in any individual, fiduciary, or representative capacity is exercised. 
(4) "Beneficiary designation" refers to a governing instrument naming a beneficiary of an 
insurance or annuity policy, of an account with POD designation, of a security registered in 
beneficiary form (TOD), or of a pension, profit-sharing, retirement, or similar benefit plan, or other 
nonprobate transfer at death. 
(5) "Child" includes any individual entitled to take as a child under this code by intestate 
succession from the parent whose relationship is involved and excludes any person who is only a 
stepchild, a foster child, a grandchild, or any more remote descendant. 
(6) "Claims,'' in respect to estates of decedents and protected persons, includes liabilities of the 
decedent or protected person, whether arising in contract, in tort, or otherwise, and liabilities of the 
estate which arise at or after the death of the decedent or after the appointment of a conservator, 
including funeral expenses and expenses of administration. "Claims" does not include estate or 
inheritance taxes, or demands or disputes regarding title of a decedent or protected person to specific 
assets alleged to be included in the estate. 
(7) "Conservator" means a person who is appointed by a court to manage the estate of a protected 
person. 
(8) "Court" means any of the courts of record in this state having jurisdiction in matters relating to 
the affairs of decedents. 
(9) "Descendant" of an individual means all of his descendants of all generations, with the 
relationship of parent and child at each generation being determined by the definition of child and 
parent contained in this title. 
(10) "Devise," when used as a noun, means a testamentary disposition of real or personal property 
and, when used as a verb, means to dispose of real or personal property by will. 
(11) "Devisee" means any person designated in a will to receive a devise. For the purposes of Title 
75, Chapter 3, Probate of Wills and Administration, in the case of a devise to an existing trust or 
trustee, or to a trustee in trust described by will, the trust or trustee is the devisee, 
and the beneficiaries are not devisees. 
(12) "Disability" means cause for a protective order as described by Section 75-5-401. 
(13) "Distributee" means any person who has received property of a decedent from his personal 
representative other than as a creditor or purchaser. A testamentary trustee is a distributee only to the 
extent of distributed assets or increment thereto remaining in his hands. A beneficiary of a 
testamentary trust to whom the trustee has distributed property received from a personal 
representative is a distributee of the personal representative. For purposes of this provision, 
"testamentary trustee" includes a trustee to whom assets are transferred by will, to the extent of the 
devised assets. 
(14) "Estate" includes the property of the decedent, trust, or other person whose affairs are subject 
to this title as originally constituted and as it exists from time to time during administration. 
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(15) "Exempt property" means that property of a decedent's estate which is described in Section 
75-2-403. 
(16) "Fiduciary" includes a personal representative, guardian, conservator, and trustee. 
(17) "Foreign personal representative" means a personal representative of another jurisdiction. 
(18) "Formal proceedings" means proceedings conducted before a judge with notice to interested 
persons. 
(19) "Governing instrument" means a deed, will, trust, insurance or annuity policy, account with 
POD designation, security registered in beneficiary form (TOD), pension, profit-sharing, retirement, 
or similar benefit plan, instrument creating or exercising a power of appointment or a power of 
attorney, or a dispositive, appointive, or nominative instrument of any similar type. 
(20) "Guardian" means a person who has qualified as a guardian of a minor or incapacitated 
person pursuant to testamentary or court appointment, but excludes one who is merely a guardian ad 
litem. 
(21) "Heirs," except as controlled by Section 75-2-711, means persons, including the surviving 
spouse and state, who are entitled under the statutes of intestate succession to the property of a 
decedent. 
(22) "Incapacitated person" means any person who is impaired by reason of mental illness, mental 
deficiency, physical illness or disability, chronic use of drugs, chronic intoxication, or other cause, 
except minority, to the extent of lacking sufficient understanding or capacity to make or communicate 
responsible decisions. 
(23) "Informal proceedings" mean those conducted without notice to interested persons by an 
officer of the court acting as a registrar for probate of a will or appointment of a personal 
representative. 
(24) "Interested person" includes heirs, devisees, children, spouses, creditors, beneficiaries, and 
any others having a property right in or claim against a trust estate or the estate of a decedent, ward, 
or protected person. It also includes persons having priority for appointment as personal 
representative and other fiduciaries representing interested persons. The meaning as it relates to 
particular persons may vary from time to time and shall be determined according to the particular 
purposes of, and matter involved in, any proceeding. 
(25) "Issue" of a person means descendant as defined in Subsection (9). 
(26) "Joint tenants with the right of survivorship" and "community property with the 
right of survivorship" includes coowners of property held under circumstances that entitle one or 
more to the whole of the property on the death of the other or others, but excludes forms of 
coownership registration in which the underlying ownership of each party is in proportion to that 
party's contribution. 
(27) "Lease" includes an oil, gas, or other mineral lease. 
(28) "Letters" includes letters testamentary, letters of guardianship, letters of administration, and 
letters of conservatorship. 
(29) "Minor" means a person who is under 18 years of age. 
(30) "Mortgage" means any conveyance, agreement, or arrangement in which property is used as 
security. 
(31) "Nonresident decedent" means a decedent who was domiciled in another jurisdiction at the 
time of his death. 
(32) "Organization" includes a corporation, limited liability company, business trust, estate, trust, 
partnership, joint venture, association, government or governmental subdivision or agency, or any 
other legal or commercial entity. 
(33) "Parent" includes any person entitled to take, or who would be entitled to take if the child 
died without a will, as a parent under this code by intestate succession from the child whose 
relationship is in question and excludes any person who is only a stepparent, foster parent, or 
grandparent. 
(34) "Payor" means a trustee, insurer, business entity, employer, government, governmental 
agency or subdivision, or any other person authorized or obligated by law or a governing instrument 
to make payments. 
(35) "Person" means an individual or an organization. 
(36) (a) "Personal representative" includes executor, administrator, successor personal 
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representative, special administrator, and persons who perform substantially the same function under 
the law governing their status. 
(b) "General personal representative" excludes special administrator. 
(37) "Petition" means a written request to the court for an order after notice. 
(38) "Proceeding" includes action at law and suit in equity. 
(39) "Property" includes both real and personal property or any interest therein and means 
anything that may be the subject of ownership. 
(40) "Protected person" means a person for whom a conservator has been appointed. A "minor 
protected person" means a minor for whom a conservator has been appointed because of minority. 
(41) "Protective proceeding" means a proceeding described in Section 75-5-401. 
(42) "Registrar" refers to the official of the court designated to perform the functions of registrar 
as provided in Section 75-1-307. 
(43) "Security" includes any note, stock, treasury stock, bond, debenture, evidence of 
indebtedness, certificate of interest, or participation in an oil, gas, or mining title or lease or in 
payments out of production under such a title or lease, collateral trust certificate, transferable share, 
voting trust certificate, and, in general, any interest or instrument commonly known as a security, or 
any certificate of interest or participation, any temporary or interim certificate, receipt, or certificate 
of deposit for, or any warrant or right to subscribe to or purchase, any of the foregoing. 
(44) "Settlement," in reference to a decedent's estate, includes the full process of 
administration, distribution, and closing. 
(45) "Special administrator" means a personal representative as described in Sections 75-3-614 
through 75-3-618. 
(46) "State" means a state of the United States, the District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of 
Puerto Rico, or any territory or insular possession subject to the jurisdiction of the United States. 
(47) "Successor personal representative" means a personal representative, other than a special 
administrator, who is appointed to succeed a previously appointed personal representative. 
(48) "Successors" means persons, other than creditors, who are entitled to property of a decedent 
under the decedent's will or this title. 
(49) "Supervised administration" refers to the proceedings described in Title 75, Chapter 3, Part 5, 
Supervised Administration. 
(50) "Survive," except for purposes of Part 3 of Article VI, Uniform TOD Security Registration 
Act, means that an individual has neither predeceased an event, including the death of another 
individual, nor is considered to have predeceased an event under Section 75-2-104 or 75-2-702. The 
term includes its derivatives, such as "survives," "survived," "survivor," and "surviving." 
(51) "Testacy proceeding" means a proceeding to establish a will or determine intestacy. 
(52) "Testator" includes an individual of either sex. 
(53) "Trust" includes any express trust, private or charitable, with additions thereto, wherever and 
however created. The term also includes a trust created or determined by judgment or decree under 
which the trust is to be administered in the manner of an express trust. The term excludes other 
constructive trusts, and it excludes resulting trusts, conservatorships, personal representatives, trust 
accounts as defined in Title 75, Chapter 6, Nonprobate Transfers, custodial arrangements pursuant to 
any Uniform Transfers To Minors Act, business trusts providing for certificates to be issued to 
beneficiaries, common trust funds, voting trusts, preneed funeral plans under Title 58, Chapter 58, 
Preneed Funeral Arrangement Act, security arrangements, liquidation trusts, and trusts for the 
primary purpose of paying debts, dividends, interest, salaries, wages, profits, pensions, or employee 
benefits of any kind, and any arrangement under which a person is nominee or escrowee for another. 
(54) "Trustee" includes an original, additional, or successor trustee, whether or not appointed or 
confirmed by the court. 
(55) "Ward" means a person for whom a guardian has been appointed. A "minor ward" is a minor 
for whom a guardian has been appointed solely because of minority. 
(56) "Will" includes codicil and any testamentary instrument which merely appoints an executor, 
revokes or revises another will, nominates a guardian, or expressly excludes or limits the right of an 
individual or class to succeed to property of the decedent passing by intestate succession. 
Amended by Chapter 142, 1999 General Session 
75-2-402 UNIFORM PROBATE CODE 
minor children as affected by, 6 A.L.R.3d 1387. 
Waiver of right to widow's allowance by post-
nuptial agreement, 9 A.L.R.3d 1319. 
Illegitimate child, eligibility to receive fam-
ily allowance out of estate of his deceased fa-
ther, 12 A.L.R.3d 1140. 
Key Numbers. — Homestead «=> 134. 
75-2-402. Exempt property — Amount. 
In addition to the homestead allowance, the surviving spouse of a decedent 
who was domiciled in this state is entitled from the estate to value not exceed-
ing $5,000 in excess of any security interests therein in household furniture, 
automobiles, furnishings, appliances, and personal effects. If there is no sur-
viving spouse, children of the decedent are entitled jointly to the same value. 
If encumbered chattels are selected and if the value in excess of security 
interests, plus that of other exempt property, is less than $5,000, or if there is 
not $5,000 worth of exempt property in the estate, the spouse or children are 
entitled to other assets of the estate, if any, to the extent necessary to make up 
the $5,000 value. Rights to exempt property and assets needed to make up a 
deficiency of exempt property have priority over all claims against the estate, 
except reasonable funeral expenses, and the right to any assets to make up a 
deficiency of exempt property shall abate as necessary to permit prior pay-
ment of the reasonable funeral expenses, homestead allowance, and family 
allowance. These rights are in addition to any benefit or share passing to the 
surviving spouse or children by intestate succession, but is chargeable against 
any share passing by the will of the decedent unless the will provides other-
wise. 
History: C. 1953, 75-2-402, enacted by L. 
1975, ch. 150, § 3; 1988, ch. 110, § 4. 
Editorial Board Comment. — Unlike the 
exempt values described in §§ 75-2-401 and 
75-2-403, the exempt values described in this 
section are available in a case where the dece-
dent left no spouse but left only adult children. 
The possible difference between beneficiaries 
of the exemptions described by §§ 75-2-401 
and 75-2-403, and this section, explain the pro-
vision in this section which establishes priori-
ties. 
Section 75-2-204 covers waiver of exempt 
property rights, and § 75-2-206 covers the 
question of whether a decedent's will may put 
a spouse to an election with reference to ex-
emptions. 
Cross-References. — Effect of divorce, an-
nulment and decree of separation, § 75-2-803. 
Waiver of rights by surviving spouse, 
§ 75-2-204. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
Insufficiency of estate. 
—Multiple-party accounts. 
Insufficiency of estate. 
—Multiple-party accounts. 
It was error for the probate court to deny the 
widow her exempt property claim from multi-
ple-party accounts in the name of the dece-
dent's daughter where the estate was insuffi-
cient to satisfy the claim. In re Estate of 
Wagley, 760 P.2d 316 (Utah 1988). 
50 
75-2-405. Source, determination, and documentation. 
(1) If the estate is otherwise sufficient, property specifically devised may not be used to satisfy 
rights to homestead allowance or exempt property. Subject to this restriction, the surviving spouse, 
guardians of minor children, or children who are adults may select property of the estate as 
homestead allowance and exempt property. The personal representative may make those selections if 
the surviving spouse, the children, or the guardians of the minor children are unable or fail to do so 
within a reasonable time or there is no guardian of a minor child. The personal representative may 
execute an instrument or deed of distribution to establish the ownership of property taken as 
homestead allowance or exempt property. The personal representative may determine the family 
allowance in a lump sum not exceeding $18,000 or periodic installments not exceeding $1,500 per 
month for one year, and may disburse funds of the estate in payment of the family allowance and any 
part of the homestead allowance payable in cash. The personal representative or an interested person 
aggrieved by any selection, determination, payment, proposed payment, or failure to act under this 
section may petition the court for appropriate relief, which may include a family allowance other than 
that which the personal representative determined or could have determined. 
(2) If the right to an elective share is exercised on behalf of a surviving spouse who is an 
incapacitated person, the personal representative may add any unexpended portions payable under the 
homestead allowance, exempt property, and family allowance to the trust established under 
Subsection 75-2-212(2). 
Enacted by Chapter 39, 1998 General Session 
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75-3-803. Limitations on presentation of claims. (1) All claims against a decedent's estate which 
arose before the death of the decedent, including claims of the state and any subdivision of it, whether 
due or to become due, absolute or contingent, liquidated or unliquidated, founded on contract, tort, or 
other legal basis, if not barred earlier by other statute of limitations, are barred against the estate, the 
personal representative, and the heirs and devisees of the decedent, unless presented within the earlier 
of the following dates: 
(a) one year after the decedent's death; or 
(b) within the time provided by Subsection 75-3-801(2) for creditors who are given actual notice, 
and where notice is published, within the time provided in Subsection 75-3-801 (1) for all claims 
barred by publication. 
(2) In all events, claims barred by the nonclaim statute at the decedent's domicile are also barred in 
this state. 
(3) All claims against a decedent's estate which arise at or after the death of the decedent, 
including claims of the state and any of its subdivisions, whether due or to become due, absolute or 
contingent, liquidated or unliquidated, founded on contract, tort, or other legal basis are barred 
against the estate, the personal representative, and the heirs and devisees of the decedent, unless 
presented as follows: 
(a) a claim based on a contract with the personal representative within three months after 
performance by the personal representative is due; or 
(b) any other claim within the later of three months after it arises, or the time specified in 
Subsection (l)(a). 
(4) Nothing in this section affects or prevents: 
(a) any proceeding to enforce any mortgage, pledge, or other lien upon property of the estate; 
(b) to the limits of the insurance protection only, any proceeding to establish liability of the 
decedent or the personal representative for which he is protected by liability insurance; or 
(c) collection of compensation for services rendered and reimbursement for expenses advanced by 
the personal representative or by the attorney or accountant for the personal representative of the 
estate. 
Amended by Chapter 179, 1992 General Session 
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75-7-402. Powers of trustees conferred by this part. (1) From time of creation of the trust until 
final distribution of the assets of the trust, a trustee has the power to perform, without court 
authorization, every act which a prudent man would perform for the purposes of the trust, including 
the powers specified in Subsection (3). 
(2) In the exercise of his powers, including the powers granted by this part, a trustee has a duty to 
act with due regard to his obligation as a fiduciary, according to the standard set forth in Section 75-
7-302. 
(3) A trustee has the power, subject to Subsections (1) and (2) to: 
(a) collect, hold, and retain trust assets received from a trustor until, in the judgment of the trustee, 
disposition of the assets should be made. The assets may be retained even though they include an 
asset in which the trustee is personally interested; 
(b) receive additions to the assets of the trust; 
(c) continue or participate in the operation of any business or other enterprise and effect 
incorporation, dissolution, or other change in the form of the organization of the business or 
enterprise; 
(d) acquire an undivided interest in a trust asset in which the trustee, in any trust capacity, holds an 
undivided interest; 
(e) invest and reinvest trust assets in bonds, notes, stocks of corporations regardless of class, real 
estate or any interest in real estate, interests in trusts or in any other property, or individual interests 
in property wherever it is located; 
(f) invest and reinvest trust assets in securities of an open-end or closed-end type management 
investment company or investment trust which is registered under the Investment Company Act of 
1940, as amended, including securities of any investment company or investment trust that is 
affiliated with or a subsidiary of the trustee, or to which the trustee or its affiliate or subsidiary 
provides a service such as that of an investment advisor, custodian, transfer agent, registrar, sponsor, 
distributor, manager, or otherwise, for which it receives reasonable remuneration for such service; 
(g) deposit or invest trust funds in a bank, including a bank operated by the trustee; 
(h) (i) acquire or dispose of an asset, for cash or on credit, at public or private sale; 
(ii) manage, develop, improve, exchange, partition, change the character of, or abandon a trust 
asset or any interest therein; and 
(iii) encumber, mortgage, or pledge a trust asset for a term within or extending beyond the term of 
the trust, in connection with the exercise of any power vested in the trustee; 
(i) make ordinary or extraordinary repairs or alterations in buildings or other structures, or 
demolish any improvements, raze existing or erect new party walls or buildings; 
(j) (i) subdivide, develop, or dedicate land to public use; 
(ii) make or obtain the vacation of plats and adjust boundaries; 
(iii) adjust differences in valuation on exchange or partition by giving or receiving consideration; 
or 
(iv) dedicate easements to public use without consideration; 
(k) enter, for any purpose into a lease as lessor or lessee with or without an option to purchase or 
renew for a term within or extending beyond the term of the trust; 
(1) enter into a lease or arrangement for exploration and removal of minerals or other natural 
resources or enter into a pooling or unitization agreement; 
(m) grant an option involving disposition of a trust asset, or take an option for the 
acquisition of any asset; 
(n) vote a security, in person or by general or limited proxy; 
(o) pay calls, assessments, and any other sums chargeable or accruing against or on account of 
securities; 
(p) sell or exercise stock subscription or conversion rights, consent, directly or through a 
committee or other agent, to the reorganization, consolidation, merger, dissolution, or liquidation of a 
corporation or other business enterprise; 
(q) hold property in the name of a nominee or in other form without disclosure of the trust so that 
title to the property may pass by delivery, but the trustee is liable for any act of the nominee in 
connection with the property so held; 
U++~./ / , ,™™ 1^ o+o+^ „ t ^ o / ^ ^ / W T T T T T77^/Vitm/7^ 0 8 0 1 8 him 7/19/01 
(r) insure the assets of the trust against damage or loss and the trustee against liability with respect 
to third persons; 
(s) (i) borrow money to be repaid from trust assets or otherwise; 
(ii) advance money to be repaid from trust assets or otherwise; or 
(iii) advance money for the protection of the trust, and for all expenses, losses, and liabilities 
sustained in the administration of the trust or because of the holding or ownership of any trust assets, 
for which advances with any interest the trustee has a lien on the trust assets as against the 
beneficiary; 
(t) (i) pay or contest any claim; 
(ii) settle a claim by or against the trust by compromise, arbitration, or otherwise; and 
(iii) release, in whole or in part, any claim belonging to the trust to the extent that the claim is 
uncollectible; 
(u) pay taxes, assessments, compensation of the trustee, and other expenses incurred in the 
collection, care, administration, and protection of the trust; 
(v) allocate items of income or expense to either trust income or principal, as provided by law, 
including creation of reserves out of income for depreciation, obsolescence, amortization, or for 
depletion in mineral or timber properties; 
(w) notwithstanding the provisions of Section 75-5-102, pay any sum distributable to a beneficiary 
under legal disability, without liability to the trustee, by paying the sum to the beneficiary or by 
paying the sum for the use of the beneficiary either to a legal representative appointed by the court, or 
if none, to a relative; 
(x) effect distribution of property and money in divided or undivided interests and adjust resulting 
differences in valuation; 
(y) (i) employ persons, including attorneys, auditors, investment advisers, or agents, even if they 
are associated with the trustee, to advise or assist the trustee in the performance of his administrative 
duties; 
(ii) act without independent investigation upon their recommendations; and 
(iii) instead of acting personally, employ one or more agents to perform any act of administration, 
whether or not discretionary; 
(z) prosecute or defend actions, claims, or proceedings for the protection of trust assets and of the 
trustee in the performance of his duties; and 
(aa) execute and deliver all instruments which will accomplish or facilitate the exercise of the 
powers vested in the trustee. 
(4) If a governing instrument or order requires or authorizes investment in United States 
government obligations, a trustee may invest in those obligations, either directly or in the form of 
securities or other interests, in any open-end or closed-end management type investment company or 
investment trust registered under the provisions of the Investment Company Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. 
Sections 80a-1 through 80a-64 if: 
(a) the portfolio of the investment company or investment trust is limited to United States 
government obligations, and repurchase agreements are fully collateralized by United States 
government obligations; and 
(b) the investment company or investment trust takes delivery of the collateral for any repurchase 
agreement either directly or through an authorized custodian. 
(5) The trustee may exercise the powers set forth in this section and in the trust either in the name 
of the trust or in the name of the trustee as trustee, specifically including the right to take title to 
encumber or convey assets, including real property, in the name of the trust. This subsection applies 
to a trustee's exercise of trust powers both prior to and after the effective date of this subsection. After 
the effective date of this subsection, for recording purposes, the name and address of at least one 
trustee must be included on all recorded documents affecting real property to which the trust is a 
party in interest. 
(6) (a) If the fair market value of a trust is less than $25,000, the trustee may terminate the trust by 
the following procedure: 
(i) the trustee shall determine a plan of distribution that agrees, as nearly as possible, with the 
trust's dispositive plan; 
(ii) the trustee shall give notice to all interested persons of its intent to distribute the assets in 
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accordance with the plan unless an interested person objects within 20 days after the date of the 
notice; 
(iii) if no objection is received within 20 days after the date of the notice, the trustee shall proceed 
to distribute the trust assets in accordance with the plan; 
(iv) if the trustee receives a written objection to the plan within 20 days of the date of the notice, 
the trustee shall not distribute the assets of the trust, but may then petition the court for an order 
authorizing distribution in accordance with the plan. The court shall have plenary authority to 
approve, modify, or reject the trustee's petition. 
(b) The existence of a spendthrift or similar provision shall not effect the trustee's powers under 
this subsection unless the trust instrument specifically provides that the trustee shall not have the 
power to terminate the trust. 
Amended by Chapter 179, 1992 General Session 
Download Code Section Zipped WP 6/7/8 75_08018.ZIP 8,183 Bytes 
Sections in this ChapteijChapters in this TitlejATl TitlesjLegislative Home Page 
Last revised: Wednesday, April 25, 2001 
.. mnnrr n r / i _ ^ mc A O A I O I_^__ H H ^ / A I 
104 Utah 813 PACIFIC REPORTER, 2d SERIES 
merit, in my view. We tolerate nonuni-
formity of result in negligence cases all the 
time. Nothing this Court does can bring 
about uniformity of result with respect to 
drugs. The states are already divided on 
the issue of whether FDA approval of a 
drug should confer immunity from design 
defects, although it appears that no state 
has gone as far as Utah now does. Suffice 
to say, a number of courts apply comment 
k on a case-by-case basis—a task that can-
not be avoided even under the majority's 
position if a strict liability claim is coupled 
with a negligence claim, as is usually the 
case. 
Significantly, Congress has not shared 
this Court's professed concern for uniform-
ity. Whatever lack of uniformity there has 
been in drug cases has been insufficient to 
justify uniform national products liability 
legislation. Furthermore, the Legislature 
of this State thought that a presumption 
was sufficient protection for manufactur-
ers rather than outright immunity. See 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-15-6(3) (1987). It is 
indeed ironic that the policy of uniformity 
weighs more heavily in this Court than in 
the United States Congress or the Utah 
Legislature. We can only deal with the 
law in Utah, and the possibility of patch-
work verdicts on a nationwide basis is sim-
ply beyond our power to affect. In short, 
the majority simply deprives Utahns of a 
judicial remedy for injuries sustained from 
defectively designed drugs, despite the fact 
that citizens of other states may recover 
for those injuries. 
In this case, plaintiff Ilo Marie Grund-
berg was taking a variety of medications 
for chronic depression and anxiety. Hal-
cion, the medication at issue here, had first 
been prescribed for Mrs. Grundberg on 
May 21, 1987.* In December 1987, Mrs. 
Grundberg lost her job and, shortly there-
after, moved with her mother, Mildred 
Coats, to Hurricane, Utah, where they lived 
together in a mobile home. On June 19, 
1988, Mrs. Grundberg took three medi-
cations: Valium, codeine, and Halcion. La-
ter that night, she shot and killed her moth-
er. Mrs. Grundberg was charged with 
4. Halcion is the trade name for triazolam, a 
prescription medication used for treatment of 
insomnia. Triazolam is one of a class of drugs 
crimina] homicide. Because of alienists' re-
ports, the Washington County prosecutor 
dropped all criminal charges on February 7, 
1989. Mrs. Grundberg and Janice Gray, 
the personal representative of Mrs. Coats' 
estate, filed this civil action later in 1989. 
At issue in this case is whether Halcion 
was the cause of Mrs. Grundberg's bizarre 
behavior on the night of the homicide. 
If Halcion was a causative agent, it is 
significant that The Physicians' Desk Ref-
erence (1990 ed.) lists nine other hypnotic 
agents available for use. At least two of 
the other hypnotics and one other medi-
cation listed as a sleeping aid are benzo-
diazepines and are, therefore, of the same 
general type as Halcion. In addition, the 
same reference lists thirteen sedatives that 
are on the market. The majority ignores 
the fact that the FDA found Halcion to be 
neither unique nor particularly essential 
and presented no advancement over exist-
ing therapeutic alternatives. Perhaps not 
all would have been appropriate medi-
cations, but with so many possible alterna-
tives, it is doubtful that Halcion should be 
immune from strict liability. 
I also join Justice HOWE's dissent. 
A. Wayne WINEGAR and Mary 
Winegar, his wife, Plaintiffs 
and Appellees, 
v. 
FROERER CORP., a Utah corporation; 
P.F. Investments, a Utah limited part-
nership; and Fredrick Froerer, III, 
Zane Froerer, and Phyllis Froerer, indi-
viduals, Defendants and Appellants. 
No. 890160. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
May 17, 1991. 
Purchasers brought action against as-
signees of executory land sale contract, 
known as benzodiazepines. Halcion, which is 
manufactured by Upjohn, was approved by the 
FDA in November 1982. 
WINEGAR v. FROERER CORP. 
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seeking to rescind contract and to receive 
judgment for amount they had paid under 
purchase agreement. The Third District 
Court, Salt Lake County, James S. Sawaya, 
J., granted purchasers' motion for sum-
mary judgment. Assignees appealed. The 
Supreme Court, Durham, J., held that: (1) 
genuine issue of material fact, as to par-
ties' intent in making assignment "subject 
to" covenants and conditions contained in 
agreement of sale, precluded summary 
judgment, and (2) mere transfer of warran-
ty deed as one component of assignment 
transaction did not automatically establish 
that parties intended conveyance of title to 
property, and parol evidence was necessary 
to determine what effect to give to that 
transfer. 
Reversed and remanded. 
1. Judgment <s=>181(2, 3) 
Summary judgment is appropriate only 
when there is no genuine issue of material 
fact and moving party is entitled to judg-
ment as matter of law. Rules Civ.Proc, 
Rule 56(c). 
2. Appeal and Error <3=»863, 934(1) 
In reviewing trial court's rulings, Su-
preme Court accepts facts and inferences 
in light most favorable to losing party; 
because summary judgment is granted as 
matter of law, it may reconsider trial 
court's legal conclusions. Rules Civ.Proc, 
Rule 56(c). 
3. Assignments <s=»31 
Assignment is transfer of rights; del-
egation is transfer of duties. 
4. Assignments <s=»18 
Generally, all beneficial rights under 
executory contract are assignable. 
5. Assignments @=»90 
Absent assumption of liability, assign-
ment of contract does not impose on as-
signee the assignor's duties or liabilities 
under contract. 
6. Assignments <s=»137 
Burden of proof is on party who as-
serts that there has been assumption of 
assignor's liabilities to show assumption.by 
"clear and unequivocal" evidence. 
7. Assignments <§=>72 
Assignment is interpreted according to 
rules of contract construction. 
8. Contracts <3=>147(1) 
In interpreting contract, intentions of 
parties are controlling. 
9. Contracts <®=>147(2) 
If contract is in writing and language 
is not ambiguous, intention of parties must 
be determined from words of agreement. 
10. Evidence <s=>448 
Court may only consider extrinsic evi-
dence if, after careful consideration, con-
tract language is ambiguous or uncertain. 
11. Contracts e=>143(2) 
Contract provision is ambiguous if it is 
capable of more than one reasonable inter-
pretation because of uncertain meanings of 
terms, missing terms, or other facial defi-
ciencies. 
12. Contracts <s=>176(2) 
Whether ambiguity exists in contract 
is question of law. 
13. Judgment <s=>181(19) 
Motion for summary judgment may 
not be granted if legal conclusion is 
reached that ambiguity in contract exists 
and there is factual issue as to what parties 
intended. 
14. Judgment <s=>181(29) 
Genuine issue of material fact, as to 
intent of parties to assignment of exec-
utory land sale contract "subject to" cove-
nants and conditions contained in agree-
ment of sale, precluded summary judgment 
for purchasers in action to rescind contract 
and to receive judgment for amount paid 
under purchase agreement. 
15. Deeds <s=>56(2) 
Conveyance is valid only upon delivery 
of deed with present intent to transfer. 
16. Deeds <*=>56(2) 
It is possible for party to transfer war-
ranty deed without intending to convey 
property. 
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17. Deeds <S=>56(2) 
Evidence <3=>450(3) 
Mere transfer of warranty deed as 
component of assignment transaction did 
not automatically establish that parties in-
tended to convey title to property; thus, 
Darties' intent was not evident on face of 
iocuments and parol evidence was neces-
sary to determine what effect to give to 
xansfer of warranty deed. 
David R. Olsen, Paul M. Simmons, Salt 
-iake City, for Froerer Corp. 
Joseph S. Knowlton, Salt Lake City, for 
Vinegars. 
DURHAM, Justice: 
Plaintiffs Wayne and Mary Winegar 
nought this action against the assignee of 
n executory land sale contract of which 
hey were purchasers. They sought to re-
cind the contract and to receive a judg-
lent for the amount they had paid under 
le purchase agreement. The district 
Durt granted their motion for summary 
ldgment. We reverse. 
In 1979, the Winegars entered into an 
greement to purchase property in Du-
lesne County, Utah. The agreement pro-
ided that upon payment in full of the 
Lirchase price, Ranch Liquidators of Utah, 
ic. ("Ranch Liquidators1'), the sellers of 
te property, would deliver to the Wine-
irs a warranty deed and a title insurance 
)licy. In 1980, Ranch Liquidators as-
gned that contract to Froerer Corporation 
the Froerers") as part of a larger trans-
ition in which the Froerers purchased 
renty-three executory land sale contracts 
om Ranch Liquidators in the same area. 
: the time of the assignment, Ranch Liq-
dators also gave the Froerers a warranty 
ed to the property named in the Wine-
irs' agreement. The Froerers did not 
en record the deed, but kept it in their 
fice. 
The Froerers and Ranch Liquidators first 
'ned an agreement in April 1980, giving 
3 Froerers limited recourse against 
inch Liquidators for claims by the real 
iate buyers for any consideration that 
was not Ranch Liquidators' responsibility 
under the original land sale contracts. The 
assignment agreement, executed in June 
1980 between Ranch Liquidators and the 
Froerers, transferred Ranch Liquidators' 
"right, title, interest and equity" in the 
purchase agreement between Ranch Liqui-
dators and the Winegars. The Froerers 
accepted the assignment "subject to the 
covenants and conditions contained in the 
[original land sale agreement]." No men-
tion was made of whether the parties in-
tended to assign Ranch Liquidators' obli-
gations and liabilities under the contract. 
Similarly, the agreement failed to mention 
what the parties intended when Ranch Liq-
uidators gave the Froerers the warranty 
deed. 
The Winegars paid all remaining pay-
ments on the purchase agreement to the 
Froerers and completed paying on the con-
tract in May 1984. When the Winegars 
demanded a warranty deed for the proper-
ty from the Froerers, the Froerers instruct-
ed them to request the deed from Ranch 
Liquidators. Ranch Liquidators was un-
able to convey the property to the Wine-
gars, however, because it had conveyed the 
property to a third party by quitclaim deed 
in 1982. Because the Winegars had never 
recorded their interest under the purchase 
agreement and the Froerers had never re-
corded the warranty deed, Ranch Liqui-
dators' 1982 quitclaim conveyance was val-
id. In an unsuccessful effort to resolve the 
dispute, the Froerers gave the Winegars 
the unrecorded warranty deed the Froerers 
had received from Ranch Liquidators. The 
Winegars recorded this deed together with 
a quitclaim deed executed by the Froerers 
to them. 
In August 1987, the Winegars brought 
this action against the Froerers, alleging 
that the Froerers (1) negligently failed to 
record the warranty deed, allowing the 
property to be deeded to third parties, (2) 
negligently failed to make payments to the 
fee owner, allowing the property to be fore-
closed, (3) were unjustly enriched by the 
amounts it had received under the purchase 
agreement, and (4) breached the purchase 
agreement by failing to provide the Wine-
WINEGAR v. Fl 
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gars with a warranty deed and title insur-
ance. 
In their motion for summary judgment, 
the Winegars sought to rescind the pur-
chase agreement they had originally en-
tered into with Ranch Liquidatorsl and 
requested a judgment for the amount they 
had paid under the purchase agreement. 
In response to the Winegars' motion, the 
Froerers submitted the affidavit of Fre-
drick Froerer, III, which stated that (1) the 
assignment to the Froerers was an assign-
ment only of the rights to receive payments 
due under the purchase agreement, (2) the 
Froerers never agreed to assume Ranch 
Liquidators' liabilities under the purchase 
agreement, and (3) the Froerers did not 
intend acceptance of the assignment to con-
stitute an assumption of Ranch Liqui-
dators' liabilities. The Winegars did not 
submit any affidavits disputing Mr. Froer-
er's testimony, relying instead on the doc-
uments appended to their brief. 
By a minute entry dated January 31, 
1989, the trial court granted the Winegars' 
summary judgment motion "as prayed" 
based on "the rationale submitted and ar-
gued by the plaintiff" in support of the 
motion, which the court found to be "the 
more reasonable under the facts and . . . 
more in support of the apparent intent of 
the parties." 
On appeal, the Froerers argue that be-
cause they were not parties to the original 
purchase agreement between Ranch Liqui-
dators and the Winegars, they had no obli-
gation to convey clear title to the Winegars 
under that agreement unless they specifi-
cally assumed such an obligation. The 
Froerers argue that the agreements be-
tween Ranch Liquidators and themselves 
show no intent to assign liabilities, or at 
least are ambiguous as to whether such an 
assumption was intended. The Froerers 
also argue that the trial court erred in 
concluding, without considering the parties' 
intent, that there was an unconditional de-
livery of the warranty deed to them, con-
veying title. The Froerers assert that the 
trial court should have allowed parol evi-
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dence as to the intent of the parties on both 
issues. 
The issues we must address on appeal 
are (1) whether the assignment between 
Ranch Liquidators and the Froerers clearly 
assigned the duties as well as the benefits 
of the executory contract, and (2) whether 
giving the Froerers the warranty deed, as a 
matter of law, conveyed title to the proper-
ty. 
[1,2] Summary judgment is appropriate 
only when there is no genuine issue of 
material fact and the moving party is enti-
tled to judgment as a matter of law. Utah 
R.Civ.P. 56(c); Allen v. Ortezy 802 P.2d 
1307, 1309 (Utah 1990). In reviewing the 
trial court's ruling, we accept the facts and 
inferences in the light most favorable to 
the losing party. Because summary judg-
ment is granted as a matter of law, we may 
reconsider the trial court's legal conclu-
sions. Farmers New World Life Ins. Co. 
v. Bountiful City, 803 P.2d 1241, 1243 
(Utah 1990). 
We first address whether the trial court 
properly concluded, as a matter of law, that 
the Froerers assumed Ranch Liquidators' 
liabilities under the purchase agreement 
when they accepted an assignment of the 
agreement. We begin our analysis by re-
viewing applicable assignment principles. 
[3-5] An assignment is the transfer of 
rights; a delegation is the transfer of 
duties. First American Commerce v. 
Washington Mut. Sav., 743 P.2d 1193, 
1194 (Utah 1987) (citing J. Calamari & J. 
Perillo, Contracts § 18-24 (2d ed. 1977)). 
Generally, all beneficial rights under an 
executory contract are assignable. 
Wohlschlegel v. Uhlmann-Kihei, Inc., 4 
Hawaii App. 123, 662 P.2d 505, 514 (1983) 
(citing 6 Am.Jur.2d Assignments § 9 
(1963)). Absent an assumption of liability, 
however, the assignment of a contract does 
not impose on the assignee the assignor's 
duties or liabilities under the contract. See 
Murr v. Selag Corp., 113 Idaho 773, 747 
P.2d 1302, 1309 (Ct.App. 1987); Wohlschle-
gel v. Uhlmann-Kihei, Inc., 662 P.2d at 
514; see also Higgenbotham v. Topel, 9 
1. Ranch Liquidators was not made a party to this litigation. 
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Wash.App. 254, 511 P.2d 1365, 1368 (1973) 
(requiring assignee to expressly assume as-
signor's obligations); Cuchine v. H.O. Bell, 
Inc., 210 Mont. 312, 682 P.2d 723, 725 
(1984) (assignee liable only if it is "clearly 
shown that the assignee . . . expressly or 
impliedly assumed the assignor's liability"). 
[6] In Radley v. Smith, 6 Utah 2d 314, 
313 P.2d 465, 466-67 (1957), we stated that 
whether an assignment of the entire con-
tract includes an assumption of liabilities 
depends on the terms of the assignment 
and the parties' intent. We noted that 
whenever uncertainty or ambiguity exists 
with respect to the assumption, "it is prop-
er for the court to consider all of the facts 
and circumstances, including the words and 
actions of the parties forming the back-
ground of the transaction." Id. The bur-
den of proof is on the party who asserts 
that there has been an assumption of the 
assignor's liabilities to show assumption by 
"clear and unequivocal" evidence. Murr, 
741 P.2d at 1309 (citations omitted). 
[7-12] An assignment is interpreted ac-
cording to the rules of contract construc-
tion. See Farr v. Link, 746 P.2d 431, 433 
(Wyo.1987). In interpreting a contract, the 
intentions of the parties are controlling. 
John Call Eng'g, Inc. v. Manti City Corp., 
743 P.2d 1205, 1207 (Utah 1987). If the 
contract is in writing and the language is 
not ambiguous, the intention of the parties 
must be determined from the words of the 
agreement. See Atlas Corp. v. Clovis 
Natl Bank, 737 P.2d 225, 229 (Utah 1987); 
Oberhansly v. Earle, 572 P.2d 1384, 1386 
(Utah 1977). A court may only consider 
extrinsic evidence if, after careful consider-
ation, the contract language is ambiguous 
or uncertain. Faulkner v. Farnsworth, 
665 P.2d 1292, 1293 (Utah 1983). A con-
tract provision is ambiguous if it is capable 
of more than one reasonable interpretation 
because of "uncertain meanings of terms, 
missing terms, or other facial deficiencies." 
Id.; see also Mann v. Wetter, 100 Or.App. 
184, 785 P.2d 1064, 1067 (1990). Whether 
ambiguity exists in a contract is a question 
of law. Faulkner, 665 P.2d at 1293. 
[13] In this case, the trial court granted 
the Winegars' motion for summary judg-
ment. The only parol evidence offered 
came from the Froerers and wholly sup-
ported their position. We must therefore 
assume that the trial court found the con-
tract unambiguous and must have thus dis-
regarded the Froerers' evidence. We may 
uphold the trial court's ruling only if we 
agree that the contract was unambiguous. 
As this court observed in Big Butte Ranch, 
Inc. v. Holm, 570 P.2d 690, 691 (Utah 
1977), we first examine the language of the 
instrument, according to it the weight and 
effect it shows the parties intended. If the 
meaning is ambiguous or uncertain, parol 
evidence of the parties' intentions should 
be admitted. A motion for summary judg-
ment may not be granted if a legal conclu-
sion is reached that an ambiguity exists 
and there is a factual issue as to what the 
parties intended. Faulkner, 665 P.2d at 
1293. 
[14] As mentioned above, two doc-
uments made up the assignment agreement 
between Ranch Liquidators and the Wine-
gars. The first document limited the 
Froerers' recourse against Ranch Liqui-
dators. That agreement provided: 
[Ranch Liquidators] hereby grants unto 
[the Froerers] recourse against [Ranch 
Liquidators] in the event and limited 
only to the claims, if any, of the buyers 
or their assigns or successors, on said 
contracts for consideration of any kind 
not made a responsibility of [Ranch Liq-
uidators] by the contracts simultaneously 
conveyed to [the Froerers] and referred 
to above. 
Under the original agreements between 
Ranch Liquidators and each of the purchas-
ers of real estate, Ranch Liquidators was 
responsible for conveying title by warranty 
deed upon payment of the contract. Thus, 
the foregoing language (limiting the Froer-
ers' recourse against Ranch Liquidators to 
actions it was not responsible for under the 
contracts) implies that the Froerers did 
assume liability for any suit by a purchaser 
for breach of an obligation that Ranch Liq-
uidators was originally responsible for, 
such as conveying good title by warranty 
deed. 
WINEGAR v. Fl 
Cite as 813 P.2d 
The second agreement between Ranch 
Liquidators and the Froerers can be con-
strued to indicate a different intent. Be-
cause the two documents concerning the 
assignment were executed "substantially 
contemporaneously" and are clearly in-
terrelated, we must construe them as a 
whole and harmonize their meanings if pos-
sible. Atlas Corp. v. Clovis Nat'l Bank, 
737 P.2d at 229 The second agreement, 
entitled "Assignment of Contract and Es-
crow/' provided: 
This agreement for sale of real estate 
[between Ranch Liquidators and the 
Winegars] is being held by Ranch Liqui-
dators of Utah, Inc. [The Froerers] ac-
cept this Assignment subject to the cove-
nants and conditions contained in said 
agreement of sale. Further, a warranty 
deed covering the property described is 
executed and delivered herewith in favor 
of [the Froerers]. 
(Emphasis added.) 
The parties differ in their explanations of 
the effect of the "subject to" language 
contained in the assignment between 
Ranch Liquidators and the Froerers. Of 
course, the fact that the parties differ as to 
the interpretation of an agreement does not 
alone establish that ambiguity exists. 
Buehner Block Co. v. UWC Assocs.y 752 
P.2d 892, 895 (Utah 1988). The Winegars 
argue that this language indicates that the 
Froerers assumed Ranch Liquidators' obli-
gations under the land sale contract. This 
interpretation would be consistent with the 
April agreement limiting the Froerers' re-
course as against Ranch Liquidators. 
According to the Froerers, however, the 
"subject to" language indicates that the 
parties intended Ranch Liquidators to re-
main ultimately responsible to the Wine-
gars for their obligations under the land 
sale contract.2 The Froerers cite case law 
from other jurisdictions regarding the ef-
fect of the "subject to" language contained 
in the assignment agreement. One court, 
for example, concluded, "The words 'sub-
ject to' are not promissory." Klundt v. 
Carothers, 96 Idaho 782, 537 P.2d 62, 65 
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(1975). Just as the transferee of assets 
"subject to" an indebtedness or mortgage 
does not thereby assume liability for the 
debt, id., "subject to" can be interpreted as 
words of qualification and notice rather 
than as words of assumption or contract. 
See S.L. Nusbaum & Co. v. Atlantic Va. 
Realty Corp., 206 Va. 673, 146 S.E.2d 205, 
209 (1966). 
The Idaho Court of Appeals in 1987 ad-
dressed a similar case in which the assign-
ee of a note was sued by the obligor, a real 
estate purchaser, when the obligor discov-
ered it had actually received less property 
than the assignor had represented. Murr 
v. Selag Corp., 113 Idaho 773, 747 P.2d 
1302 (Ct.App.1987). The court noted that 
the parties did not express any intent for 
the assignee to assume liability for the 
obligor's claims against the assignor. Id. 
747 P.2d at 1310. Regarding the effect of 
the words "subject to," the court held: 
[T]he obligor on the note may assert 
setoffs against it or may have defenses 
that make the note uncollectible, but the 
obligor cannot make affirmative claims 
for damages against the note assignee 
based upon some tort or breach of con-
tract by the original payee. 
Id. 747 P.2d at 1309 (emphasis added). 
Similarly, the assignment from Ranch 
Liquidators to the Froerers did not unam-
biguously make the Froerers liable for any 
claim the Winegars may have had against 
Ranch Liquidators under the purchase 
agreement. The agreement indicated that 
Ranch Liquidators would continue to hold 
the purchase agreement, and we agree 
with those jurisdictions that recognize, in 
certain cases, that accepting an assignment 
"subject to" an existing debt or obligation 
may limit, rather than expand, an assign-
ee's liability. If we acknowledge the plau-
sibility of this interpretation, the agree-
ment is deficient in conveying what the 
parties actually intended to assign. Such a 
deficiency renders the agreement ambigu-
ous and makes parol evidence of the par-
ties' intent essential. 
2. The Froerers also cite the language "[the pur- dators of Utah, Inc.," as supporting this interpre-
chase agreement] is being held by Ranch Liqui- tation. 
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Finally, we address the effect of Ranch 
Liquidators' act of giving the Froerers the 
warranty deed. The Winegars argue that 
the Froerers purchased the property from 
Ranch Liquidators with notice of the Wine-
gars' equitable interest and so were re-
quired to convey the property when the 
Winegars fully complied with the purchase 
agreement. The trial court agreed. With-
out considering evidence of the parties' in-
tent, the trial court concluded that there 
was an unconditional delivery of the war-
ranty deed to the Froerers. The court de-
termined that this "delivery" transferred 
fee title to the Froerers, as opposed to 
constituting conditional delivery as security 
for the Froerers' right to receive future 
payments under the purchase agreement. 
As a result, the trial court held that the 
Froerers had an obligation to convey a 
valid warranty deed to the Winegars and 
were liable because they were unable to 
perform that obligation. Id. 
The Froerers concede that if the parties 
intended the deed to be a present convey-
ance of fee title, the Froerers may have 
had an obligation to convey title under an 
equitable trust theory.3 They argue, how-
ever, that the property was never "con-
veyed" to them by Ranch Liquidators but, 
rather, that they held the warranty deed 
only as security in case of default.4 They 
assert that just as when determining the 
effect of an assignment, the issue of what 
effect to give the transfer of a warranty 
deed rests on the intent of the parties in 
making the transfer. We agree. 
[15,16] A conveyance is valid only upon 
delivery of a deed with present intent to 
transfer. Baker v. Pattee, 684 P.2d 632, 
635 (Utah 1984). It is possible for a party 
to transfer a warranty deed without intend-
ing to convey the property. Debtors, for 
example, frequently execute absolute deeds 
of conveyance to creditors with merely an 
oral understanding that the creditor will 
hold the deed only as security and reconvey 
3. See, e.g., DeCorso v. Thomas, 89 Utah 160, 173, 
50 P.2d 951, 956-57 (1935) (purchaser of real 
estate with notice of existing equitable interest 
in property acquires only what vendor can 
transfer and is liable in equity to same extent as 
vendor). 
it to the debtor once the obligation is satis-
fied. S. Nelson & D. Whitman, Real Es-
tate Finance Law 44 (2d ed. 1985). These 
transactions often occur to avoid the strict 
requirements of the law of mortgages. Id. 
The case law in this country "overwhelm 
ingly establishes" that parol evidence is 
admissible in equity to show that a deed 
although absolute on its face, was intendec 
as a mortgage. Id. at 46. This rule ap 
plies even though it was knowingly cast ir 
the form of an absolute conveyance, and its 
execution was not effected by fraud, mis 
take, ignorance, duress, or undue influence 
Id. 
In Utah, "[a] fee simple is presumed tc 
be intended to pass by a conveyance of rea 
estate, unless it appears from the convey 
ance that a lesser estate was intended.' 
Utah Code Ann. § 57-1-3. This court ha? 
recognized that a deed, absolute in anj 
form, may be construed as a mortgage if i< 
was only intended as security under a paro 
agreement rather than as an outright con 
veyance. Bown v. Loveland, 678 P.2d 292 
297 (Utah 1984); see also Kjar v. Brimley 
27 Utah 2d 411, 497 P.2d 23, 25-26 (1972 
(mortgage may consist of warranty dee< 
and separate written contract). The part; 
claiming that a warranty deed was a mort 
gage must show by clear and convincinj 
evidence that the conveyance was actuall; 
intended as a mortgage. Bown, 678 P.2< 
at 297. In Bown, we reiterated the ek 
ments a court must consider when detei 
mining whether an absolute deed was ir 
tended as a mortgage, including (1) whetl 
er there was a continuing obligation on th 
part of the grantor to pay a debt or mee 
an obligation the deed allegedly was mad 
to secure, (2) the question of relative va 
ues, (3) contemporaneous and subsequer 
acts of the parties, (4) the parties' stat( 
ments, (5) the form of the written evidenc 
of the transactions, (6) the nature of th 
testimony on which the parties rely, (7) th 
relationship between the parties, and (< 
4. Of course, both the Froerers and the Winega 
could have protected themselves by recordir 
notice of their respective interests. 
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the apparent aims and purposes of the fore reverse and remand this case for trial 
transfer. Id. at 297 (citing Hansen v. Koh- on the issue of intent, 
for, 550 P.2d 186, 188-89 (Utah 1976)). 
[17] We recognize that this case is pe-
culiar because the "grantor" of the deed 
was the assignor of the contract rather 
than the party who had a continuing finan-
cial obligation to the "grantee." We think 
these cases are applicable, however, to il-
lustrate that the mere transfer of a war-
ranty deed does not automatically establish 
that the parties intend a conveyance. The 
transfer of this warranty deed was merely 
one component of the assignment transac-
tion. The only written evidence of the 
transaction consists of the two documents 
making up the assignment agreement. In 
light of the ambiguity contained in the 
agreement, we hold that the intent of the 
parties was not evident on the face of these 
documents, making parol evidence neces-
sary to determine what effect to give the 
transfer of the warranty deed. 
The agreement limiting the Froerers' re-
course against Ranch Liquidators can be 
interpreted as assigning to the Froerers 
Ranch Liquidators' obligation to convey ti-
tle to the Winegars. The transfer of the 
warranty deed could indicate that the par-
ties intended to make the Froerers liable 
for Ranch Liquidators' obligations. Other 
language in the assignment agreement, 
however, concerning who "held" the sales 
agreement and stating that the Froerers 
were taking the assignment "subject to" 
the covenants contained in the sales agree-
ment tends to indicate a contrary intent. It 
is not difficult to see how the trial court 
was tempted to "weigh" these competing 
interpretations to determine what effect to 
give this agreement. Unfortunately, 
weighing evidence is proper only when 
making findings of fact, not when deter-
mining questions of law in interpreting a 
contract on a motion for summary judg-
ment There is sufficient ambiguity re-
garding the intentions of the parties to this 
transaction that the trial court could not 
properly resolve this action in the Wine-
gars' favor sis a matter of law. We there-
HALL, C.J., HOWE, Associate C.J., 
and STEWART and ZIMMERMAN, JJ., 
concur. 
Sidney REEVES, Plaintiff 
and Appellee, 
v. 
Mary GENTILE, dba Lighthouse 
Lounge, Defendant and 
Appellant. 
No. 880492. 
May 17, 1991. 
Pedestrian struck by automobile driven 
by intoxicated tavern patron brought dram 
shop action against, inter alia, tavern own-
er. The Second District Court, Davis Coun-
ty, Stanton M. Taylor, J., entered judgment 
on jury verdict against tavern owner, and 
she appealed. The Supreme Court, Hall, 
C.J., held that: (1) evidence supported find-
ing that owner was liable; (2) Dram Shop 
Act allowed cause of action against each 
establishment that served patrons in their 
intoxicated condition and, thus, jury could 
award up to $100,000 liability against each 
tavern owner, rather than total liability of 
all taverns being limited to $100,000; (3) 
doctrine of comparative negligence does 
not apply to dram shop defendants so as to 
allow them to look to fault of other defen-
dants as protection or shield from liability; 
but (4) doctrine of comparative negligence 
applies in dram shop case as between intox-
icated person and injured parties. 
Reversed and remanded. 
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Supreme Court of Utah 
Donald Theodore SUNDQUIST, Plaintiff and Appellant, 
v 
Mary Alice SUNDQUIST, Defendant and Respondent 
No 17057 
Dec 23, 1981 
Former wife filed request for termination of educational trust established by herself and former husband as divorcing 
settlors for benefit of their children and distribution of its proceeds in equal shares to parties, and former husband 
objected The Second District Court, Davis County, Thornley K Swan, J , entered judgment that trust had not been 
created in first place, and former husband appealed The Supreme Court, Oaks, J , held that (1) by reference to 
"income derived" and use of "should" in property settlement agreement between divorcing settlors whereby they 
agreed to create educational trust for benefit of children, parties made clear that they were not creating present trust 
but only imposing obligation to create trust thereafter and that subject matter of trust was not to be property then 
owned but income installments to be received in future, and thus no trust was created at that time as to then-owned 
property and as to future income installments, but (2) trust automatically came into existence as to each installment 
of income from property owned at time of divorce as parties received each installment, (3) former wife had failed to 
prove consent by all of beneficiaries to termination of trust, (4) former wife had failed to prove that there was no 
unfulfilled purpose of trust which could be carried out by its continuance, and (5) trustee who has successfully 
defended trust from depletion of its assets by decree of termination is entitled to have corpus of trust pay reasonable 
attorney's fees incurred in such defense 
Affirmed in part, reversed in part and remanded 
Howe, J , concurred in part and dissented in part and filed opinion in which Tibbs, District Judge, concurred 
West Headnotes 
[1] Trusts k30 5(1) 
390k30 5(l) 
(Formerly 390k301/2(1)) 
Inter vivos trust is created when settlor, with intent to create trust, transfers property to trustee in trust for, or declares 
that settlor holds specific property in trust for, a named beneficiary 
[2] Trusts k25(l) 
390k25(l) 
[2] Trusts k30 5(1) 
390k30 5(l) 
(Formerly 390k301/2(1)) 
Settlor need not sign formal trust instrument or employ any particular form of words to create inter vivos trust 
[3] Trusts k21(2) 
390k21(2) 
[3] Trusts k25(l) 
390k25(l) 
To create inter vivos trust, settlor must have intent to create presently enforceable trust, trust property must be clearly 
specified and set aside, and essential terms of trust must be clear enough for court to enforce equitable duties that are 
sine qua non of trust relationship. 
[4] Trusts k21(2) 
390k21(2) 
Requirement of clarity in essential terms of trust is met if beneficiaries are identified and nature of their beneficial 
interests and duties of trustee are specified orally or in writing, or are clearly ascertainable from circumstances or 
dictated by law of trusts. 
[5] Trusts kl7(3) 
390kl7(3) 
To be enforceable against objections, trust in real property must be created by writing signed by settlor or his agent. 
U.C.A.1953, 25-5-1. 
[6] Husband and Wife k279(l) 
205k279(l) 
By reference to "income derived" and use of "should" in property settlement agreement between divorcing settlors 
whereby they agreed to create educational trust for benefit of children, parties made clear that they were not creating 
present trust but only imposing obligation to create trust thereafter and that subject matter of trust was not to be 
property then owned but income installments to be received in future, and thus no trust was created at that time as to 
then-owned property and as to future income installments. 
[7] Husband and Wife k279(l) 
205k279(l) 
Where divorcing settlors had made enforceable agreement to create trust in installments of future income from then-
owned properly, and since equity would treat trust as having been perfected when income was received, educational 
trust for benefit of their children automatically came into existence as to each installment of income from property as 
parties received each installment. 
[8] Divorce k254(2) 
134k254(2) 
District court's continuing jurisdiction in divorce proceeding to make such subsequent changes or new orders with 
respect to distribution of property as shall be reasonable and necessary does not authorize court to alter property 
rights already vested in other parties, such as in children who are beneficiaries of trust created by divorcing settlors 
in income already received and deposited in trust account. U.C.A.1953, 30-3-5. 
[9] Divorce k254(2) 
134k254(2) 
Statute conferring continuing jurisdiction upon district court in divorce proceeding to make such subsequent changes 
or new orders with respect to distribution of property as shall be reasonable and necessary authorizes divorce court 
to reallocate property rights between parties to divorce, such as by modifying earlier decree as to parties' interest in 
then-owned property including installment payments of income on that property not yet received. U.C.A.1953, 30-3-
5. 
[10] Trusts k61(3) 
390k61(3) 
Former wife failed to prove consent by all beneficiaries to termination of educational trust created by herself and 
former husband as divorcing settlors for benefit of their children where former husband, who owned beneficial 
interest in remainder, resisted termination, and although one of parties' children consented to termination, other two 
beneficiary children did not affirmatively consent to termination 
[11] Trusts k61(3) 
390k61(3) 
It is not sufficient for purposes of rule requiring consent of all beneficiaries for termination of trust that beneficiaries 
have no objection to its termination or take no position on matter, all beneficiaries must consent 
[12] Trusts k61(3) 
390k61(3) 
Former wife had failed to prove, for purpose of trust's termination, that there was no unfulfilled purpose of 
educational trust established by herself and foimer husband as divorcing settlors for benefit of their children which 
could be carried out by its continuance where, at time of attempted termination, none of three children had yet 
graduated from college although all had attended some college, none had yet attained age when majority of young 
people who aspire to advanced or college educations have satisfied such aspirations, and two of three beneficiaries 
gave evidence expressing strong aspirations for fuithcr higher education 
[13] Trusts k246 
390k246 
Trustee has fiduciary duty and concomitant power to defend tnist from depletion of its assets by decrees of 
termination or invalidity U C A 1953, 22-3- 14(3)(a), 75-7-402(1), (3)(t, x, y) 
[14] Trusts k268 
390k268 
Trustee who has successfully defended trust from depletion of its assets by decrees of termination or invalidity is 
entitled to have corpus of trust pay reasonable attorney's fees incurred in that defense U C A 1953, 22-3- 14(3)(a), 
75-7-402(1), (3)(t,x,y) 
*183 David M Swope, Salt Lake City, for plaintiff and appellant 
John Lowe, Salt Lake City, for defendant and respondent 
OAKS, Justice 
The issues in this appeal are (1) whether an express trust was created, (2) if so, whether the trial court correctly 
decreed termination of the trust on the ground that its purposes had been fulfilled, and (3) whether attorney's fees 
incurred by the trustee can be paid from the trust corpus 
I CREATION OF TRUST 
H][2][3] The principles governing the creation of a trust are well settled An inter vivos trust is created when a 
settlor, with intent to create a trust, transfers property to a trustee in trust for, or declares that he or she (the settlor) 
holds specific property in trust for, a named beneficiary Restatement of Trusts 2d, ss 2, 17 The settlor need not sign 
a formal trust instrument or employ any particular form of words Capps v Capps, 110 Utah 468, 175 P 2d 470 
(1946), Acott v Tomlinson, 9 Utah 2d 71, 337 P 2d 720 (1959), Bogert, Trusts & Trustees, s 45 (2d ed 1965), 
Restatement of Trusts 2d, s 24 But the settlor must have * 184 an intent to create a presently enforceable trust, 
Pagano v Walker, Utah, 539 P 2d 452, 455 (1975), the trust property must be clearly specified and set aside, 
Renshaw v Tracy Loan & Trust Co , 87 Utah 359, 363, 35 P 2d 298 (1934), and the essential terms of the trust must 
be clear enough for the court to enforce the equitable duties that are the sine qua non of a trust relationship 
Restatement of Trusts 2d, ss 2, 4, Pagano v Walker, 539 P 2d at 454, Duchesne County v State Tax Commission, 
104 Utah 365, 371, 140 P 2d 335, 338 (1943) 
[4] [5] This requirement of clarity is met if the beneficiaries are identified and the nature of their beneficial interests 
and the duties of the trustee are specified orally, Capps v Capps, 110 Utah at 474-75, 175 P 2d 470, or in writing (as 
is more common), or are clearly ascertainable from the circumstances, Restatement of Trusts 2d, ss 112, 129, or 
dictated by the law of trusts Loco Credit Union v Reed, 85 N M 729, 516 P 2d 1112 (1973) To be enforceable 
against objections, a trust in real property must be created by a writing signed by the settlor or his agent U C A , 
1953, s 25-5-1 But trusts other than those involving real property can be created without the formality of a writing, 
Restatement of Trusts 2d, s 39, so long as they are proven by clear and convincing evidence Capps v Capps, 110 
Utah at 474-75, 175 P 2d 470 
The district court found as a fact that "the parties attempted to set up a trust (pursuant to the requirement in their 
divorce decree) but none was created " The findings state "There is no document in evidence creating a trust," the 
terms of any trust were too "ambiguous," "the time and duration of any trust which might have been created is 
uncertain and a reasonable time for duration of the trust has elapsed," and "(t)he parties have not defined the terms 
and conditions of any trust and the court has no basis upon which to find what the terms of any trust might be which 
the parties intended to create " These findings, which are a mixture of findings of fact and a conclusion of law on the 
ultimate question of the creation of the trust, are challenged by appellant We must therefore review the evidence to 
see if it clearlv preponderates against the findings of the trial court Jensen v Brown, 639 P 2d 138 (1981), 
Cnmmins v Simonds, 636 P 2d 478 (1981) The evidence is essentially uncontested 
Appellant and respondent were husband and wife In his complaint for divorce, appellant suggested a property 
settlement, including the creation of a trust of specified property "for the education of the children of the parties " 
Respondent's answer agreed to this proposal, which was then embodied in a Property Settlement Agreement and 
Stipulation signed by the parties on October 16, 1973 That document contains the following paragraph, which is 
essentially identical to the proposals the parties had specified in their pleadings 
That both Plaintiff and Defendant agree that income derived from the interest held by the parties in the real estate 
syndicate known as the Big Bear Property in San Bernardino County, California, should be established as a family 
trust known as the Sundquist Family Trust Fund with the Plaintiff and Defendant as Trustees with the restriction 
and requirement that said funds be accumulated for the education of the minor children of the parties and at such 
time as the children have received or terminated their advanced education, any sums remaining in said trust funds 
should be equally divided between the Plaintiff and Defendant and during the administration of the trust if 
additional monies are necessary for the education of the children, the parties should be ordered to equally 
contribute to the trust fund 
A week later, the district court entered a decree of divorce, which included and expressly approved the foregoing 
provision and the other terms of the property settlement and ordered the parties to fulfill their agreements under it 
The parties proceeded as ordered By January 24, 1975, $1,164 59 had been deposited *185 in a savings account in 
the Continental Bank and Trust Company of Salt Lake City in the name of the "Sundquist Family Trust" This bank 
account, for which an IRS number had been assigned, apparently required the signatures of both parties No formal 
written trust agreement was in evidence, and presumably none was signed, but on January 25, 1975, the parties 
signed a one-page document titled "Addendum to Trust Agreement," which recited that "The grantors do hereby 
modify and clarify the trust agreement on the SUNDQUIST FAMILY TRUST " The modifications pertained to the 
definition of "education" and the type of expenses that would be paid by the trust During the remainder of 1975, the 
trust account showed deposits of interest income and a $1,154 62 income installment from the Big Bear Property, 
and withdrawals of $495 for the educational expenses of one of the parties' children Similar deposits and 
withdrawals were shown for the years 1976 through 1979 
In 1976, because of conflict between the parties over which educational expenses were to be paid from the trust, 
appellant petitioned the district court having jurisdiction of the original divorce proceeding for an order that 
respondent sign blank withdrawal slips for appellant's use, or, in the alternative, that respondent be removed as a co-
trustee This controversy was settled on May 21, 1976, by a stipulated order which (1) directed respondent to 
remove herself as a joint signatory of the bank account, (2) established further definitions concerning the type and 
amount and documentation of educational expenses that would be paid by the trust, and (3) directed appellant to give 
respondent quarterly reports on disbursements made by the trust This order refers repeatedly to "the trust," "this 
trust," or "the Sundquist Family Trust Fund " Despite this clarification, conflict over the amount or type of 
disbursements appellant made for the children's education continued 
On October 11, 1979, respondent filed in the original divorce proceeding under the heading of "order to show 
cause" a request for the termination of the trust and the distribution of its proceeds in equal shares to the parties In 
support, she recited the ages and current occupations of the three children of the marriage and alleged that "there is 
no need for a continuation of the children's education " Appellant objected, and a hearing was held on February 8, 
1980, at which respondent suggested for the first time, and the district court held, that the trust had not been created 
in the first place 
As to the $5,914 28 balance of the trust account on deposit in the bank on February 8, 1980, the district court's 
conclusion that no trust was created was erroneous in law and contrary to the clear preponderance of the evidence 
Here two parties signed an enforceable agreement to create a trust for the education of their children, of which they 
were to be trustees and to which they were to deposit the income derived from specified property The agreement 
designated the purpose and beneficiaries of the trust to provide education for the parties' children with a remainder 
interest in the parties themselves On the sufficiency of these terms, the facts in this case are practically identical to 
those in Loco Credit Union v Reed, 85 N M 729, 516 P 2d 1112 (1973), which sustained the validity of an 
educational trust created in a bank account by a property settlement agreement for the benefit of the children of the 
divorcing settlors We agree with the New Mexico Supreme Court's declaration on this subject, id 516 P 2d at 
1116 
The rights and duties of the trustee not detailed in the trust instrument are sufficiently detailed in the law of 
trusts The use to be made of the trust property is clearly stated in the written instrument evidencing the creation 
of the trust Minute details, as to the precise items for which funds in an educational trust must be used, are not 
necessary for the trust's validity 
To the same effect is Sherwin v Smith, 282 Mass 306, 185 N E 17 (1933), which held that a devise of sums to 
family members "to be used only for educational purposes" created a valid trust even though the *186 will gave no 
additional guidance on how the educational trust was to be administered 
[6] When the parties signed their Property Settlement Agreement in 1973, they fulfilled all the requirements for the 
creation of a trust (summarized earlier) except the existence of the trust property Even the property requirement 
would have been fulfilled if the parties had transferred or declared a trust of the interest they owned in the Big Bear 
Property But the agreement evidences no intent to do this Instead, the parties agreed "that income derived from the 
interest held by the parties in the Big Bear Property should be established as a family trust " By this 
reference to "income derived" and this use of "should" in the sense of duty, the parties made clear that they were not 
creating a present trust but only imposing an obligation to create a trust thereafter, and that the subject matter of the 
trust was not to be the property then owned but the income installments to be received in the future The installments 
of income were future property in 1973 and thus could not have been the subject matter of a present creation of trust 
Brainard v Commissioner, 91 F 2d 880 (7th Cir 1937), Bogert, Trusts & Trustees, s 113 (2d ed 1965), and 
authorities cited therein Viewing the matter just after the October, 1973, agreement, the parties had an enforceable 
agreement to create a trust, but no trust had been created Consequently, as to the Big Bear Property and as to future 
income installments, we agree with the district court's conclusion that no trust was created 
[7] However, as the parties received each installment of income from the Big Bear Property, the trust automatically 
came into existence as to that installment This is a consequence of the fact that the parties had made an enforceable 
agreement to create a trust in those installments of income, and the fact that equity would therefore treat the trust as 
having been perfected when the income was received As Bogert explains "When the subject-matter came into 
existence and into the hands of the intended settlor, it would at once be deemed to be held in trust, without any act of 
appropriation by the intending settlor, " Bogert, Trusts & Trustees, s 113 (2d ed 1965), and authorities cited 
therein The parties' deposit of these income installments in the properly labeled trust account in the bank is further 
confirmation of their performance of their agreement to create a trust and of the existence and validity of the trust as 
to those deposits 
If our conclusion about the creation of this trust admitted of any doubt, it would surely be resolved by the parties' 
signature on a formal "Addendum to Trust Agreement," by their performance of the trust by deposits and 
disbursements for educational purposes over a period of five years, and by the fact that the existence of the trust was, 
in effect, confirmed by periodic orders of the court that had approved the original agreement and supervised the 
performance of what the court's orders repeatedly referred to as "the trust" or "the Sundquist Family Trust " 
[8][9] For the ieasons set out above, a valid tiust was cieated and exists as to the $5,914 28 balance of the bank 
account, but not as to the parties' interest in the Big Bear Pioperty or in the futuie installments theiefiom Undei 
Utah Code Annotated, 1953, s 30-3-5, the district court in a divorce proceeding has "conlinuing jiuisdiction to make 
such subsequent changes or new orders with lespect to the distribution of the property as shall be reasonable and 
necessary " That power does not authorize the court to alter property rights already vested in other parties, such as in 
the children who are the beneficiaries of the trust in the income already received and deposited in the trust account 
Cf Hills v Hills, 638 P 2d 516, (1981) But section 50-3-5 does authonze the divorce court to reallocate propeity 
rights between the parties to the divorce, such as by modifying the earlier decree as to the parties' interest in the Big 
Bear Property, including installment payments *187 not yet received [FN1] This matter can be pursued on remand 
FN1 The record contains testimony that nine or ten future annual payments were then expected, in the total 
amounl of approximately $18,000 to $20,000 
II TERMINAIIONOFTRUST 
In Clayton v Behle, Utah, 565 P 2d 1132 (1977), this Court approved and applied the general rule that even though 
its prescribed duration has not passed, the beneficiaries can require a court of equity to decree the termination of a 
trust where (1) all beneficiaries consent, (2) no beneficiary is under an incapacity, and (3) the continuance of the 
trust is not necessary to carry out a material purpose of the trust This rule is supported by a multitude of authorities, 
including, in addition to those cited in Clayton v Behle, supra, Ambrose v First National Bank of Nevada, 87 Nev 
114, 482 P 2d 828 (1971), Bogert, Tiusts & Trustees, s 1007 (2d ed 1962), 4 Scott on Trusts s 337 (3d ed 1967), 
and authorities cited therein [FN2] 
FN2 A corollary rule, also referred to in Clayton v Behle, supra, that all beneficiaries can terminate a trust 
even though its continuance is necessary to carry out a material purpose of the trust when the settlor(s) 
consent to its termination, Fowler v Lanpher, 193 Wash 308, 75 P 2d 132 (1938), Bogert, Trusts & 
Trustees, s 1005 (2d ed 1962), 4 Scott on Trusts, s 338 (3d ed 1967), is inapplicable to this case because 
appellant, one of the settlors, resisted termination 
In its findings of fact, the district court stated that "one of the children of the parties desires that any trust should be 
terminated and the other two have no objection to such termination " There were no findings of fact on whether the 
continuance of Ihe trust was necessary to carry out a material purpose of the trust, except as implied by the district 
court's conclusions of law "the purpose of any possible trust has been accomplished, the children, beneficiaries, 
have no objection to its termination and the trust should be terminated " 
[10][11][12] At the conclusion of evidence in support of respondent's request for termination, appellant moved to 
dismiss That motion should have been granted because respondent's request for termination failed of proof in two 
essential respects 
(1) Respondeni failed to prove consent by all of the beneficiaries Appellant, who owned a beneficial interest in 
remainder, resisted the termination Moreover, although one of the parties' children consented that the trust be 
terminated, the other two beneficiary-children did not affirmatively consent to the termination As Bogert states, 
"(I)t is well settled that the court will not end the trust as a whole on the request of a part only of the beneficiaries " 
Bogert, Trusts & Trustees, s 1007 (2d ed 1962) It is not sufficient for purposes of this rule that beneficiaries "have 
no objection to its termination" or take no position on the matter All beneficiaries must consent Clayton v Behle, 
supra, A B v Wilmington Trust Co , 41 Del Ch 191, 191 A 2d 98 (1963), Hills v Travelers Bank & Trust Co , 125 
Conn 640, 7 A 2d 652 (1939), Closset v Burtchaell, 112 Or 585, 230 P 554 (1924) 
(2) Respondent also failed to prove that there was no unfulfilled purpose of the trust which could be carried out by 
its continuance Indeed, the contrary is clear from the evidence The purpose of the trust created by the parties was 
to provide education for their children, with the remaining trust property to be divided equally between the parties 
"at such time as the children have received or terminated their advanced education " At the time of the attempted 
termination, the three children beneficiaries were ages 191/2, 221/2, and 241/2 All had attended some college, but 
none had yet graduated from college, and none had yet attained the age when a majority of young people who aspire 
to "advanced" or college educations have satisfied those aspirations Two of the three beneficiaries gave evidence 
expressing strong aspirations for further higher education, one was then enrolled part time m a university, and the 
other was in the army, but expressed his desire to continue his college *188 education part time on active duty and 
later as a civilian. In view of these facts, we cannot see how it can be said that the educational purposes of this trust 
have been fulfilled or that the appropriate and reasonable duration for performance of this trust for "advanced 
education" has passed. Consequently, the trust could not be terminated. Clayton v. Behle, supra; Lafferty v. Sheets, 
175 Kan. 741, 267 P.2d 962 (1954); Closset v. Burtchaell, supra. 
For each of these two reasons, we hold that this trust could not be terminated on the evidence before the district 
court in this proceeding. 
III. ATTORNEY'S FEES 
At the hearing, appellant sought an order directing the payment of his attorney's fees from the corpus of the trust. 
Appellant's attorney represented that he had expended 15 hours in preparing to resist the proposed termination, plus 
his time in the hearing in the district court. These fees were denied, and appellant challenges this on appeal. 
[13][14] A trustee has the fiduciary duty and the concomitant power to defend the trust from the depiction of its 
assets by decrees of termination or invalidity. U.C.A., 1953, s 75-7-402(1) and (3)(x) and (y); In re Hart's Estate, 51 
Cal.2d 819, 337 P.2d 73 (1959); Van Gorden v. Lunt, 234 Iowa 832, 13 N.W.2d 341 (1944) A trustee who has 
done so successfully is entitled to have the corpus of the trust pay the reasonable attorney's fees incurred in that 
defense. U.C.A., 1953, s 22-3-14(3)(a), s 75-7-402(3)(t); In re Hart's Estate, supra; Van Gorden v. Lunt, supra; 
Nelson v. Mercantile Trust Co., Mo., 335 S.W.2d 167, 175 (1960). As we said in Walker v. Walker, 17 Utah 2d 53, 
60, 404 P.2d 253 (1965), "a tmstee is entitled to reimbursement for all expenses properly incurred in discharging the 
responsibilities of his trust." On remand, the court should therefore review the fees for legal services rendered to the 
trust in this matter and order the payment of reasonable fees from the trust corpus. 
Insofar as it holds that no trust was created in the parties' interest in the Big Bear Property, including their interest in 
installments not paid as of February 8, 1980, the decree of the district court is affirmed. In all other respects, the 
decree of the district court is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
No costs awarded. 
HALL, C. J., and STEWART, J., concur. 
HOWE, Justice (concurring and dissenting): 
I concur that a trust was created as payments were received and that the court can modify the divorce decree to 
provide that no more payments should come into the trust. 
I dissent from the balance of the holding of the majority opinion. I believe it to be error to require that the trust 
continue as to the funds on hand just because all the beneficiaries did not consent to its termination, or because its 
purpose was not fulfilled. Under s 30-3-5, U.C.A.1953, the district court has broad powers to change the funding of 
education for minor children from one source to another, or to discontinue funding completely. (Incidentally, both 
parents here offered to personally pay any expenses if their children desired further education). The formal rules of 
trust law should not be applied to perpetuate the trust in view of the power of the court under s 30-3-5 to terminate it. 
I also dissent from the statement in the majority opinion that the balance on hand, $5,914.28, has "vested" in the 
children. This amount belongs to the parents upon termination of the trust under the terms of their stipulation and the 
divorce decree entered in 1973. 
TIBBS, District Judge, concurs in the opinion of HOWE, J. 
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OPINION 
GARFF, Judge 
Appellant, Steven Ashton, appeals the order determining the heirs of his father, Kenneth Dale Ashton, claiming that 
the operative language of the will conveys only a life estate The court, in an order dated December 1, 1989, 
determined that Ruth Elizabeth Ashton, the deceased's second wife, took the estate free and clear of all claims of the 
children We reverse and remand 
FACTS 
Decedent, Kenneth Dale Ashton, and his first wife, Thclma, had four children After Thelma died, Mr Ashton 
married Ruth Elizabeth Ashton on August 30, 1985 On March 12, 1986 he executed a will T he relevant portion 
of the will, section v, reads as follows 
I give, devise and bequeath all of my pioperty, real, personal or mixed, of whatever nature or wheiever situated, 
which I may own or have the right to dispose of at the time of my death to my beloved wife, Ruth Elizabeth 
Ashton She shall have the full enjoyment of the estate for as long as she desires or shall live 
On January 5, 1989, Mr Ashton died and the will was admitted to probate Mrs Ashton objected to the 
appointment of the children as personal repiesentatives because she was named in the will and was therefore 
preferred under the Utah statute T he court then appointed Mrs Ashton as personal representative T he trial court 
concluded that Mr Ashton, through his *542 will, left his entire estate to Mrs Ashton "free and absolute of any 
claim of any other heir " 
Steven Ashton appeals the couit's conclusion that Mrs Ashton inherited a fee simple interest rather than a life estate 
AMBIGUIIT AND TESTATOR'S INTENTIONS 
We focus our attention on section v of the will and what appears to be ambiguous wording The threshold question 
of whether a writing is ambiguous is one of law Because the initial determination of whether a writing is 
ambiguous does not require resort to extrinsic evidence, we accord the trial court's interpretation no particular 
deference and we review for correctness Whitehouse v Whitehouse, 790 P 2d 57, 60 (Utah Ct App 1990), Grayson 
Roper Ltd Partnership v Finhnson, 782 P 2d 467, 470 (Utah 1989) 
[1][2] If the will is ambiguous, any rule of construction normally used in other writings must yield to the intention of 
the testator as revealed in the instrument In re Johnson's Estate, 64 Utah 114, 228 P 748, 749 (Utah 1924), In re 
Poppleton's Estate, 34 Utah 285, 97 P 138, 140 (1908) The factual issue of the decedent's intent is one we review 
with deference to the trial court's findings, if adequate, and we reverse only upon a finding of clear error In re Lstate 
of Bartell, 776 P 2d 885, 886 (Utah 1989), Utah R Civ P 52(a) In order to show clear error, the appellant "must 
marshal the evidence in support of the findings and then demonstrate that despite this evidence, the trial court's 
findings are so lacking in support as to be 'against the clear weight of the evidence,' thus making them 'clearly 
erroneous ' " Id (quoting State v Walker, 743 P 2d 191, 193 (Utah 1987)) 
[3] In construing a will, a court must look to the testator's intent as expressed in the will Utah Code Ann § 75-2-
603 (1978), In re Estate of Gardner, 615 P 2d 1215, 1217 (Utah 1980) The intent may be "ascertained not alone 
from the provision itself, but from a scrutiny of the entire instrument of which it is a part, and in the light of the 
conditions and circumstances in which the instrument came into existence." Poppleton, 97 P. at 140 (quoting Adams 
v. First Baptist Church, 148 Mich. 140, 111 N.W. 757, 11 L.R.A. (N.S.) 509, 515 (1907); accord, Gardner, 615 
P.2d at 1217. Thus, extrinsic evidence may be used to ascertain what the testator intended. 
[4] Once a court determines intent, it must then "find the facts specially and state separately its conclusions of law 
thereon...." Utah R.Civ.P. 52(a). With some minor exceptions, failure to make findings on all material issues 
constitutes reversible error. Acton v. Deliran, 737 P.2d 996, 999 (Utah 1987). The findings "must show that the 
Court's judgment or decree 'follows logically from, and is supported by, the evidence.' " Id. (quoting Smith v. Smith, 
726 P.2d 423, 426 (Utah 1986)). The findings also " 'should be sufficiently detailed and include enough subsidiary 
facts to disclose the steps by which the ultimate conclusion on each factual issue was reached.'" Acton, 737 P.2d at 
999 (quoting Rucker v. Dalton, 598 P.2d 1336, 1338 (Utah 1979)). 
[5] The first sentence of the disputed passage appears to devise the entire estate to Mrs. Ashton in fee simple, while 
the last sentence suggests a life estate, making the clause ambiguous on its face. While the court did make findings 
in the present case, those findings pertain only to the dates of marriage, execution of the will, signing of an 
addendum, and of the death. The findings make no mention of the testator's intent or the conditions and 
circumstances surrounding the making of the will. Nor do the findings include subsidiary facts showing the steps 
leading to the court's conclusion that the decedent intended that Mrs. Ashton be the only heir, taking the estate free 
and absolute of any claim of any other heir. 
Because the findings are insufficient to allow for adequate review, we remand for the trial court to make explicit, 
detailed findings as to the conditions and circumstances surrounding the making of the will, *543 the nature of the 
estate, [FN1] and finally the decedent's intent, and how that intent supports the court's conclusion. 
FN1. A life estate, while sensible in the context of real estate, would be quite anomalous in the context of, 
say, cash. Other pertinent facts include that the testator called his attorney to specifically add the second 
sentence to the key provision after he reviewed it in draft; that no provision is made, in a will otherwise 
quite detailed and complex, for distribution of any life estate remainder interest; and that the decedent 
made ample provision for his wife through nontestamentary means such as insurance and joint tenancy. 
Reversed and remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
JACKSON and ORME, JJ., concur. 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE OF 
RICHARD D. SNOW, DECEASED, AND 
THE RICHARD D. SNOW FAMILY 
TRUST, 
ORDER OF FINAL JUDGMENT 
Probate No. 993900093 EF 
Judge Glenn K. Iwasaki 
This matter came before the Court and the Court granted a Partial Summary Judgment in 
favor of Petitioner on July 31,2000. Based upon the Order of the Court, and in the interest of finally 
resolving this matter, the parties have submitted a Joint Stipulation for Order of Final Judgment in 
this case. The Court, having reviewed the Joint Stipulation, pleadings, and record on file, and 
therefore being fully advised, now orders and adjudges as follows: 
NOW THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED AND ADJUDGED THAT: 
1. Judgment is awarded against Ruby Womack and she is hereby ordered to re-pay the 
Richard D. Snow Family Trust in the amount of $18,687.35, plus pre-judgment interest at the legal 
rate from the date any such funds were utilized until the judgment is entered, in foil repayment of 
any use by her of Trust principal for moving of the Mobile Home. 
2. Judgment is awarded against Ruby Womack and she is hereby ordered to re-pay the 
Trust in the amount of $11,557.11, for attorney's fees paid to her attorneys in this action from 
principal of the Trust, plus pre-judgment interest from the dates paid until the judgment is entered. 
3. Ruby Womack is removed as Personal Representative of the Estate of Richard D. 
Snow and removed as Trustee of the Richard D. Snow Family Trust for the inappropriate use and 
distribution of estate and trust assets. 
4. Marcia L. Snow, who is the named Successor Trustee to the Richard D. Snow Family 
Trust and Personal Representative to the Estate of Richard D. Snow, is appointed as the Special 
Administrator of the Estate of Richard D. Snow and as Trustee of the Richard D. Snow Family Trust. 
Notwithstanding the foregoing, Ruby Womack has expressed her intent to appeal the decision of the 
Court. Therefore, the Court orders that this removal be suspended and not put into effect pending 
the filing of the appeal. However, the removal of Ruby Womack shall be immediately effective 
upon the expiration of 30 days from the entry of the Court's Order, if an appeal has not been filed 
within that 30-day period; or, if Ruby Womack files an appeal in this matter within the prescribed 
30-day period, the removal of Ruby Womack shall be effective upon the appropriate court of appeals 
rendering a final decision either upholding the Court's Summary Judgment or the final Order, in 
favor of Petitioner. 
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5. Upon qualification and acceptance, the Court shall issue letters of special 
administration in favor of Petitioner. 
6. Ruby Womack is ordered that from the date of the joint stipulation between the 
parties, she shall not remove, distribute, or expend any principal or income of the Estate of Richard 
D. Snow or of the Richard D. Snow Family Trust and shall continue to hold any fluids in the Granite 
Credit Union Account Number 59669-4, and shall provide monthly, within 10 days of receipt, copies 
of all statements to Petitioner or her counsel. 
7. Ruby Womack is not to receive any distributions of income from the Trust until she 
has repaid in full all amounts ordered to be repaid to the Trust herein. 
8. Any action on Petitioner's Motion to Dismiss Respondent's Counterclaims, 
Petitioner's claims for attorney's fees, and the counterclaims of the Respondent, shall be postponed 
until the expiration of the time for appeal from the entry of the final judgment of the Court, or until 
the appropriate court of appeals renders a final decision on Respondent's appeal. 
DATED this ^ Zday of August, 2000. 
BY THE COURT: 
District Court Judge 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE OF 
RICHARD D. SNOW, DECEASED, AND 
THE RICHARD D. SNOW FAMILY 
TRUST, 
ORDER 
Probate No. 993900093 EF 
Judge Glenn K. Iwasaki 
Petitioner's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment having come before the Court on the 31st 
day of July, 2000, at the hour of 11:00 a.m., Dennis M. Astill appearing for Petitioner, and Robyn 
R. Walton appearing for Respondent, and the Court having considered the briefs and the arguments 
of the parties, and having entered its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, and being fully 
apprised in this matter, hereby enters its Order. 
NOW THEREFORE, it is hereby ordered that Partial Summary Judgment is granted in favor 
of Petitioner and against Respondent as follows: 
1. Ruby Womack is hereby ordered to change the title of the 1994 Guredon Mobile 
Home, VIN #6BD01D01947680A/8 (the "Mobile Home") into the name of the Richard D. Snow 
Trust, dated November 8,1993. 
2. Judgment is hereby entered against Ruby Womack and in favor of the Richard D. 
Snow Trust, in the amount of $7,034.67, plus pre-judgment interest at the legal rate from the date 
such amount was utilized by said Ruby Womack to the date payment is rendered by Ruby Womack 
to the Trust. 
3. Ruby Womack is hereby ordered to re-pay the Trust the amount of approximately 
$17,000, plus pre-judgment interest at the legal rate from the date any such funds were utilized, in 
full repayment of any use by her of Trust principal for moving of the Mobile Home. Ruby Womack 
is hereby ordered to provide an exact accounting to the Court of the amounts so used. 
4. Ruby Womack is hereby ordered to re-pay an amount in excess of $10,000 for 
attorneys fees paid to her attorneys in this action from principal of the Trust, plus pre-judgment 
interest from the dates paid until fully re-paid to the Trust. 
5. Ruby Womack is hereby ordered to render a full and complete accounting to the 
Court and Marcia Snow of all funds received from the estate and Trust of Richard D. Snow, 
including all principal, income and use of all funds, including but not limited to, moving expenses 
for the Mobile Home, payments of attorneys fees and costs, and other uses of Trust principal or 
income in accordance with this Order. 
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6. All other issues set forth in Petitioner's Petition shall remain for trial set in this matter 
for August 22,2000. 
Z< DATED this j^Jday of August, 2000. 
BY THEXOURT 
District Court Judge 
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1 SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH; JULY 31, 2000 
2 HONORABLE JUDGE GLENN K. IWASAKI 
3 P R O C E E D I N G S 
4 THE COURT: The matter before the Court is the matter 
5 of the Estate of Richard Snow, 993900093. May I have 
6 appearances, please? 
7 MR. ASTILL: Dennis Astill appearing for the 
8 Petitioner Marsha (Inaudible) Snow. 
9 THE COURT: Thank you, Mr. Astill. 
10 MS. WALTON: Robyn Walton appearing for the 
11 Respondent, Ruby Womack. 
12 THE COURT: Thank you, Ms. Walton. 
13 This is before the Court on Petitioner's Motion for 
14 Partial Summary Judgment. The Court had previously made some 
15 rulings on this matter. I'm acquainted with the facts of this 
16 case. I've had opportunity to review the pleas. Thank you all 
17 for the courtesy copies. I've reviewed those. 
18 This is your motion, Mr. Askill, you may proceed, 
19 MR. ASTILL: Thank you, Your Honor. 
20 Your Honor, as is clear from the record, we're here 
21 today primarily to construe the provisions of this Trust and 
22 it's a rather confusing document from the get go. As you 
23 review the Trust there are very specific dispositive provisions 
24 in Article III of the Trust providing what should happen to the 
25 Trust assets at the death of Mr. Snow. Those provisions 
1 clearly provide that it goes to his children or issue. Then at 
2 Page 8 of the Trust there are, I guess I can only interpret it 
3 as a little bit of a strange provision where it suddenly shows 
4 up with different type and different presentation from the rest 
5 of the document, at a heading called Special Provisions and it 
6 purports to redefine what should happen with assets of the 
7 Trust. 
8 Now, Your Honor, as we've conducted legal research tc 
9 decide which of those two provisions rule, the rule of law 
10 appears, I think generally accepted, that the later provisions 
11 of the document govern, to the extent they're not inconsistent 
12 with the - or to the extent they're consistent and if they're 
13 directly inconsistent, then they would overrule the prior 
14 provisions in the document, but they're to be read in 
15 conjunction and consistent with one another to the extent you 
16 can. And so, as we review the document, the Special Provision 
17 appear to govern. And then we have an amendment that says it 
18 amends the Special Provisions and, Your Honor, the same rule o 
19 law should apply. 
20 Now, as we've conducted discovery with the parties, 
21 from the witnesses originally identified, we find, Your Honor, 
22 there are not factual disputes relating to the creation of the 
23 Trust or the language of the Trust, thus it really leaves it t 
24 this Court to determine the proper construction of the languag 
25 of that Trust. There is no one that has been identified, even 
in the responsive memorandum from Mrs. Walton that would 
indicate that anyone had ever reviewed the Trust with the 
Decedent where he expressed his clear intent with respect to 
any provision of the document and, in fact, the affidavits that 
are provided from two individuals relate to conversations long 
after the Trust was executed and long after the trust amendment 
was executed, so we don't think they're relevant at all to this 
Court's construction of the document itself. So, we're here 
today to get that construction resolved. 
And then we're here for a couple of other matters, 
Your Honor, there have been some actions that are again, are 
undisputed. Actions taken by the Trustee and beneficiary of 
the Trust, Mrs. Womack, that we think is inappropriate under 
the terms of the Trust and need to be resolved. Those are that 
there was a debt that was paid on a van that should not have 
been paid. The Doctrine of Exoneration should apply to that. 
The mobile home was moved and principle of the Trust was 
exhausted for the purpose of moving that mobile home and then 
there has been expense monies and including expense monies for 
attorney's fees paid to defend Mrs. Womack's interest in this 
case. 
Now, let me address the first point with res-pfect to 
the construction of the Trust. From the -
Oh, did you have a question? 
THE COURT: No. 
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MR. ASTILL: From the terms of the Trust itself, Your 
Honor, it is very clear in Paragraph 1 of the Special 
Provisions relating to the Guerdon mobile home that Marsha 
Snow, or Marsha Elingson there and now Snow was the remainder 
beneficiary. And as we look at Article III-B in Pages 3 and 4 
of the Trust, Marsha Snow would have been the residuary 
beneficiary under that article as well. And so we look at the 
Special Provisions and it clearly says she's the remainder 
beneficiary of that mobile home and that Mrs. Womack receives 
the right to reside in it as long as she desires or until she 
dies or remarries. So it's clearly, at best, a life estate anc 
then the remainder or the mobile home would pass then to Mrs. 
Snow at the time that that right of Mrs. Womack expires. 
Now, the amendment excluded the remainder language 
and so the question that this Court has to answer, does that 
mean that the amendment eliminated that remainder language, anc 
again the case law, Your Honor, it is pretty clear, that unless 
the amendment is specifically inconsistent with the prior 
provisions, then it has to be read to be consistent with those 
prior provisions. That's the rules of construction for wills 
and the rules of construction for Trusts and so as we read thai 
section, Your Honor, it doesn't expressly say, the remainder 
interest to Marsha Snow is terminated. It simply restates the 
first sentence and so again, Your Honor, I think that the only 
way to properly read that is to say that if it doesn't 
expressly contradict it, if it doesn't refute it, then it has 
to be read consistent with and along with the prior provisions 
so that Marsha Snow would continue to be the remainder 
beneficiary of that third mobile home. Even if the Court could 
read it to say, well, since they left that out, it means she 
doesn't get it, she's still the residuary beneficiary under 
Article III-B of the Trust and that has never been contradicted 
or terminated or revised or amended other than to provide these 
life interests to Mrs. Womack. 
Now, the language of the Trust, Your Honor, clearly 
provides a life estate only to Mrs. Womack. As we review both 
the amendment and the original Special Provisions in Paragraph 
1 it says, "Ruby Womack may live in the mobile home, Guerdon, 
as long as she desires or until she remarries or she dies." 
And again, there's a pretty clear expression of a life estate 
at best. In fact, there's some other part of that, things that 
would lead you to believe that there are other conditions for 
termination other than death and that is if she doesn't want to 
live there any more or she remarries, then that interest 
terminates. 
Now, Paragraph 3 then goes on to say, "the remainder 
of the Trust Estate should be held in Trust to provide Ruby 
Womack with income." The only reasonable interpretation of 
that can be, whatever is left after making these initial 
disbursements, is to be there to provide her with income and we 
think that's pretty consistent with the language of the Trust 
in general and consistent with the prior provisions of the 
Trust, Article 3 and the prior Special Provisions. None of 
those provisions expressly disinherit Mrs.. Snow and, in fact, 
where Mr. Snow wanted to expressly disinherit one of his 
children, he certainly did so with Patricia Sprouse, his other 
daughter and he says Mshe gets nothing from the Trust Estate". 
She's already received some stuff. Nowhere do we read that 
with respect to Marsha Snow. And so, Your Honor, it seems 
clear that the only reasonable and appropriate was to construe 
the Trust is to say Mrs. Womack gets a life estate at best in 
the mobile home. Mrs. Womack gets the income for life from the 
Trust. The remainder interest goes on to Mrs. Snow. 
THE COURT: Going with that analysis, going to the 
next points about the $17,000 for the mobile home and then the 
selling of the van. Is the selling of the van generating 
income? 
MR. ASTILL: Well, the van wasn't sold, Your Honor. 
Money was taken out of the Trust Estate. There was a 
substantial cash fund left in the Trust Estate at death. Money 
was taken from that, $7,034, and the van was paid off with 
that. 
THE COURT: Her argument is, that was income, was it 
not and she was entitled to it or - I'll make that argument for 
her? 
€ 
MR. ASTILL: No, the answer is that wasn't income, 
that was principle of the Trust. 
THE COURT: And you're relying upon income as defined 
in the code? 
MR. ASTILL: Correct. 
THE COURT: Now, how much income was the Trust 
generating? 
MR. ASTILL: Very little. By the time the van was 
sold, Your Honor, which happened immediately after his death, 
there was very little income that had been generated to that 
point in time and then since then, it remained in a credit 
union. We've only received one piece of information during 
deposition testimony of Mrs. Womack to the effect that there 
was $300 of income earned in the one year, but that's because 
the principle's been exhausted. 
THE COURT: Sure. 
MR. ASTILL: And Mrs. Womack hasn't done anything but 
leave it in a credit union. So she's generating some interest 
income and that's about all it was. 
Now, a couple of other points, Your Honor. With 
respect to the Special Provision language and the amendment 
language, where Mr. Snow intended very specific things to be 
amended or revoked, or I should say just revoked, he was very 
clear about that. For example, in the amendment, where he 
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the Trust. So we think Your Honor, at this point, there's 
really only one conclusion that Mrs. Womack received a life 
estate in the Guerdon mobile home. The Trust still owns the 
mobile home and she gets a life estate only. The mobile home 
should be placed so that it's titled in the name of the Trust 
and express acknowledgment to that effect, and actually Mrs. 
Womack has agreed it is an asset of the Trust. And we think, 
Your Honor, for safety sake, it needs to be titled in the name 
of the Trust and this Court needs to construe the Trust so that 
it's clear that Marsha Snow is a residuary beneficiary with 
respect to the mobile home first, and with respect to all othei 
Trust assets second. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
MR. ASTILL: Now, with respect to the arguments on 
the income issue, Your Honor. Principle and Income Act is 
pretty clear in this and there's nothing that's been argued or 
1 set forth before this Court including in the terms of the 
2 Trust, that would change how the Principle and Income Act 
3 should be applied. Income is income and where the fTrust says 
4 she gets the income, then that's what it is. We cannot, 
5 somehow, torturously, construe the Trust to say that I can use 
6 principle because I have the power as Trustee to say what is 
7 income and what is principle. That's ludicrous and it's not 
8 supported by any case law; not supported by the language of 
9 the Trust certainly and the language of the Trust in fact, 
10 makes it very clear that, in fact I want to refer the Court 
11 specifically to this, I believe it's Article VIII, Paragraph 5, 
12 which was referred to several times in Mrs. Walton's 
13 memorandum. It says there "To determine whether and to what 
14 extent receipts should be deemed income or principle," - that's 
15 on Page 11 of the Trust, Your Honor - "whether or to what 
16 extent expenditures should be charged against principle or 
17 income and what other adjustments should be made between 
18 principle and income, provided such adjustments do not conflict 
19 with well settled rules for the determination of principle and 
20 income questions." The Trustee just can't simply out of hand 
21 say "I'm going to call that income. I'm going to call that 
22 principle. I'm going to charge this expense to income. I'm 
23 going to charge this one to principle, because I can. The 
24 Trust says I can make those decisions." It cannot violate well 
25 settled rules for the determination of principle and income 
1 questions. And clearly, at this point, Your Honor, where 
2 there's very little income by Mrs. Womack's own admission, 
3 there's only $300 worth of income in the year that she's 
4 accounted for, there's no way that those kinds of expenses can 
5 be charged to income. So she's just, whatever she wants, she's 
6 charging to principle and it's undisputed that she has used 
7 that principle for her personal benefit. 
8 Now, Your Honor, the provision of the Trust says that 
9 she is entitled to income. Now, a lot of emphasis is placed on 
10 the second part of that language, Paragraph 3 of the Special 
11 Provisions in the amendment that says "Ruby shall have complete 
12 discretion in the use of the Trust Estate." Now, if Mr. Snow 
13 again, had wanted a Trust for Mrs. Womack that gave her 
14 complete and unfettered discretion for her personal use of the 
15 estate, he would have said it. Again, he has been very clear 
16 in the Catastrophic Illness Provision. He knew how to revoke 
17 that. Where he wanted Patricia Sprouse to have something - to 
18 not have something, he was able to do that and in Paragraph 2, 
19 where he wanted somebody to have something very specific and 
20 direct ownership, he was very clear. The 1995 custom van shall 
21 be distributed to Ruby Womack. He didn't have any trouble 
22 expressing his intent if he wanted somebody to have something 
23 absolutely. And in order to read the Trust the way MrS. Womack 
24 and Mrs. Walton want to read it, we have to assume that that 
25 language for discretionary use means she can do any darn thing 
1C 
1 she pleases, but he didn't really say that and it ignores the 
2 prior provisions of the Trust, so it can't be read consistent 
3 with that intent. 
4 In 75-7402 of the Code, Your Honor, "When the 
5 Trustee", the reference is made there to the broad discretion 
6 give to a Trustee. That's how we read and should read that 
7 Paragraph 3, is consistent with Utah law. Utah law says, "The 
8 Trustee can perform every act which a prudent man would perform 
9 for purposes of the Trust." Very very broad discretionary 
10 power. Section III of 75-7402 give exceptionally broad powers 
11 for investment and management of the Trust. So that's not 
12 inconsistent. Utah law is very consistent with that language 
13 with regard to the Trustee's discretion and how the Trust is 
14 administered, but it doesn't eliminate Paragraph 2 or Part 2 of 
15 that Section 402, it says that "The Trustee must act with due 
16 regard to the obligations of a fiduciary." And, Mr. Snow has 
17 not eliminated their responsibility and so Mrs. Womack, in her 
18 efforts to administer the Trust, has administered it for her 
19 personal benefit, period. In her view of this Trust, Your 
20 Honor, she is the sole beneficiary and the only person who is 
21 entitled to anything out of this Trust. Mr. Snow didn't say 
22 that. He said that she gets the income. He said she gets a 
23 life estate in the mobile home. She gets the van outright. 
24 She can do anything she wants with the van, but he didn't say 
25 "You have the unfettered, complete right to anything you want 
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1 with any assets of this Trust and there's nothing in here that 
2 would restrict that." That's not what he said. 
3 And again, Your Honor, as you review the language of 
4 this document consistent with all the prior provisions as 
5 muddled as it becomes, I think that's the only reasonable 
6 reading, is that she's an income beneficiary only of the assets 
7 of the Trust other than the mobile home and the mobile home has 
8 its own specific provisions for how long she can remain in that 
9 mobile home. And finally that Mrs. Snow is the residuary 
10 beneficiary of the mobile home and any other assets remaining 
11 in the Trust at death. 
12 Let me move next, Your Honor, to the non-exoneration 
13 issue. Mrs. Womack took money out of the Trust to pay off a 
14 debt that existed against the y9b van that was disposed of to 
15 her, it was specifically devised. Uniform Probate Code is very 
16 clear on that Your Honor, that any specific device passes 
17 property subject to a lien or debt, period. And the comments 
18 under that same section, make it clear that it's set up to 
19 establish a rule of construction against exoneration of debts 
20 and so Mrs. Womack took money from the Trust to exonerate a 
21 debt against the estate. We don't dispute that it was an 
22 estate debt, it clearly was, but it was a debt that was secured 
23 by the van, she was the specific (inaudible) of the van. 752-
24 609 very clearly says you don't exonerate the debt unless 
25 there's language that says so and there is no language that car 
12 
be pointed to. So we thinkf very clearly, Your Honor, at the 
very least, Mrs. Womack owes this Trust right now, $7,034.67 
plus interest because she misused funds of the Trust. 
Now, Your Honor, as we continue through some of these 
other issues, I think really the next big issue and it is 
relating to the -
THE COURT: What about the $17,000 used for the 
moving of the mobile home? 
MR. ASTILL: That's what I'm coming to, Your Honor. 
Mrs. Womack has, much like the exoneration of the debt issue 
has taken principle from the Trust and if the Trust is read as 
we construe it, Your Honor, she's not entitled to that 
principle. So she's now taken $17,000, approximately - we 
don't have an exact figure - and used it to move the mobile 
home to a new location. There's no basis for that in the Trust 
itself and again, it's not her personal Trust. It was created, 
she's clearly a beneficiary, we don't dispute that, but it 
doesn't give her, as the Trustee and a beneficiary, the sole 
right and power to spend money anyway she sees fit. She has to 
consider her fiduciary obligations to all beneficiaries 
including the residuary beneficiary, Mrs. Snow. 
Now, Your Honor, the attorney's fee is a similar 
issue. During the course of discovery we find that from the 
Trust, Mrs. Womack has spent over $10,000 now paying attorney's 
fees to defend herself for her misappropriation of Trust funds, 
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misuse of Trust funds and misconstruction of the Trust. Those 
are clearly Your Honor, personal obligations. In our reply 
memorandum we provided the Court with a case Ashton versus 
Ashtonf where it's very clear and that was a probate matter of 
course, but it provided there very clearly, that where a 
beneficiary is defending their claims, their rights, to Trust 
assets or estate assets, those are not appropriate 
administrative expenses. Those are personal expenses and fees 
cannot be allowed. And we're asking the Court to make Mrs. 
Womack, then account to the estate, account to the Trust for 
her personal use of Trust assets, including the payment of 
these fees and refund those funds back to the Trust. 
Now, let me address a couple of issues brought up in 
the Reply Memorandum. First of all, the argument was made that 
the amendment supercedes the Special Provisions only and so it 
was intended and meant to replace just the Special Provisions 
clauses of the Trust. Well, Your Honor, if you look at Page 8 
of the original Trust, that same language that Mrs. Womack is 
arguing, it says "These above Special Provisions supercede all 
others in this Trust." If that's true, then that same language 
should apply and so the Special Provisions language could only 
supercede Special Provisions language, which means it, doesn't 
modify the terms of Article III-B of the Trust. We'd be happy 
with that reading of the Trust, Your Honor. But I doa*t think 
it's fair or reasonable and I don't think that's correct. I'm 
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willing to admit from our own case law research that we think 
the Special Provisions govern, Nowf we've addressed the 
discretionary use of funds heref Your Honor. 
We think finally, let me just address one last point 
and that is with respect to the affidavits that were presented 
to this Court. As you review those affidavits, first of all, 
Your Honor, ultimately I will make an objection to this Court 
even hearing testimony from those witnesses because they were 
never identified. We've never had a chance to do discovery. 
Discovery is now cut off and suddenly we are, through this 
Reply Memorandum, we are informed of a dozen witnesses we've 
never heard of before, but even with that, Your Honor, if you 
look at the affidavits that are Exhibits 6 and 7 to the 
Opposition Memorandum, both of those relate to conversations 
held with Mr. Snow at least two or three years after the date 
that he executed his Trust. So even if they could be brought 
before this Court and the Court wanted to consider it, they 
can't have any relevance in determining what the intent of Mr. 
Snow was when he drafted the Trust, when he created the Trust 
and you'll note that neither one of those affiants indicated 
that they'd ever read the Trust document itself or had the 
document read to them Mr. Snow. So, he may have made some 
statements to them. I'm not even going to argue about that 
because we are here on a Summary Judgement Motion, but they're 
not relevant to determining his intent in 1995 when he executed 
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1 that amendment to the Special Provisions, and so we don't think 
2 those apply, Your Honor, or can even be read in conjunction 
3 with the construction of this document. 
4 Thank you, Your Honor. Are there any questions? 
5 THE COURT: I don't think so. Thank you, Mr. Astill. 
6 Ms. Walton? 
7 MS. WALTON: Your Honor, the first thing that I'd 
8 like to address to just get out of the way is the Petitioner's 
9 documents claim that the affidavits and several of the facts 
10 that have been alleged in our response to their motion for 
11 Summary Judgement is inadmissable and I just wanted to just 
12 briefly bring in the fact that we've done away with the Dead 
13 Man Statute here in the State of Utah in that Utah Rules of 
14 Evidence 601 CI allows us to bring in statement of a decedent 
15 if it's on personal Jaw ledger of the declarant at the time the 
16 manner was recently perceived. I believe the affidavits 
17 themselves address the requirements of that rule. That's also 
18 supported by Madis versus O'Leary. That having been addressed, 
19 I'd like to kind of, because we have a lot of different issues, 
20 I'm going to try and squeeze it down into about four or five 
21 arguments. 
22 Obviously we don't - and I'm sure it's no surprise 
23 agree on how the law is reading as far as our research goes. 
24 We're not here to really litigate whether or not Mr. Snow's 
25 documents are pretty. What I believe we are here to litigate 
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it is what his documents say. In my research this very issue, 
trusts are somewhat hesitantly compared to contracts and I 
believe the rule is that we have to go to the actual documents 
themselves to ascertain what the decedent's intent was. We are 
also allowed to look at the facts that are surrounding the 
decedent's life at the time the documents were created if that 
will help us to ascertain meaning, but I do believe it's 
important for us to stay on task and look at the actual 
documents themselves. 
The first thing that we know - first of all, I just 
have to kind of lodge an objection here about the continued use 
of some documents that we don't believe match the originals. 
With the Reply Memorandum that we submitted with the Court and 
with the original Court file, we have filed the decedent's 
original documents and the petitioner continues to use a set of 
documents that we disagree on if they even resemble the 
originals. The document that I attached, if you wouldn't mind 
Your Honor, looking
 fiat Page 8 of my exhibit, that's attached to 
the Memorandum in Opposition. 
THE COURT: Your Exhibit 1? 
MS. WALTON: Yes. Exhibit 1, down at the bottom 
there's some handwriting and obliterations on that. The very 
bottom of the document, that page has a strange notation that 
says 'void'. Throughout the discovery we haven't been ^ble to 




























discovery, we believe those marks were made by Richard Snow. 
So our position it that obviously that this particular page was 
meant to be done away with by the amendment. The amendment is 
Exhibit 2 and I have to strongly disagree that Mr. Snow didn't 
deal with the remainder issue and if we look to the facts that 
occurred at his time of life, it says in here that the 
remainder of the Trust (inaudible) in the amendment, shall be 
used by Ruby Womack with income and that she shall have 
complete discretion in the use of the Trust Estate. I believe 
the word 'remainder' in and of itself presents a conflict with 
Mr. Astill's argument in reading the Special Provisions in the 
original Trust. I believe that is our conflict and I believe 
that section, if we can't agree on what the decedent meant, 
then we can go look at Parole Evidence. But until then, I 
don't think that we can use Parole Evidence or even Rules of 
Construction to imply a meaning on Mr. Snow's documents. So as 
far as the other issues, we're going to come back to that very 
thing, I think that the documents need to be read as they are 
and given meaning as they are. 
Let me move on here to, we discussed the plain 
language of the documents and our position, Your Honor, is that 
we should use the four corners of the original Trust and the 
Amendment to determine what Mr. Snow meant. Only if there's 
ambiguous things can we go to Rules of Construction and Parole 
Evidence. 
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The Remainder Clause has been addressed. The word 
^remainder' can be no more obvious than it is. It says in here 
"Remainder in Trust to provide Ruby Womack with income." Now, 
we have a dispute here on the actual language and it's boiled 
down to actually English or grammar. It says here "the 
remainder of the Trust is" - again Your Honor, I'm looking at 
Exhibit 2 to my document, Paragraph 3 "the remainder of the 
Trust Estate shall be held in Trust to provide Ruby Womack with 
income." Obviously we have two different interpretations of 
that. Ruby Womack believed she was to be provided with income. 
She lived together with the decedent. They were life partners. 
They had a romance for years. She took care of him through 
thick and thin and we believe that he meant to provide her with 
income and it was to be in her discretion. Now, if there's 
going to be an ambiguity in the word ^income' then we get to 
look to Parole Evidence. I don't believe that we have any 
evidence that's even been submitted by Marsha Snow. There 
isnrt one affidavit or one fact that's been put into evidence 
that she knows that her dad meant something different. There's 
no fact whatsoever from Marsha Snow in fact, with the motion 
for Summary Judgment or the Reply. 
Then, I'd like to talk Your Honor, I believe the 
document also itself, should be what we look to when we talk 
about the other issues. Paying the decedent's debt. Now, I 
was kind of surprised this morning, to hear Mr. Astill admit he 
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1 had a hard time seeing this along the way is that there is no 
2 dispute that the van is the debt of the estate. In all of the 
3 pleadings that they've submitted to you, Your Honor, they have 
4 claimed that the van debt, is Ruby's debt and the fact of the 
5 matter is - if I can just take you to Exhibit 9, I have 
6 enclosed and subpoenaed the documents that came from Larry H. 
7 Miller where the decedent bought the van and it will clearly 
8 show that it was a debt of Richard Snow's. I put those 
9 documents here, Your Honor, so that you could see by the terms 
10 of this contract that if this van debt wasn't paid off, you 
11 better believe that these people are going to come in and repo 
12 this van and make it be paid by the estate. 
13 Then I'd like to take and compare, let's go back to 
14 the Trust, Exhibit 1, and this is back on Page 11, and what I'd 
15 like to read is Paragraph 7 on there. This section is a lead 
16 in and I don't know, Your Honor, if you've read the whole Trust 
17 or just the parts that we've pointed out. Page 10 Article VIII 
18 is Powers of Trustees. It says in Article VII, "The Trustees 
19 of Richard Snow's Trust have the power to renew, assign, alter, 
20 extend, compromise, release, with or without consideration or 
21 submit to arbitration or litigation, obligations or claims held 
22 by or asserted against the undersigned." So it was completely 
23 within Ruby's discretion to pay off a contract that the 
24 undersigned owed. The undersigned being Richard Snow. The 
25 contract was with Richard Snow and it was completely within her 
20 
discretion and our position, Your Honor, is that we have to 
look at what his document said before we even go to the 
Statute. The Statute also supports our position that the 
Trustees have the right to pay claims. But we believe the 
documents should take precedence in that. 
The documents said that Ruby didn't have the 
discretion to pay attorney's fees. This has been made to look 
at like the attorney's fees that Ruby has paid are a debt of 
Ruby's. But if we look back to the very beginning of this law 
suit which by the way, was filed well before any of these fees 
were incurred. The only issue when Marsha filed this law suit 
was the van issue. The document itself also allows in paragrah 
11, or page 11, paragraph 6 to delegate powers to agents 
including attorneys and to remunerate them and pay their 
expenses. Again, the document that Ruby is working with has 
told her she has the ability to pay those fees. And if I'm not 
mistaken, the Petition that started this whole law suit is a 
petition for removal of Trustees for things that a Trustee did 
wrong and I don't see how that can be contorted into Ruby's own 
personal expenses. I believe the documents should prevail in 
that respect. 
We believe that the document also - there's one more 
thing I'd like to point out that is also kind of a grammatical 
issue that opposing Counsel has, I think, misstated. Page 11 
































doesn't have the right to dip into principle and say what's 
income and expenses because she's bound by the Rules of 
Principle and Income which goes to our Utah State Principle and 
Income Rules. But I want to just look at the paragraph and cut 
apart that paragraph really carefully. It says that Ruby as 
"Trustee has the right to determine whether and to what extent 
receipts should be deemed income or principle, whether to or to 
what extent expenditures should be charged against principle or 
income, and what other adjustments should be made between 
principle and income provided the adjustments do not conflict 
with (inaudible) Rules of Income and Principle. The principle 
and income question does not relate, we believe, to her extent 
to determine what expenditures should be charged to income or 
principle and that when she read this, she thought that she was 
fully within her right as trustee to move the mobile home. 
We're dealing here with a sixty-eight year old woman who is not 
capable of working and she believed that Richard, her life 
mate, set this Trust up to take care of her for the rest of her 
life, and so she believed it was well within her rights. And 
in fact, in the depositions, Marsha Snow - and I put this an 
exhibit, Your Honor, and this is exhibit, I believe number 10 
up on Paragraph 15, this is Marsha Snow talking about the 
decedent's comments, "He also told me that I could move the 
home and I could do whatever I wanted to do with it. He said 
there was sufficient money in the account for me to move the 
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home if I chose to or leave it there." So I think that from 
the statements of the Petitioner herselff that there is not 
question that Richard Snow meant that it would be okay for the 
mobile home to be moved. And I realize that Counsel is trying 
to say that we took that out of context but what I'm saying is 
that it was even in the petitioner's eyes, something that her 
father, the decedent anticipated that was okay for the trustee 
to do because what I believe what she was talking about was a 
period of time when she was still the trustee. However, we get 
down the years several years, and Mr. Snow amends his Trust and 
makes Ruby Womack the trustee; but I still don't see any reason 
why the current trustee wouldn't have had the powers that 
Marsha believed she had when she was the trustee. 
One of the final things that I would like to do is 
that I believe that the case that opposing counsel, the Ashton 
case that he was talking about saying that it is inappropriate 
to use attorney's fees and charge them as administrative 
expenses. I believe this case could be distinguished. In the 
Ashton case, the surviving wife had a claim against the estate. 
She was a claimant against the estate, a creditor's claim. She 
wanted the attorney's fees to be paid out of the estate and the 
Court of Appeals told her that she couldn't do that. 
In our documents, Your Honor, I have shown a Supreme 
Court case that says that if you're sued as a Trustee and the 
documents says that you can, Sunquist versus Sunquist 639P says 
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1 that Mthe Trustee may also prosecute or defend actions, claims, 
2 or proceedings for the protection of the trust assets and of 
3 the trustee in the performance of his duties." We believe, 
4 Your Honor that the documents should prevail, that we are under 
5 responsibility to Mr. Snow to make sure that the document, what 
6 he said in the document prevails. 
7 There are several issues of fact that are presented 
8 as evidence in this. First of all, we have issues of fact even 
9 in the fact that the petitioner continues to say that the 
10 misappropriated monies are personal debts of the decedent's and 
11 I hope that we've illustrated that they are legitimately Trust 
12 expenses authorized by the Trust. 
13 The other thing that we've hoped to show is that 
14 there's a dispute of fact in the evidence in the parole 
15 evidence. If we're going to go beyond four corners of the 
16 Trust and the Amendment, then we get to bring in evidence, 
17 parole evidence, to say what Mr. Snow meant and we did that. 
18 Now, Mr. Astill has led you to believe that we have 
19 withheld or something of our witnesses, but I'll have you know 
20 that not one time during the depositions - and he's deposed my 
21 client twice - did they ask us who our witnesses were going to 
22 be and if we knew anybody who had discussions or knowledge of 
23 Mr. Snow's estate plan. We do have those witnesses. We put 
24 them in our witness list, but under no circumstances were they 
25 withheld to be dishonest in any way. 
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1 Your Honor, we believe that our document speaks for 
2 itself and that it's very important for us and this Court to 
3 read and use the documents before we look to Rules of 
4 Construction. We've been quoted Rules of Construction for 
5 wills. Those would be helpful if we didn't know what the 
6 document says, but we can't legally go beyond the words of the 
7 document and construct what we think Richard meant especially 
8 because there are severe issues that of fact with that are 
9 inappropriate for summary judgment. Thank you. 
10 THE COURT: Thank you Ms. Walton? 
11 Briefly Mr. Astill? 
12 MR. ASTILL: Yes, Your Honor. I am very much 
13 confused by Ms. Walton's statement that we continue to use 
14 documents that do not resemble the original. The documents 
15 that we presented to the Court were documents that were 
16 provided to us by Mrs. Womack and through the course of 
17 depositions, I think we determined, that there were some 
18 numbers that were on pages that were missing in those copies 
19 but that otherwise the text was the same. I just represent to 
20 the Court here today that the text is exactly the same >vnd I 
21 don't understand that statement but I just want to clarify 
22 I that. 
I think it's true, Your Honor we need to understand 
I how we define remainder and who it applies to and I think our 
2|5 I argument stands on that. 
r\ 
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THE COURT: Let me ask you a question, Mr. Astill. 
MR. ASTILL: Yes. 
THE COURT: As to the van, if I buy your 
interpretation, then Ms. Womack was entitled to that van and 
your case law would indicate she's entitled to the van and she 
takes all the liens and whatever is left owing on it and it's 
her responsibility to pick it up. 
MR. ASTILL: That's correct. 
THE COURT: Her responsibility personally? 
MR. ASTILL: Correct. Subject to. So in other words 
she's entitled to the equity value of that van, okay? 
THE COURT: But Ms. Walton brings up a point, whether 
or not that is an indebtedness that eventually is going to be 
jpicked up by the estate one way or the other. I mean it's kind 
of an inevitability argument that she's saying. That while 
Womack may have paid it at $7500, eventually it was going to be 
paid by the estate anyway based upon the position that this was 
an estate property. 
MR. ASTILL: Right, and I think that's the fallacy 
Your Honor, in the Code Section that's referred to specifically 
addresses that issue. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
MR. ASTILL: It says, If I can find it quickly, Your 
Honor, so that we... (Inaudible). Okay, 75-2609 says, "A 
specific device passes subject to any security interest 
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1 existing at the date of death without right of exoneration 
2 regardless of the general directive in the will to pay debts.'' 
3 What we have here is a Trust with that same general directive 
4 to pay the debts. And so the statute is saying, Your Honor, it 
5 disposes of the asset and, yes, if Your Honor, if the equity 
6 value of that asset were insufficient to satisfy the obligation 
7 then I have no problem with the concept that that falls, that 
8 debt, that excess debt falls back to the estate. But to adopt 
9 Mrs. Walton argument would really throw out the non-exoneration 
10 statute and that's not the intent and the comment provides that 
11 it's a statute, a Rule of Construction against exoneration and 
12 it goes on in the comments to 609 "unless the will indicates to 
13 the contrary, a specific (inaudible) of a mortgage property 
14 takes subject to the lien without right to have other assets 
15 apply to discharge the secured obligation." So very clearly, 
16 wherever there's a secured obligation, Your Honor, not a 
17 general claim, not a general debt of the estate, a specifically 
18 secured obligation and somebody is specifically devised that 
19 asset, they have to use that asset to pay that debt and it's 
20 not exonerated by the estate itself so that they don't get it 
21 free and clear. 
22 THE COURT: What would the language be that, that 
23 would be covered by the estate (inaudible)? 
24 MR. ASTILL: Well, if I were doing it, Your Honor, 
25 and I said I hereby specifically devise the 1995 Chevy van to 
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Ruby Womack, I'd say and I direct my trustee to repay any 
indebtedness secured by the van. If you understand the non-
exoneration statute, that's what you have to do. 
THE COURT: Right. Okay. 
MR. ASTILL: Your Honor, I think we can all agree 
that there's no ambiguity as to what is meant by income and Ms. 
Walton says Mrs. Womack gets the income. What we don't agree 
on is the argument that Mrs. Womack, because she's the trustee 
and because she's given broad discretion, can call anything 
income and anything principle she wants and charge anything to 
income and chaige anything to principle she wants, just 
because. That's not consistent with the case law or the 
13 I statutes. Mrs. Walton also argues that we have to look at the 
14 four corners of the original Trust. I don't disagree with 
15 that, that's what we're here today to do and we shouldn't apply 
16 Rules of Construction. The Rules of Construction are meant to 
17 construe these documents. They've been adopted over many 
18 years. 
19 Your Honor, with respect to the attorney's fees let 
20 me address the Ashton case. The Ashton case was specifically 
21 about a disagreement among the heirs including Mrs. Ashton as 
22 to how the will should be construed and how the assets should 
23 be disposed of. Now because she was the personal 
24 representative and trustee, she wanted to be paid because it 
25 I was in her mind as in Mrs. Womack's, her duty to construe the 
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1 trust, but the Courts are very clear on this, Your Honor, if 
2 this construction, contest, if this contest about how to 
3 dispose of assets is trying to decide who gets the benefits, 
4 this beneficiary or this beneficiary, that is not a trust 
5 expense, that's an expense that relates solely to the benefits 
6 ' of that beneficiary. 
7 Let me address the comment that Marsha Snow was 
8 talking to the decedent and related in her deposition he said I 
9 could move the mobile home. Your Honor, the only reason that 
10 that is, is that Marsha Snow would have been the ultimate 
11 residuary beneficiary. She would have owned everything. She 
12 could have done anything. Her Dad is telling her there's 
13 plenty of money, you can move it, you can do whatever you want 
14 to, or you can leave it here and pay rent here, whatever you 
15 choose to do, that has nothing to do with a life estate given 
16 to Mrs. Womack, she's the ultimate residuary beneficiary. 
17 Now, with respect to our original petition, Your 
18 Honor, it was originally brought for the very reason that I've 
19 shown this Court, the non-exoneration problem. Mrs. Womack 
20 originally paid off that debt which she shouldn't have. When 
21 we advised counsel of that, they said no, we disagree with you, 
22 we're going to let her do it. And then we find out through 
23 discovery, she's taken principle from the Trust, $17,000, then 
24 we find out through discovery she's got over $10,000 in 
25 attorney's fees, fighting about what? Not whether the Trust is 
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1 being properly administered but whether or not she gets this or 
2 she gets that and who gets what. And the whole thing is, she's 
3 misusing the Trust funds for her to be able to take and keep 
4 those attorney's fees in that instance is just inappropriate. 
5 Your Honor, there is no dispute of fact relating to 
6 the construction of this document or the issues we've brought 
7 before the Court today. Thank you. 
8 THE COURT: Mr. Astill, thank you. 
9 I've had opportunity to review the pleadings and I 
10 appreciate the good briefing on and I think that this deals 
11 with matters of law and not fact disputes. When I review what 
12 the original Trust said, regardless of whether or not there are 
13 some questions as to what the original Trust said, there is no 
14 disagreement as to what the amendment says. The amendment 
15 indicates that Ruby Womack may live in the mobile home, 
16 Guerdon, as long as she desires, until she marries or dies. So 
17 she can say there as long as she lives at the outside. If she 
18 re-marries, she will no longer have that and if she doesn't 
19 want to live there, she doesn't have that. So that's pretty 
20 clear to me that the very best she gets a life estate with 
21 certain provisions that would cut it down: number one, her lack 
22 of intent; number two, until she remarries. I don't see any 
23 inconsistency even if I look at the original Trust paragraph, 
24 although the original Trust paragraph said more, there is no 
25 inconsistency with what the amendment, in my mind says, H S to 
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what the original Trust said. 
There is no issue of material fact and I do not 
accept the position claimed by Womack that she is entitled to a 
revisionary interest, that is not supported by the language. 
Going to the Special Provisions, she is to, Marsha -
excuse me - the remainder shall be divided among the decedent's 
surviving children after everything is said and done with Ruby 
Womack. The remainder provides that the remainder of the Trust 
Estate shall be held in Trust to provide Ruby Womack with 
income. The amendment specifically provides that the assets 
were to be held in Trust and not given outright to Womack. The 
revision will go to the surviving children. As I understand 
it, Ms. Snow is the only surviving child. The other sister has 
died, so that's the only surviving heir and so she would be 
entitled to the revisionary aspect of it; however Ruby Womack 
will be allowed to have the income form the Trust. 
Now, in my mind, income is income and while I 
understand the position taken by Ms. Walton that I do not need 
to look at statutory or constructive rules, that's exactly what 
I would have to do in order to aid me in the construction of 
these legal terms. In doing that, the Court finds that income 
is defined as the return in money or property derived from the 
use of principle as stated in Utah Code 223-4 Sub 1, that 
merely says that she's entitled to the income. 
In sum, my analysis would conclude that when the 
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Trust and the amendment are read in conjunction with the 
definition of income, it is clear that Womack is entitled only 
to the income generated from the principle of the Trust, not 
the principle and no revisionary claim as to anything remaining 
in the Trust related to the income and with that, while I at 
first blush, Ms. Walton's argument seems to be reasonable as to 
the debts of the van, specifically, I have to read that in 
conjunction to the non-exoneration of provision as well as the 
code section cited to me by Mr. Astill. In that way the Court 
finds most importantly what was not said, and it was not said 
that the van would be subject, would be given to her free and 
clear with all expenses to be paid by the estate. It didn't 
say that and when it didn't say that then I just have to look 
at what the application of what wasn't said, and referring to 
the code section, the Court is convinced that the debt against 
the Trust, while Womack's claim that the debt both for the 
$17,000 or so1 moving of the mobile home and the decedent's van 
was against the Trust, is without merit in light of the 
analysis that I've just explained. 
Now, as to the attorney's fees I fall squarely in 
line with the interpretation of Ashton v. Ashton. The Court 
did have opportunity to review that case and finds that 
pursuant to the Court in Ashton indicating that the expenses 
were incurred and her attorney's fees in her role as a claimanl 
with interest that conflicts with other heirs to the estate no1 
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as a personal representative of the estate. And in this case, 
Womack incurred attorney's fees and other expenses in her role 
as a beneficiary and cannot not assert these as expenses of the 
Trust. So for those reasons and I think I've come down almost 
on fours, if not on all fours, with Mr. Astill's decision, the 
motion for Partial Summary Judgment is granted. 
Mr. Astill, please be so kind as to draft up the 
appropriate documents in this matter. 
With that ruling, does that leave us with anything 
for the hearing that is scheduled for the 8th of August? 
MR. ASTILL: Your Honor, if I - with that ruling, I 
believe what it would leave is for Mrs. Womack to provide us 
with an exact accounting for money she has spent from the Trust 
which she has still not provided to us. 
THE COURT: And with this ruling, the Trust is 
entitled to have that. 
MR. ASTILL: So I guess the hearing in that date 
would just be about how much she has spent and than a judgment 
could be rendered on the exact amount of the figures. 
THE COURT: Well, and you all talk to see if that 
hearing is even necessary. I will keep it on the calendar 
subject to you all calling my clerk and telling her it's not 
needed. Thank you very much. The court's in recess. 
(Whereupon the hearing was concluded.) 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE OF 
RICHARD D. SNOW, DECEASED, AND ; 
THE RICHARD D. SNOW FAMILY 
TRUST, ; 
) FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
) CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
) Probate No. 993900093 EF 
) Judge Glenn K. Iwasaki 
This matter having come before the Court pursuant to cross-motions for summary judgment 
filed by Marcia L. Snow, the sole surviving child of the decedent, and Ruby Womack, the personal 
representative of the decedent's estate. After receiving cross-motions for summary judgment and 
memoranda in support thereof, a hearing was held on this matter on February 14, 2000. Marcia L. 
Snow was represented by Dennis M. Astill and Ruby Womack was represented by Robyn Rowe-
Walton. The Court, having reviewed the record on file, received evidence and argument from the 
parties, and being fully advised, makes the following findings of fact and conclusions of law. 
FILES DISTRICT COURT 
Third Judicial District 
^ - > A P R 1 7 2000 
By 
^ SALT LAKE COUNTY 
Deputy Clerk 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. The signed and notarized Inventory filed by Ruby Womack unequivocally states that 
the Estate of Richard D. Snow is comprised of assets valued in at least the amount of $44,000, 
comprised of a Guredon mobile home (valued at $35,000) and a van (valued at $9,000). 
2. On July 14,1999, Ms. Snow made a claim of exempt property under Utah Code Ann. 
§75-2-403. 
3. There is no surviving spouse of the Richard D. Snow Estate. 
4. On July 30, 1999, Ms. Womack denied Ms. Snow's Petition for Exempt Property. 
5. Elased upon the Inventory of Ms. Womack, the property received by Ms. Snow did 
not have a value of$5,000, the Inventory specifying that the property had little or no value. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. Utah Code Ann. §75-3-803 is not applicable because a claim for an exempt property 
allowance is an entitlement. 
2. As there is no surviving spouse of the Richard D. Snow Estate, the children of the 
decedent are entitled to an exempt property allowance. 
3. The exempt property allowance applicable to the decedent's estate is $5,000. 
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4. The Richard D. Snow Estate has sufficient assets to pay the $5,000 exempt property 
allowance. 
5. Based upon the Petition of Marcia L. Snow, she is entitled to the full amount of the 
exempt property allowance, i.e. the sum of $5,000. 
DATED this/ /day ofSSIsh, 2000. 
BY THE COURT 
District Court Judge 
Approved as to form: 
Robyn Rowe-Walton 
Attorneys for Ruby Womack 
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ORDER 
1. Marcia L. Snow's Motion for Summary Judgment is granted. 
2. Ruby Womack, as personal representative of the decedent's estate, is ordered to pay 
to Marcia L. Snow the amount of $5,000, as the exempt property allowance for the decedent's estate. 
lis / d . 
BY THE 
DATED th i day of 
4_ 
72000. 
District Court Judge 
Approved as to form: 
Robyn Rowe-Walton 
Attorneys for Ms. Ruby Womack 
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